All that I ever defigned upon this argument, was to make out the credibility of the thing from the authority of the holy fcriptures, without defcending to a more particular explication of it than the fcripture hath given us; left, by endeavouring to lay the difficulties which are already started about it, new ones fhould be raised, and fuch as may perhaps be much harder to be removed than those which we have now to grapple withal. And this, I hope, I have in fome measure done in one of the former difcourfes, [Ser. 44.]. Nor indeed do I fee, that it is any wife neceffary to do more; it being fufficient, that God hath declared what he thought fit in this matter; and that we do firmly believe what he fays concerning it to be true, though we do not perfectly comprehend the meaning of all that he hath said about it.

For in this, and the like cafes, I take an implicit faith to be very commendable; that is, to believe whatever we are fufficiently affured God hath revealed, though we do not fully understand his meaning in fuch a revelation. And thus every man who believes the holy fcriptures to be a truly divine revelation, does implicitly believe a great part of the prophetical books of fcripture, and several obfcure expreffions in thofe books, though he do not particularly understand the meaning of all the predictions and expreffions contained in them. In like manner, there are certainly a great many very good Chriftians, who do not believe and comprehend the myfteries of faith nicely enough to approve themselves to a fcholaftical and magifterial judge of controverfies, who yet, if they do heartily embrace the doctrines which are clearly revealed in fcripture, and live up to the plain precepts of the Chriftian religion, will, I doubt not, be very well approved by the great and juft, and by the infallibly infallible judge of the world.

3. Let it be further confidered, that though neither the word Trinity, nor perhaps perfon, in the fenfe in which it is ufed by divines when they treat of this mystery, be any where to be met with in fcripture; yet it cannot be denied, but that three are there fpoken of by the names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, in whofe name every Chriftian is baptized, and to each of whom the highest titles and properties of God are in fcripture attri

buted.

buted; and these three are spoken of with as much diftinction from one another as we use to speak of three feveral perfons.

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So that though the word Trinity be not found in fcripture, yet these three are there exprefsly and frequently mentioned and a trinity is nothing but three of any thing. And fo likewife, though the word perfon be not there expressly applied to Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft; yet it will be very hard to find a more convenient word whereby to exprefs the diftinction of thefe three. For which reafon I could never yet fee any juft caufe to quar. rel at this term. For fince the Holy Spirit of God, in fcripture, hath thought fit, in speaking of these three, to distinguish them from one another, as we use in common fpeech to diftinguifh three feveral perfons, I cannot fee any reason why, in the explication of this mystery, which purely depends upon divine revelation, we should not fpeak of it in the fame manner as the fcripture doth : and though the word perfon is now become a term of art, I fee no cause why we fhould decline it, fo long as we mean by it neither more nor less than what the fcripture fays in other words.

4. It deferves further to be confidered, that there hath been a very ancient tradition concerning three real differences or diftinctions in the divine nature; and thefe, as I faid before, very nearly refembling the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Whence this tradition had its original, is not easy, upon good and certain grounds, to fay. But certain it is, that the Jews anciently had this notion; and that they did diftinguish the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit of God, from him who was abfolutely called God, and whom they looked upon as the first principle of all things: as is plain from Philo Judæus, and Mofes Nachmanides, and others, cited by the learned Grotius, in his incomparable book of the truth of the Chriftian religion, book 5.

And, among the Heathen, Plato, who probably e nough might have this notion from the Jews, did make three diftinctions in the Deity, by the names of Effential Goodnefs, and Mind, and Spirit.

So that whatever objections this matter may be liable VOL. III.

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to, it is not fo peculiar a doctrine of the Christian religion as many have imagined, though it is revealed by it with much more clearness and certainty; and, confequently, neither the Jews nor Plato have any reason to object it to us Chriftians; efpecially fince they pretend no other ground for it, but either their own reason, or an ancient tradition from their fathers: whereas we Chriftians do appeal to express divine revelation for what we believe in this matter, and do believe it fingly upon that

account.

5. It is befides very confiderable, that the fcriptures do deliver this doctrine of the Trinity without any manner of doubt or queftion concerning the unity of the divine nature; and not only fo, but do most stedfastly and conftantly affert, that there is but one God. And in thofe very texts in which these three differences are mentioned, the unity of the divine nature is exprefsly af ferted; as where St John makes mention of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, the unity of thefe three is likewife affirmed: There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit; and these three are

one.

