act that we perform. In truth, we do not name any one separately and distinctly from all others. It would be useless to do so in a single instance it would be impossible to do so in all. But we name what often occurs to us. We have often a sensation of colour; we call it "white" we have often a feeling of pleasure; we call it "joyous :" we often see an object which affects us with peculiar sentiments of regard or aversion; we call it "father" or enemy:" we often meditate on thoughts, which appear to us amiable or the reverse; we call them "benevolence" or "hatred." In this manner it is that our catalogue of names is formed. 117. Each of these thoughts or conceptions has its natural and proper limits; but these we do not always very accurately observe. No man confounds "red" with "white," but he confounds "whitish" with "reddish." A boy does not think his hoop square, but he knows not whether it is circular or elliptical. Thus it is, that men do not agree in their opinions of many things, to which they nevertheless agree in giving some common names; otherwise it would be impossible for them to communicate to each other anything like the thoughts or feelings which they respectively entertain. 66 66 118. The relation between words and thoughts has been expressed in various ways by writers on language. Plato calls the Verb dnλwμa, a "showing forth," and the Noun, onμetov, a "sign;" Arisδήλωμα, totle sometimes calls a word σημεῖον, a sign, and sometimes σύμβολον, a symbol; Plotinus says, ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τῶ ἐν ψυχῇ, “ the word (or sentence) in the voice is an imitation of that in the soul;" Cicero renders the ouμßolov of Aristotle by the Latin Nota, a "mark." More modern writers have described words as the Pictures, the Echoes, the Colours, the Vestments of thoughts, the representatives of thoughts, of ideas, of mental operations, &c. The author of a recent work, entitled "The Discovery of the Science of Languages,” objects to all expressions which imply that words in any manner represent thoughts. He observes, that if words had this power, we should have as many names for the same object, as we receive various impressions from it;" that " no single person can ever see the same thing twice in the same manner;" and that, no two persons could ever have a common impression of it;" consequently intelligible language would, on this supposition, be wholly impossible. The objection would be just, if we were to take such expressions, as those above quoted, in their literal sense; but they are obviously figurative; because we have no other means of explaining mental operations than by the analogies which we suppose them to bear to sensible acts and objects. What the authors in question mean is not that every word, as uttered by a speaker, is an exact representation of a thought existing in his mind at the time; but that words in general serve to indicate what is passing in the human mind. And this indeed words do, partly by their separate signification, but more by their grammatical arrangement. 66 119. It is according to the place which a particular word occupies The Noun. in such an arrangement, and to the function which it therein exercises, that it receives its grammatical designation as a part of speech. A word is called a Noun when in a simple sentence it serves merely to name a conception, and not to assert anything concerning it. Indeed, the English word noun is nothing but a corrupt pronunciation of the French nom, which, like the Italian nome, was again a corruption of the Latin nomen, and this latter was of common origin with the Greek ovoμa, which, both in the Iliad and Odyssey, signifies the name by which a person is distinguished from others; the radix being found in the verb vέuw, to allot, attribute, or distribute. And as a personal name distinguishes the man, to whom it is allotted, from other men, so a noun distinguishes the thing or thought, to which it is allotted, from other things or thoughts. The trite definition of a noun, as "the name of a thing which may be seen, felt, heard, or understood," is equivocal; for it may or may not include adjectives, and nouns commonly called abstract, according as the words "thing" and "understood" receive a stricter or more lax interpretation. I therefore prefer defining a noun, the name of a conception; and it has been seen that, by a conception, I mean whatsoever we can contemplate in thought as one existence, either subjectively in the mind, or objectively in the external world, and either as substance, or as attribute; for red is as much the name of a certain colour, as Peter is the name of a certain man, or England of a certain country; and in like manner virtue is as much the name of a certain thought, as a ship is the name of a certain thing; all these, therefore, and whatever other words serve, in a simple sentence, to name any conception of the mind, are nouns. Nouns. 120. It is next to be considered, how nouns may be best distri- Classes of buted into classes, with reference to the different kinds of conceptions, which they serve to name. 