Derivation. ΤΟ By rò v Plato meant that which is, in the absolute sense of the word-that which is, always, and certainly, and without any variation. By rò μ ov he meant that which is not at any time, or in any manner, and cannot be conceived to be. Thus it is always and certainly true that in our idea of a circle all the radii are equal; and it is not at any time or in any manner true that we can form an idea of a circle with unequal radii. But there is a third case which is continually occurring to us, namely, that an object is presented to our observation which may correspond more or less accurately with a given idea. We may see, for instance, a coach-wheel, or the dome of St. Paul's church, but we can only form an opinion how nearly either of these approaches to our idea of a perfect circle; for the life of man would not suffice to prove such coincidence beyond the possibility of a doubt. Now, Plato distinguished this class of objects by the expression τὸ γιγνόμενον, which he opposed to τὸ ὄν, as in the following celebrated passage of the Timæus Έστιν οὖν δὴ κατ ̓ ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὊΝ μὲν αεὶ, γένεσιν δε οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ μὲν, ὃν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ ΝΟΗΣΕΙ, μετα λόγου περιληπτὸν, αεὶ κατα ταὐτὰ ὂν. τὸ δ ̓ αὖ ΔΟΞΗ, μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν—which passage CICERO has thus freely rendered:-" Quid est, quod semper sit, neque ullum habeat ortum? et quid est, quod gignatur, nec unquam sit? Quorum alterum intelligentiâ et ratione comprehenditur, quod unum semper atque idem est: alterum quod affert opinionem per sensus rationis expertes, quod totum opinabile est; id gignitur et interit, nec unquam esse vere potest." And the general sense of both these great writers is, that science is founded on that which is; opinion on that which seems : science relates to that which is distinctly apprehended, because it is permanent, immutable, and consonant to the necessary laws of human existence; opinion to that which is vague and indistinct, arising from sensible impressions, and the casual accidents of time and place. What Mr. Tooke called his "general doctrine," was of this latter kind it was an opinion derived from comparing the sound of words, not only without regarding, but often in direct opposition to their sense. Should any one for a moment conceive that I am speaking without due respect to the literary reputation of Mr. Tooke, I beg to remind him that I speak of a passage in which Mr. Tooke himself treated the profound wisdom of a PLATO and a CICERO with the most sovereign contempt, and even represented Lord Monboddo as an idiot, for quoting their very words. Elsewhere he said that the learned Lord was incapable of writing a sentence of common English;" but this is nothing to his abuse of one of his critics, the late Mr. WINDHAM, an accomplished scholar, and as honourable a man as ever existed, whom Mr. Tooke called in his chapter on conjunctions, a cannibal," and "a cowardly assassin." 66 66 353. Mr. Tooke rested his opinion respecting conjunctions on their derivation. "There is not such a thing" (said he)" as a conjunction in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to its own family and origin.' This may, or may not, be the case; but it is part of the history of language, and has nothing to do with the science of grammar. Mr. Tooke has accurately "traced home" some conjunctions: in regard to others, he has been mistaken; but whether right or wrong in the particular instances, his "general doctrine" can derive no benefit from them. To prove that a word performs one function at one time, does not disprove its performing another function at another time. Many of Mr. Tooke's etymologies in this part of his work are borrowed from former writers; but those writers never conceived anything so absurd, as that derivation was the whole of grammar. แ 354. Having disposed of these preliminary objections, I come to the Definition. definitions which have been given by different authors of this part of speech. It has been seen that the early Greek grammarians included what we call prepositions and conjunctions in the class of Zúvdeoμoi (connectives). Subsequent writers observed, that while the preposition expressed a relation of word to word, the conjunction expressed a connection of sentence with sentence. Hence ALDUS MANUTIUS, a very able grammarian of the fifteenth century, defines a conjunction, "Pars orationis indeclinabilis adnectens ordinansque sententiam." SCALIGER, in the sixteenth century, says, “Conjunctio est quæ conjungit orationes plures." SANCTIUS, towards the end of that century, more briefly, Conjunctio orationes inter se conjungit." VOSSIUS, in the seventeenth century, "Conjunctio est quæ sententiam sententiæ conjungit:" HARRIS, in the eighteenth, "The conjunction connects not words but SENTENCES;" and some years after him, COURT DE GEBELIN, in his figurative manner, says, "Une conjonction est un mot, qui de plusieurs tableaux de