the mixed or variable times which are expressed by all the conjunctive tenses. Suffice it to say, that the combination of any mood which implies contingency or futurity, with a tense, referring to present or past time, must necessarily affect the expression of time, and, consequently, that in this respect, the tenses of the indicative must differ from the analogous tenses in any other mood. As, therefore, in nouns, the term gender, originally used to express the mere distinction of sex, has been applied in use to distinguish large classes of words from each other, with reference only to their terminations; so in verbs the word Tense, originally meaning the expression of time alone, has been also used in most grammars to express that concep

tion in combination with the others above noticed.

287. From the remaining essential property of the verb, namely, Person. the expression of Attribute, arises the necessity for a distinction of Person; for every attribute must relate to a subject of the first, second, or third person, as above distinguished. The form of the verb may or may not be altered on this account. We may say in Latin amo, amamus, amatis, amant, or in English "I love," " we love," "ye love," "they love;" but it is manifest that though in the examples cited from the latter language the form remains unchanged, the signification is alike varied in both languages. The difference of person, therefore, in point of form, is merely accidental to the verb: it peculiarly belongs to the pronoun, and has been sufficiently explained in treating of that part of speech. In many languages, the person of the verb is necessarily expressed by a separate pronoun. This is universally the case in the Chinese, for the verb being alike in all the persons, it would be impossible to distinguish one from the other without the addition of some other word. The three persons singular of the present tense run thus :

Ngo Ngai,

I love;

Ni Ngai, Thou lovest ;
Ta Ngai, He loves.

And the same occurs in the other tenses, and in the plural number.
In English we find it partially the case; for though in the singular
we have three distinctions of person in the present, as "I love,"
"thou lovest,"
," "he loves," and two in the past, as "I loved," "thou
lovedst," yet in all other parts (with the exception of the irregular to
be) the verb remains unaltered. Nor does this arise from any pecu-
liarity in the original genius of our language, for the more ancient
dialects, from which it is derived, abounded with personal terminations.
Now these terminations, as will be shown hereafter, were, in their
origin, nothing more than the pronouns themselves, which, in process
of time, coalesced with the expression of attribute, connection, asser-
tion, and time, and so formed words, signifying at once all these
different circumstances, together with the additional distinction of
person.

288. Some verbs are called impersonal, a name which only seems Impersonals.

Number.

to mean that they are not usually conjugated with distinction of per-
sons, but remain always in the form of the third person. If they had
no other peculiarity than that from which their name is derived, it
might not be necessary to notice them in a treatise on Universal
Grammar; but, in truth, they are constructed on a principle different
from that which has been already explained in reference to person.
The impersonals are of two kinds, active and neuter. By active I
mean those which require an object, as "it grieves me," "it becomes
me,” miseret me, decet me, &c.; by neuter I mean those verbs of which
the action terminates in itself, as "it rains," "it snows," "it is hot,"
"it is cold;" the Latin pluit, the French il fait chaud, the Italian fa
freddo, the German es donnert, es friert, &c. In all these instances the
verb contains a mere assertion of the existence of the conception; but
does not indicate any agent. These verbs have been sometimes ex-
plained as agreeing with a nominative implied in them: thus pudet is
said to be a verb agreeing with the implied nominative pudor, as if
the meaning were,
"shame shames me;" but this is rather a formal
than a substantial explanation. Pudet in reality contains, and does
not merely imply the noun pudor: it expresses the same conception as
the noun, and asserts its existence. It is therefore rather of the nature
of a verb substantive, than of a verb active; and though, in some
idioms, a nominative is expressed, yet in reality that nominative is
superfluous, or, at most, is only introduced to keep up the general
analogy of the language. The nominative it in the English language,
and il in French, have no distinct reference to any conception. They
are pronouns, which do not stand for any noun. If any one should
say, "It rains," we cannot, as in the common case, where a distinct
nominative is expressed, ask "what rains?" for the answer would
only be it; and if we were then to ask, "what is it?" we must be
left without any answer. Hence, in translation, the nominative it is
often lost. We do not say in Latin, Hoc pluit; nor in Greek, TOYTO
Xpn. The proper notion of an impersonal verb, therefore, is, that it
asserts the existence of an action without reference to any particular
agent.