'Many grammarians," says Vossius, "and among them some of the highest celebrity, first distribute the noun into proper and appellative, and then into substantive and adjective; but erroneously; since even the proper noun is a substantive, inasmuch as it subsists by itself in speech. But let us seek our method from the schools. Our great Stagirite first divides rò öv (or that which is) into that which subsists by itself, and is therefore called substance, and that which exists in another as in its subject, and is therefore called attribute. Afterwards he proceeds to distinguish substance into primary and secondary, the primary being an individual, the secondary a genus or species. By parity of reason, therefore, we should divide the noun first into that which subsists by itself in speech, and is called substantive, and that which needs the addition of a substantive in speech, and is called adjective; and afterwards we should distribute the substantive into that which belongs to a single thing, and is called proper, and that which comprehends many, and is commonly called appellative." discri Conceptions 121. The distribution proposed by Vossius seems most consonant minated. to grammatical principle. I therefore begin with distinguishing substantives from adjectives, and I call them both Nouns; for they are both names of conceptions, and they are nothing more. They do not imply any assertion respecting these conceptions; and herein they are clearly distinguished from verbs. It is true that the adjective agrees with the verb in expressing, not substance, but attribute; and therefore it is, that Harris, and some other grammarians, rank these two classes of words together under the title of attributives. I do not deny that this arrangement is so far correct; but I say that it interferes with the method which I conceive it advisable to pursue, as the most direct and scientific. As Vossius justly postpones the consideration of the classes of substantives, to the distinction between substance and attribute; so I postpone the consideration of the assertion of an attribute, to the consideration of those conceptions both of substance and of attribute, which must necessarily precede all assertion. This, I apprehend, is strictly the order of science. Language is a communication of the mind; the mind, as far as it is capable of communication, consists of thoughts and feelings. Thoughts are formed by the reasoning power. The reasoning power is divided into three faculties, conception, assertion, and conclusion; but conception necessarily precedes assertion, because we cannot assert that anything exists, until we know what that thing is. and not con 66 122. Conceptions are either conceptions of substance, that is of something considered as subsisting of itself, or conceptions of attribute, that is of something considered as a quality or property of a substance. It may appear unnecessary to dwell on a distinction so obvious. No man, it may be said, however ignorant, can suppose that in the phrase 66 a white horse," the word "white" does not denote a quality belonging to the "horse;" or that in the phrase glorious victory," the word "glorious" does not denote a quality belonging to victory. No man, when he says "the sun is shining," thinks of the sun as an attribute of shining; but, on the contrary, he considers " shining" to be an energy, or property, or quality, or attribute of the sun. This is no doubt true; but unfortunately there have been writers in modern times, who have treated the distinction in question as a technical impertinence," and as resting on "false philosophy, and obscure because mistaken metaphysics;" and it therefore becomes necessary to examine the arguments on which their objection is founded. 66 66 Substantives 123. It has been contended that "the substantive and adjective are Adjectives frequently convertible without the smallest change of meaning,” and in vertible. proof of this, it is asserted that we may indifferently say a perverse nature," or a "natural perversity;" now surely, although I would not assert, that the person advancing such an illustration was altogether of "a perverse nature," I might without offence attribute his opinion, on this particular point, to a little "natural perversity." In the one and not con case, the friends of the person in question would understand me to Substantives assert, that his whole mind was tainted with the vices of obstinacy Adjectives and self-willedness, that he wilfully shut his eyes against the truth, vertible. and maintained opinions which he knew to be wrong in literature, in philosophy, in politics, and in religion-a description of his character, which would naturally occasion them to take great offence. In the other case, they would understand me to give him credit for such reading and literary acquirements, as might well have corrected what I look upon as an error; and they could hardly take it amiss that I attributed that error, rather to a slight defect, from which the best