CHAPTER VI. OF NOUNS ADJECTIVE. 199. I HAVE said that the noun adjective is the name of a concep- Definition. tion or thought, considered as a quality or attribute of another conception. In more popular language, it is a word added to a substantive to designate a quality, which distinguishes it from some other substantive of the same class, as a red house, a lovely lady, the moneyed interest, the fiftieth regiment; where red, lovely, moneyed, and fiftieth are all adjectives. In order fully to understand this definition, it will be proper to advert once more to the nature of a simple enunciative sentence or logical proposition. The subject, or that concerning which something is asserted, is always a noun substantive; the predicate may be a noun adjective. Thus, in the sentence "John is tall," the subject is "John," which is a noun substantive; the predicate is "" tall,” which is a noun adjective. Complex sentences are resolvable into more simple ones: and where adjectives are used, so as to render a sentence complex, they are always resolvable into the predicate of a logical proposition. Thus, if it be said that " a wise man is cautious," this sentence is resolvable into the two simple sentences" a man is cautious," and "that man is wise," and in each of these the adjective is the predicate of the proposition. 66 66 Adjective. 200. The inferences to be drawn from this statement are several. Not the subject of a In the first place, whenever the name of a conception is employed as proposition. the subject of a proposition, it is not an adjective. Thus, the conception expressed by the words "good" and "goodness" is the same; but if we predicate anything of this conception; if, for instance, we say goodness is amiable," the word goodness must necessarily be a substantive. And this does not depend on the form of the word; for if the idiom of our language allowed us to say good is amiable," or "the good is amiable," the word "good' would be as much a substantive as 66 goodness." 201. Hence it follows, that the distinction between a substantive Mode of and an adjective does not necessarily depend on any difference between the conceptions which they express, but between the different modes in which those conceptions are contemplated by the mind. If we contemplate goodness as a separate idea, if we assert anything of that idea, if we make it the subject of any proposition, then it is a substantive; but if we predicate it of anything else, if we consider it only as a quality of that thing, then it is an adjective. viewing it. vertible. 202. Hence, again, it follows, that an adjective and a substantive Not concannot be convertible, without wholly changing the meaning of the proposition in which they are employed. Thus, to say that "envy Cannot stand alone. Have not the same meaning. is criminal," and that "criminality is envious," are two propositions entirely different. 203. It is equally a rule of Universal and of Particular Grammar, that an adjective cannot stand alone, but must be joined with its substantive; which is, in truth, no more than saying, that a predicate must necessarily refer to some subject. Mr. Tooke, however, controverts this rule, though it is certainly as old as the words adjective and substantive. He objects, that the rule equally applies to the oblique cases of nouns substantive, and that therefore "the inability to stand alone in a sentence is not the distinguishing mark of an adjective;" but, though it were not a distinguishing mark, it might yet be a rule common to all adjectives. However, the real intent of the rule is to distinguish adjectives from the substantives with which they are used, and that in the most simple sentences; and with reference not to their form or inflection, but to their signification. Thus, if we say a golden is valuable," the sense is incomplete, and the adjective golden" requires the addition of a substantive, as, for instance, ring," to render it intelligible. On the contrary, if we say "gold is valuable," the sentence is perfect. 66 66 66 66 204. Mr. Tooke contends that "the adjectives golden, brazen, silken, uttered by themselves, convey to the hearer's mind, and denote the same things as gold, brass, and silk." The short answer to this is, that it is contrary to common sense and experience to confound these terms together; and nobody ever does so, who understands the English language in the slightest degree. But if we wish to trace the source of Mr. Tooke's error, we must examine more particularly his expressions. First, what does he mean by "uttered by themselves?" Words uttered by themselves are like syllables or letters uttered by themselves. They are the mere elements of discourse. Their proper force and effect in rational speech must depend on their connection with each other. Again, what is meant by denoting the same things ?" In so far as they are both of the same origin, there is doubtless a common conception to which they both bear relation; but it does not follow that they both bear the same relation to it. A numerous tribe of words derived from, or connected with, this term, gold, is to be found in the different European languages. Is it to be said that they all "convey to the hearer's mind and denote the same things?" Let us see how this can possibly be made out. From (1) the splendour of the rising or setting sun, was denominated (2) the yellow colour resembling that splendour. From the name of that colour, was derived (3) that of the jaundice, which rendered the whole body yellow, and (4) that of the gall, which produced the jaundice. From yellow also came (5) the name given to the yolk of an egg. And again, from this colour came (6) the name of gold. Gold, being the most precious of metals, gave its name (7) to riches in general; and particularly (8) to money. Hence were denominated all kinds of payments, whether (9) voluntary gifts, or (10) offerings, or (11) tribute, or (12) rent, or (13) fines; as well as (14) debts Thou gaudy gold, Hard food for Midas-I will none of thee. Whereas, in the other case, it is noticed but incidentally, as a thought passing over, and giving a momentary tinge to another thought, but differing from it as the light in which we view a substance differs from the substance itself. So the same Bassanio, in the same scene, speaking of his mistress's portrait, says, here in her hair, The painter plays the spider, and hath woven A golden mesh to entrap the hearts of men. as substan 205. From what has been already said, it will easily be under- How treate stood that these secondary thoughts, which are expressed by adjectives, tives. Necessary to language. Agreeing with substantive. 