6. It is yet further confiderable, that from this myftery, as delivered in fcripture, a plurality of gods cannot be inferred, without making the fcripture grossly to contradict itfelf; which I charitably fuppofe the Socinians would be as loth to admit as we ourselves are. And if either councils, or fathers, or schoolmen, have fo explained this mystery, as to give any juft ground, or fo much as a plaufible colour, for fuch an inference, let the blame fall where it is due, and let it not be charged on the holy fcriptures; but rather, as the Apostle fays in another cafe, let God be true, and every man a liar.

7. And lastly, I defire it may be confidered, that it is not repugnant to reafon, to believe fome things which are incomprehenfible by our reafon; provided that we have fufficient ground and reafon for the belief of them; efpecially if they be concerning God, who is in his nature incomprehenfible; and we be well affured that he hath revealed them. And therefore it ought not to offend us, that thefe differences in the Deity are incomprehenfible by our finite understandings; becaufe the di

vine nature itself is fo, and yet the belief of that is the foundation of all religion.

There are a great many things in nature which we cannot comprehend how they either are, or can be: As the continuity of matter; that is, how the parts of it do hang fo faft together, that they are many times very hard to be parted; and yet we are fure that it is fo, be-cause we fee it every day. So likewife, how the fmall feeds of things contain the whole form and nature of the things from which they proceed, and into which by degrees they grow; and yet we plainly fee this every year.

There are many things likewife in ourfelves, which no man is able in any measure to comprehend, as to the manner how they are done and performed: As the vital union of foul and body. Who can imagine by what device or means a fpirit comes to be fo clofely united and fo firmly linked to a material body, that they are not to be parted without great force and violence offered to nature? The like may be faid of the operations of our feveral faculties of fenfe and imagination, of memory and reafon, and especially of the liberty of our wills and yet we certainly find all these faculties in ourselves, tho' we cannot either comprehend or explain the particular manner in which the feveral operations of them are performed.

And if we cannot comprehend the manner of those operations which we plainly perceive and feel to be in ourfelves, much lefs can we expect to comprehend things without us; and leaft of all can we pretend to compre hend the infinite nature and perfections of God, and every thing belonging to him. For God himself is certainly the greatest mystery of all other, and acknowledged by mankind to be, in his nature, and in the particular manner of his existence, incomprehenfible by human understanding. And the reafon of this is very evident; becaufe God is infinite, and our knowledge and underftanding is but finite: and yet no fober man ever thought this a good reafon to call the being of God in queftion.

The fame may be faid of God's certain knowledge of future contingencies, which depend upon the uncertain wills of free agents; it being utterly inconceivable, how

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any understanding, how large and perfect foever, can certainly know beforehand that which depends upon the free will of another, which is an arbitrary and uncertain caufe.

And yet the fcripture doth not only attribute this foreknowledge to God, but gives us alfo plain inftances of God's foretelling fuch things, many ages before they happened, as could not come to pass but by the fins of men; in which we are fure that God can have no hand, though nothing can happen without his permiffion. Such was that most memorable event of the death of Christ, who, as the fcripture tells us, was by wicked hands crucified and flain and yet even this is faid to have happened according to the determinate foreknowledge of God; and was punctually foretold by him fome hundreds of years before. Nay, the fcripture doth not only afcribe this power and perfection to the divine knowledge, but natural reafon hath been forced to acknowledge it; as we may fee in fome of the wifeft of the philofophers. And yet it would puzzle the greatest philofopher that ever was, to give any tolerable account how any knowledge whatfoever can certainly and infallibly foresee an event through uncertain and contingent caufes. All the reaLonable fatisfaction that can be had in this matter is this, that it is not all unreafonable to fuppofe, that infinite knowledge may have ways of knowing things, which our finite understandings can by no means comprehend how they can poffibly be known.

Again, there is hardly any thing more inconceivable, than how a thing should be of itself, and without any cause of its being and yet our reafon compels us to acknowledge this; becaufe we certainly fee, that fomething is, which muft either have been of itself, and without a caufe, or elfe fomething that we do not fee must have been of itfelf, and have made all other things. And by this reafoning, we are forced to acknowledge a Deity; the mind of man being able to find no reft, but in the acknowledgement of one eternal and wife mind, as the principle and firft caufe of all other things and this principle is that which mankind do by general confent call God. So that God hath laid a fure foundation of

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