natures are not wholly exempt, than to gross ignorance, or total want of understanding. So much for the particular expressions quoted as proof that substantives and adjectives may be convertible without the smallest change of meaning: on the other hand, the well-known instance of a "chesnut horse," and a "horse chesnut," affords an example of a change of meaning produced by such convertibility, scarcely less ludicrous, than rendering into English the miles gloriosus of Plautus by the phrase "military glory." The fact is, that in all such instances, the views taken by the mind are different, according as it regards the one conception, or the other, as principal; just as the man who is on the eastern side of the street considers the western to be the opposite side; whilst he who is on the western side thinks the same of the eastern. We may speak of a "religious life," or of "vital religion." In the one case, we are considering the conception of "life," as that which must necessarily form the basis of our assertion, and which may be differently viewed, according as it is put in connexion with the conceptions of religion, irreligion, business, pleasure, or the like: in the other case, we take the conception of "religion" as the direct object of thought, and then limit it by the conception of life, or vitality. how made 124. It is objected, that this limitation may as regularly be effected Sentence by a substantive as by an adjective; and that "man's life," or "the complex. life of man" is exactly equivalent to "human life;" which I by no means deny; but then it must be observed, that the sentence takes a different form, and instead of simple becomes complex; the termination ('s) or the word (of) signifies "possession," or "belonging to," and renders one sentence resolvable into two. For instance, the proposition "the life of man is precious," includes two propositions— 1. Life belongs to, or is possessed by, man. 2. Life is precious. Dr. WALLIS, indeed, in his valuable English Grammar, first published "Adjectivum possessivum fit à quovis substantivo (sive singulari, sive Mr. Tooke's theory. and the principle on which it rests, would equally go to prove that all the oblique cases of substantives, in all languages, should be considered as adjectives; for Mr. Tooke has justly observed, that these cases cannot stand alone; although he has not noticed that this is owing to the complexity of the sentences in which they are used. 66 66 66 "Red" and 125. The last-mentioned writer contends, that "the adjective is equally and altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive." If he means by thing, a conception of the mind, he is perfectly right; but if he means by thing, an external substance, such as a horse," or a man," or "the globe of the sun," or a grain of the light dust of the balance," he is as clearly wrong. "white," ""soft" and "hard," "good" and "bad," "" virtuous" and wicked," do not represent any such things as the latter; but they do represent conceptions of the mind, some of which conceptions may be considered as belonging exclusively to external bodies, others as belonging exclusively to mental existence, and others as common to both. Mr. Tooke says, he has "confuted the account given of the adjective by Messrs. de Port Royal," who "make substance and accident the foundation of the difference between substantive and adjective;" but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messrs. de Port Royal, but by every grammarian who preceded them from the time of Aristotle; and whatever respect may be due to the abilities of Mr. Tooke, I must a little hesitate to think that he alone was right, and that so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, and sound judgment, were all wrong. But how has he confuted this doctrine? Why, truly, by showing that when a conception is not regarded as a substance, it may be regarded as an attribute; and when it is not regarded as an attribute, it may be regarded as a substance. "There is not any accident whatever," says he, "which has not a grammatical substantive for its sign, when it is not attributed; nor is there any substance whatever which may not have a grammatical adjective for its sign, when there is occasion to attribute it ;" which is pretty much like saying, there is not any captain whatever who may not be degraded, and placed in the ranks; nor any private soldier whatever who may not be raised from the ranks and honoured with a captain's commission; and therefore there is no difference between a captain and a private soldier. The premises are incontestable: the only fault is, that they have nothing to do with the conclusion. this point, I trust, I have satisfactorily vindicated the principle laid down by Aristotle, and adopted by all grammarians from his time to that of Mr. Tooke, viz., that the noun substantive is the name of a conception, considered as possessing a substantial, that is, independent existence; the noun adjective is the name of a conception, considered as a quality, or attribute of the former. On |