CHAPTER II

THE VOTER AND THE PARTY

In the previous lecture I pointed out that I considered the first duty of the voter in matters of public policy to be the securing of adequate knowledge. I also tried to point out some of the difficulties which confront the voter in getting accurate information. I fear that I left you in a somewhat unsatisfactory state of mind and that you felt from what I said that the problem of intelligent, conscientious action is well-nigh insoluble for even the educated voter if he is obliged to equip himself to pass upon the details of every piece of legislation. Our system of government is, however, on the one hand a system of representative government and, on the other hand, a system of party government. By representative government we mean that instead of the voters, who have the ultimate power, directly legislating according to their immediate desires, they delegate this function to representatives whom they elect by their votes and whom,

presumably, they trust to represent either their own interests or the interests of the community as a whole. By party government we mean that such representatives are divided into party groups, each group representing a particular policy regarding each great public question and acting as a coherent body to carry out a party program.

Since, therefore, under our present system the voter is, in general, not called upon to vote directly upon important legislative measures, his problem becomes a secondary one; namely, that he shall choose the proper representative to voice his views or shall make the right choice between political parties to whom is entrusted the carrying out of measures of this kind. There are various problems connected with the mutual relations between the voter and his representative, the voter and his party, and the representative and his party, which I shall consider in succeeding lectures. What I want to point out here is that under a representative and party government the moral responsibility of the voter is primarily in the intelligent choice of leaders whom he will

follow rather than in the acquisition of technical knowledge on each measure of public importance. Even in making such a choice, however, he can only do so conscientiously by having some intelligent opinion on at least the principles which he wishes to see enacted into legislation, even if he is content to leave the details to others. Consequently, he cannot escape the moral obligation of hard thinking and careful study to which I have referred.

This is not the place to venture on the much discussed problem of how far a representative form of government satisfactorily meets the needs of the voting population. There has been a strong agitation in recent years, as you know, in favor of substituting a more direct form of legislation by the people. Personally, I do not hold an extreme view either way regarding the problem of the initiative and the referendum. I am decidedly skeptical as to their accomplishing any very good results in the long run, but, on the other hand, I do not feel that they are fraught with very grave danger, especially in the field of local and

state affairs. All I wish to point out here is the fact that under such a system the responsibility of the voter becomes much more immediate and direct and is, to my mind, largely beyond his capacity.

Direct legislation to be successful must be enacted by a body of voters who are not only convinced of some general principle which they wish to see adopted, but who have made the detailed study necessary to an understanding of the probable workings of each specific measure. The danger resulting from ignorance (whether due to indifference or to sheer limits of the human mind to handle an innumerable set of problems) is enhanced in proportion as the direct act of legislation is removed from a body of experts whose whole time and thought is, theoretically at least, devoted to these problems. In national affairs (and I am confining most of my consideration of this question to national affairs) the system of representative and party government still endures.

What, then, is the duty of the voter who is confronted with the fact that it is impossi

ble for him to master all the intricacies of public policy in detail? In arguing recently with one of the most intelligent students of public problems whom I know, I was maintaining that the first political duty of man is to secure knowledge. To this he replied that it is the very hopelessness of even the most conscientious man getting trustworthy knowledge on most matters that made him feel that my claim was practically meaningless. In other words, he held that to advocate the impossible was to advocate nothing. His own problem for himself, he said, was to make up his mind regarding some leader whom he could trust and then follow him.

I take it that he meant some intellectual leader rather than some political leader. Such a solution may frequently work well and, of course, such intellectual leadership has been found in the past. Some of the great newspaper editors have doubtless exercised such an influence, and their readers have simply been content, once having established this trust, to follow them blindly regarding every measure. This acceptance of authority on faith is apparently less