converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in those of the ftate over the lives of its fubjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal fafety to both, there is no room for arguing, from the exiftence of fuch a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former,

MORAL

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

воок V.

DUTIES TOWARDS GOD.

CHAP. I

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

N one sense, every duty is a duty towards

IN

God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty but there are fome duties of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated fenfe, called duties towards God.

That filent piety, which confifts in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wisdom and goodness in

the

the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his difpenfations; of referring the blessings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his fuccour; may poffibly be more acceptable to the Deity than any visible expreffions of devotion whatever. Yet thefe latter (which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former) compofe the only part of the subject which admits of direction or difquifition from a moralift.

Our duty towards God, so far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both; and the difference between them is, that the one confifts in action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a sense of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship; when, from the fame motive, we rest in a journey upon that day, we discharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thanksgiving, and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former may be obferved of prayer, we fhall make that the title of the following chapters, and the direct fubject of our confideration.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

OF THE DUTY AND OF THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, SO FAR AS THE SAME APPEAR FROM THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

W

WHEN one man defires to obtain any thing of another, he betakes himself to entreaty: and this may be obferved of mankind in all ages and countries of the world. Now what is univerfal, may be called natural; and it feems probable that God, as our fupreme governor, fhould expect that towards himself, which by a natural impulfe, or by the irrefiftible order of our conftitution, he has prompted us to pay to every other being on whoin we depend.

The fame may be faid of thanksgiving.

Again-prayer is neceffary to keep up in the minds of mankind a fenfe of God's agency in the univerfe, and of their own dependency upon him.

But, after all, the duty of prayer depends upon its efficacy: for I confefs myfelf unable to

con

conceive how any man can pray, or be obliged to pray, who expects nothing from his prayers; but who is perfuaded, at the time he utters his request, that it cannot poffibly produce the fmalleft impreffion upon the being to whom it is addreffed, or advantage to himself. Now the efficacy of prayer imports that we obtain fomething in confequence of praying, which we fhould not have received without prayer; against all expectation of which, the following objection has been often and seriously alleged-" If "it be most agreeable to perfect wisdom and juf"tice that we fhould receive what we should defire, God, as perfectly wife and juft, will give it "to us without afking; if it be not agreeable to these attributes of his nature, our entreaties "cannot move him to give it us, and it were impious to expect they fhould." In fewer words, thus: " If what we request be fit for us,

66

we shall have it without praying; if it be not "fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying." This objection admits but of one answer, namely, that it may be agreeable to perfect wisdom to grant that to our prayers, which it would not have been agreeable to the fame wisdom to have given us without praying for. But what virtue; you will ask, is there in prayer, which should make

a fa