la parole fait un tout," meaning by the word tableau not a single object, or word, but such a combination as is properly called a sentence. Agreeing with all these authorities in their common principle, I would suggest, as the definition of a conjunction, a part of speech serving to show the particular mode in which one sentence is connected with another sentence. I designedly omit to notice, as characteristics of the conjunction, its being "indeclinable," as stated by Manutius; "void of signification," as stated by Harris. Nor do I think it proper to say with Frischlin and others, quoted by Vossius, "that it conjoins verbs and sentences, actually or potentially." According to the definition of a sentence above given, it is clear that the conjoining of verbs must be the conjoining of sentences. And as to the words "actually or potentially," they seem merely to have relation to those constructions of speech, which are explainable by the figure commonly called Ellipsis. On the other hand the expression "adnectens ordinansque sententias," which was adopted by Manutius from the old grammarians, Comminianus and Palæmon, appears very material, and suggests the propriety of noticing that sentences are or Do not cònnect mere words. connected by conjunctions not simply and in an uniform manner, diversely according to their particular modes of connection. 66 but 355. Here again Mr. Tooke objected that there were cases in which the words, commonly called conjunctions, did not connect sentences, or show any relation between them. "You, and I, and Peter, rode to London, is one sentence made up of three. Well!" (said he) "So far, matters seem to go on very smoothly. It is, You rode, I rode, Peter rode. But let us now change the instance, and try some others, which are full as common, though not altogether so convenient. Two AND two make four; AB AND BC AND CA form a triangle; John and Jane are a handsome couple. Does AB form a triangle, BC form a triangle? &c. Is John a couple? Is Jane a couple? Are two, four?" This objection of Mr. Tooke's seems to have induced Mr. Lindley Murray, after defining a conjunction as a part of speech chiefly used to connect sentences," to add," it sometimes connects only words." Now, if it could be shown that the word and, or any other word generally used as a conjunction, was occasionally used with a different force and effect, that circumstance would not make it less a conjunction, when used conjunctionally. In the instances cited, however, by Tooke, the word and serves merely to distribute the whole into its parts, all which bear relation to the verb: and it is observable, that though the verb be not twice expressed, yet it is expressed differently from what it would have been, had there been only a single nominative. We say, "John is handsome,”66 Jane is handsome;" but we say John and Jane are a handsome couple. In this particular, the use of the conjunction differs from that of the preposition it varies the assertion, and thus does in effect combine different sentences; for though AB does not form a triangle, yet AB forms one part of a triangle, and BC forms another part, and CA the remaining part; and these three parts are the whole. So, when PERIZONIUS says, "Emi librum x drachmis et iv. obolis," although the buying was not wholly effected by the ten drachmas, nor by the four oboli; yet the purchaser did employ ten drachmas in buying, and he did also employ four oboli in buying. The meaning, therefore, if fully developed, would exhibit two sentences connected by the conjunction and. Since the first publication of the passages immediately preceding, I have been glad to see the view here taken confirmed by the authority of Dr. Latham, in one of his valuable grammatical works.* He says, 66 Although the statement that conjunctions connect not words but propositions, and that exclusively, is nearly coeval with the study of grammar, it is not yet sufficiently either believed or acted upon. What,' I have been frequently asked, ' are we to do with such expressions as John and Thomas carry a sack to market, three and three make six, &c.? Surely this does not mean that John carries one sack and Thomas another; that one three makes one sum * Latham, First Outlines, p. 21. of six, and another three makes another sum of six, &c.' The answer to this lies in giving the proper limitation to the predicates. It is not true that John and Thomas each carry a sack; but it is true that they each of them carry. It is not true that each three makes six; but it is true that each three makes (i. e. contributes to the making). As far then as the essential parts of the predicate are concerned, there are two propositions; and it is upon the essential parts only that a grammarian rests his definition of a conjunction." It may perhaps be asked what is here meant by the essential part of a predicate; for instance, what is the essential part of the predicate in the proposition AB, and BC, and CA form a triangle? I apprehend that the learned author last quoted would consider the