Secondly, By what Means Chrift perfected their Redemption and Salvation.

The first Question is, What Reason have we to believe that Men were Sinners, and ftood in Need of Pardon?

It is a Saying of St. Auftin's, Si non periiffet Homo, non veniffet Chriftus; If Man had not fallen, Chrift had not come: And our Lord fpeaks to the fame Senfe, when he tells us, The Son of Man is come to feek and to fave that which was loft: And his Answer to those who reproached him with converfing with Publicans and Sinners ftands upon the fame Ground; They that are whole need not a Phyfician, but they that are fick. Had Man continued in Innocence, the Religion of Nature would have anfwered all the Ends of his Creation: He wanted no Redeemer in his natural State; for it would be abfurd to fuppofe that Christ came to redeem Man from the State and Condition in which God made him. After the Works of the Creation were finished, God liked them all, and faw every thing that he had made; and behold it was very good: In this State therefore nothing was wanting to the Perfection of the Creature: God was pleased with all his Works, and with Man efpecially, to whom

he gave Dominion over the rest of the World. In this State therefore there was no Want of a Reconciler between God and Man; nor would there ever have been any fuch Want, had this happy State continued.

That Innocence and Virtue fhall be rewarded, Guilt and Iniquity punished, is no more than what natural Senfe and Reason have always taught the confidering Part of Mankind: For the Voice of Reason and of the Law are in this Respect the fame, This do, and thou shalt live. And though Man is altered and changed, yet the Nature of Things is ftill the fame; and he is no ill Reafoner, who, from the abftracted Confideration of Virtue and Vice, concludes, that Virtue has a juft Title to Reward, and Vice deferves Punishment: And it is no Wonder that they who argue upon these general Views only, should imagine, that moral Virtue may ftill exalt a Man to all the Degrees of Happiness that his Nature is capable of.

In the celebrated Question concerning the Merit of good Works, there has arose much Confufion, for Want of distinguishing between good Works, fimply and in their own

Nature

Nature confidered, and confidered as done or performed by the Sons of Men. The firft is a fingle Question; Whether Virtue in its own Nature has a Title to Reward ? And who will deny it: For as fure as God is juft, as fure as there is a Difference between Good and Evil, he will, he must reward the one, and punish the other. But when you afk, Whether the good Works of Men deferve and merit Reward? ⚫ you ftrangely alter the State of the Question; for here not only the Nature of good Works, but the Nature and Condition of Man must be confidered too. If he has already concluded himself, if Sentence is gone out against him, and his Cafe be irretrievable, your Question must be impertinent; because you afk, Whether he, who is already under Condemnation for his evil Works, may be rewarded for his good Works?

Put the Cafe, that a Man ten Years ago committed a fecret and barbarous Murder; that fince he has lived in an unblameable Submiffion and Obedience to the Government: Afk then the Queftion, Whether Submiffion and Obedience to the Government have a Right and Title to Protection and Defence in Life and Fortune? Every

Man

But ask again,

Man will anfwer, Yes. Whether this Man's Obedience and Submiffion have the fame Right and Title? Every Man will anfwer, No: Because the Villainy committed long fince puts him out of Protection of the Government, and Justice is ftill indebted to him for the horrid Fact; and whenever it meets him will execute upon him Wrath and Vengeance.

I intend not to prefs this Inftance to a Parallel with our Cafe: But thus much, at leaft, it fhews, That Virtue and Morality may, in their own Nature, and in themfelves confidered, deferve Reward from a juft and righteous Being; and yet the Virtue and Morality of Man may not deserve it. And this is the parting Point between the Patrons of Natural and Revealed Religion; the not confidering which has made some imagine, that, whilst we defend the Authority of Revelation, we give up the Principles of Reafon and Nature. Is there not, fay they, an effential Difference between Virtue and Vice? True, there is. Is not Justice the Attribute of God; and must not a just God reward Virtue, and punish Vice? True ftill. Is not this then, fay they, a sufficient Foundation for Religion, without recurring

to

to Grace and Faith, or Miracles, or Myfteries? True, it is, where native Innocence is preserved, where Religion is res integra: But what will you fay of those who have already offended? Confult your Principles of Reason; the Voice of Nature is, that Vice must be 'punished: If fo, all that Offenders, all that Sinners can expect from Natural Religion is the just Reward of their Sins and Offences: And whether thefe are fuch Terms and Conditions as fhould endear Natural Religion to Sinners, Common Sense fhall judge.

Were Christianity to be preached to a new Race of Men, created without Spot of Sin, or Stain of Guilt, they might well wonder at the Conditions of Faith and Repentance; at the Doctrine of Salvation by the Righteousness of Chrift, and not by their own; and that their Happiness should depend not upon their own Works, but upon the free Grace and Promife of God: They might well afk, Why should God make that a Matter of free Grace and Promise, which must be the neceffary Effect and Confequence of his Juftice? Why may we not be faved by our own Righteousness, fince Righteousness has a natural Claim to Happiness?