66 may be brought more distinctly before the mind, and treated as substantives in connection with other substantives. It is thus that instead of "" a virtuous man," we may say "a man of virtue;" but though there appears, in this instance, very little difference of meaning, yet, on analysing the two expressions, we shall find that a new and distinct operation of the mind is performed, which operation is here expressed by the word "of." We do not merely, as in the case of the words "virtuous man," contemplate the conception of "man as a substance, and that of virtue as a quality belonging to the individual in question; but we contemplate "man as having a substantial existence, and "virtue" as having an existence capable of coalescing with man; and further, we contemplate the actual union of these two thoughts, as expressed by the word "of." Slight, therefore, as the difference of meaning is between the words " a man of virtue" and "a virtuous man," yet the grammatical difference is not to be overlooked: and the best proof of this will be to consider how totally the style of any author would be altered if we were always to change the genitive case of the substantive into an adjective, and vice versa. Suppose that, instead of the line, The quality of mercy is not strained, we were to say, 206. The preceding remarks, too, show the absurdity of asserting that "adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary to language," and that "the Mohegans have no adjectives in their language;" for though this latter fact is vouched by " Dr. Jonathan Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in Newhaven, and communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published by Josiah Meigs," it amounts really to this, that the Mohegans cannot distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality; and if so, they must be utterly destitute of the faculty of reason, which probably neither Dr. Edwards, nor Mr. Meigs, nor Mr. Tooke intended to assert. The only conceivable ground for the Reverend Doctor's assertion is, that the Mohegans employ the same word in a substantive and adjective sense, as we say "there is a calm," and "the day is calm," the weather "is cold," and I have a cold;" or figuratively, as "silver locks," the "honey-moon," "angel visits," serpent error," "infans pudor," and the like. 66 66 207. It is a common rule, that the adjective should agree with its substantive in gender, number, and case, whence perhaps, it might at first sight be inferred, that gender, number, and case properly belong as well to the adjective as to the substantive. This, however, is not the fact the adjective simply expresses a quality; but it must of necessity be connected in language with its substantive, and that connection is effected in many languages by a similarity of inflection; || and when the inflections of the substantive express gender, or number, or case, those of the adjective often follow a similar rule of construction. This construction, it is obvious, is a matter belonging only to Particular, and not to Universal Grammar. It may exist in one language and not in another; and, in fact, there are languages (our own, for example) in which all these variations in adjectives are unknown. 208. On the other hand, a variation of degree belongs, in an Degree. especial manner, to certain adjectives, but not at all to substantives; and where there are variations of degree, they may be compared together, whence arise, what are technically called by grammarians, the degrees of comparison. 66 cable to 209. Substantives cannot be compared, as such, in point of degree; Not applifor that would be to suppose that the nature of substantial existence substantives was variable; and that one existing thing was more truly existing than another, which is absurd. "A mountain," says Harris, cannot be said more to be, or to exist, than a molehill; but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more a lion than the lion B; but, if more anything, he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard is, nor a tiger more than a cat; but, if anything, they are more bulky, more strong, &c.; the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagyrite, οὐκ ἂν ἐπισ δέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ; substance is not susceptible of more and less." Sanctius, referring to this same passage of Aristotle, observes, that we may hence infer that comparatives cannot be drawn from nouns substantive. "Therefore," adds he, "they are deceived, who reckon the words senex, juvenis, adolescens, infans, &c., as substantives, for they are altogether adjectives. Nor is it to be objected, that Plautus has made from Panus the comparative Pœnior; for he does not there mean to express the substantial existence of the Carthaginian, but his craftiness, as if he had said callidior; for the Carthaginians were reputed to be a very crafty people. So the writer who used the word Neronior, from Nero, meant only to signify an excess of cruelty." 210. As substantives in general admit not of degree, so there are Nor to som some adjectives which equally exclude either intension or remission. adjectives. Thus Scaliger justly observes, that the word "medius" can neither be heightened nor lowered in degree; and that the same may be said of "hodiernus," and of many other adjectives. On this topic Mr. Harris thus expresses himself: 66 As there are some attributes which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such, for example, are those which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as when we say a circular table, a quadrangular court, a conical piece of metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things |