essential part of the predicate to be expressed by the word form; for it is meant to assert first that the line AB essentially forms some part of a figure, say the base; and that BC essentially forms another part, say the perpendicular; and that CA essentially forms a third part, say the hypothenuse: and the result of these three propositions is, that the three lines form a triangle; but this is a result which cannot be obtained, but by expressly or tacitly assuming the three first propositions to be true. So, when I say John and Jane are a handsome couple, I mean to assert that John is handsome and also that Jane is handsome, which two assertions are both implied by the conjunction and. 356. The view which I have here taken of conjunctions leads me Sentences to consider first the nature of connected sentences; secondly, connected the different modes of connecting them in point of signification; and thirdly, the expression of such connection by phrases or separate words. And first as to the sentences connected. These it has been shown must be either enunciative or passionate in the former the verb, in the latter the interjection which stands in the place of a verb, is to be taken as the hinge on which all the rest of the sentence turns. By means of this we form an unity of thought, a distinct perception of some fact, or a feeling of some sentiment, connected with a distinct object. But thoughts and sentiments do not always succeed each other in the mind as detached and perfectly separate things, but more commonly with associations of similarity or contrast, with relations of cause and effect, and with a thousand other modifications and mutual dependencies. Hence these first and elementary unities become parts of larger unities: the simple sentence forms only a phrase or paragraph in a more comprehensive sentence; and the longest sentence is more or less closely connected with what precedes or follows it, in a long discourse or poem. Nor are the enunciative capable of being connected with enunciative only, or the passionate with the passionate; but we pass naturally from a strong feeling to contemplate its consequence, as in the beautiful anthem, "O that I had wings like a dove! Then would I flee away, and be at rest ;” * *From Psalm lv. 6. I ength of passages. Modes of connection. where then, though adverbial in form, acts as a conjunction, by showing the dependence of the second sentence on the first. 357. How far these connections may go, that is to say, how many conjunctions may be admitted into one comprehensive sentence, is a matter not to be determined by any grammatical rule, but must depend on the taste and judgment of the writer; and great writers, more particularly great poets and orators, often seem to indulge in a more than common degree of continuity. Thus MILTON— Now Morn, her rosy steps in th' eastern clime And temp'rate vapours bland, which th' only sound Lightly dispers'd, and the shrill matin-song Thus, too, CICERO— Potestne tibi hujus vitæ lux, Catilina, aut hujus cœli spiritus esse jucundus, cum scias, horum esse neminem qui nesciat, te pridie Kalendas Januarias, Lepido et Tullo Consulibus, stetisse in comitio cum telo; manum consulum et principum Civitatis interficiendorum causâ paravisse; sceleri ac furori tuo non mentem aliquam aut timorem tuum, sed fortunam Populi Romani obstitisse ? 66 66 And it is to be observed that, after each of these instances, the next following sentence begins with a distinct expression of relation to that which preceded it. Milton, having described Adam's sleep as light, goes on to say, so much the more his wonder was" to find that the rest of Eve had been unquiet: and Cicero, having briefly alluded to the former atrocities of Catiline, proceeds, ac jam illa omitto." Indeed there are some writers whose sentences, for whole pages together, are connected, and it is difficult to detach a short passage so as to show its whole force and effect, without referring to the previous and subsequent parts of the discourse. For instances of this continuous style, I may particularly refer to the Sermons on the Creed by the celebrated Dr. ISAAC BARROW; who, it must be confessed, carried this method to an excess; for even in a continued argument the mind seems to require some short pauses, and resting places, as it were, to enable it to pursue its steps with regularity and firmness. 358. A slight degree of reflection must teach any one, that the modes of connecting sentences, in point of signification, must be very various, and consequently that conjunctions may in this view be classed under several different heads. It is clear, too, that the grounds of distinction between the classes ought to be adopted with care, and explained with perspicuity; so as to prevent the student from employing one conjunction, when a very different one may be required by the context. Accordingly, the best grammarians have philosophically investigated the different modes in which one sentence can be said to depend on, or be related to another; and the result of |