289. The expression of Number is another accidental property of the verb; and belongs to it only in so far as the verb may be combined with the expression of person. It is, therefore, like the same property in the adjective, a mere method of connecting it in construction with the noun substantive, or pronoun, which forms its nominative. Accordingly, it applies to verbs in the same manner as it does to nouns and pronouns. When they admit a dual number, as in Sanscrit, Arabic, and Greek, the verb admits the same; when they do not, it has only a singular and a plural. Indeed, the matter could not well be otherwise, if, as has been already stated, the personal terminations of the verb be really the pronouns themselves coalescing with it. The verb is equally said to be in the singular or plural, whether it has or has not distinct terminations appropriated to those different numbers;

we call "I love" singular, and "we love" plural; but it is manifest,
that in all such instances the expression of number exists only in the
pronoun.
These are questions of Particular Grammar: all that can
be laid down on the subject, as a rule of Universal Grammar, is, that
as on the one hand there is nothing in the peculiar nature of the verb
which involves the idea of number, so there is nothing in the idea of
number which can prevent it from being combined with the verb,
where the genius of the language permits such a union.

290. Since the verb, by means of its connection with the pronoun, Gender. admits person and number, there is no reason why it should not also admit Gender; and, in fact, this distinction obtains in the Arabic, the Ethiopic, and some other languages. It is, however, rare; and as gender properly belongs only to nouns, or pronouns substantive, with respect to which it has been already discussed, we need not here pursue the investigation.

291. Some writers contend, that the verb, as expressing an attri- Comparison. bute, is capable of Comparison; nor does it appear that this can be gainsaid, if we regard only the attributive nature of the verb. There are, indeed, certain attributes, as has been already observed, which are not intensive; and these of course cannot admit degrees of comparison; neither can the assertive power be compared: for the verb must assert a thing either to exist, or not to exist. On the other hand, verbs may be compounded with conceptions implying comparison, as "to outdo," "to overtake," subesse, superesse, &c. They may too, in general, be compared by means of the adverbs of comparison, more, most, less, least, &c.; but I am not aware that it has been attempted, in any language, to combine in one and the same word the assertive power with the comparative. It is not easy to conceive any form of verb which in itself would express the degrees of comparison; and the reason probably is, that though the mere qualities of substance may be simply intensive, yet actions are intensive in various modes, as well as in various degrees. Of different substances, concerning which whiteness can be predicated, some may be more and some less white; but of different beings concerning which the act of walking may be predicated, all equally walk, though one walks more, another less; one faster, another slower, &c. and so of mental action, several persons love, but one loves more warmly, another more violently, another more purely; so that there is not in actions, as there is in qualities, a simple scale of elevation and depression; and, consequently, the mere comparison of more and less would not answer all the purposes of language, as applied to the verb, though it does as applied to the adjective. For this reason participles, when they are compared, lose their participial power; for sapientior and potentior do not express acts, but habits, or fixed qualities, and therefore answer to the English adjectives "wiser," and " more powerful."

292. Thus have we seen, that though the proper force and effect of Conclusion. the verb―that on which its peculiar character depends-is assertion,

66

yet it is capable of combining therewith, and in fact it does so combine, not only the conception of attribute which Priscian calls the res of the verb, but the expression of mood, tense, person, number, and even gender. Observe," says the President DES BROSSES, "how, in one single word, so loaded with accessory notions, everything is marked, every notion has its member, and the analogical formulas are preserved throughout on the plan first laid down." Elsewhere he adds, "All this composition is the work, not of a deeply-meditated combination, nor of a well-reasoned philosophy, but of the metaphysics of instinct." The Goths, the Saxons, the Greeks, and the Latins, in forming the schemes of conjugation above noticed, were probably impelled by principles in the human mind, the very existence of which they hardly suspected. Similar principles have operated, but with endless diversity of application, in the formation of all the various dialects which have been spoken in ancient and modern times, by nations the most barbarous and the most civilized; and it is the development and explication of these ever-operative principles which forms the proper object of the science of Universal Grammar.

CHAPTER X.

OF ARTICLES.

parts of

293. HAVING explained the uses of the principal parts of speech Accessory employed in enunciative sentences, I come now to the accessories. speech. The principal parts, as has been fully stated, are those which are necessary for communicating thought in a simple sentence: and the communication of thought requires the naming of some conception, and the assertion of its existence as an object either of perception or of volition. Conceptions are named by the noun: they are asserted to exist by the verb; but it often becomes desirable to modify either the name, or the assertion, or the union of both. How is this to be done? Certain modifications may be incorporated with the noun by its cases, and numbers, and genders; with the verb by its moods, tenses, and persons; with the adjective by its degrees of comparison; and with the participle, gerund, supine, and infinitive, by their marks of time, relation, &c. The same, or similar effects, may be produced by separate words; and what must those separate words be? Nouns, or verbs, which, appearing in subordinate characters, are no longer to be considered such as they were formerly.

294. We wish to modify a conception; how can we do it but by How modifying other another conception? We wish to modify an assertion; how can we words. do it but by another assertion? It is therefore plain that the accessory words must have had originally the character of principals; that is to say, they must have been either nouns or verbs. This is a truth extremely obvious in itself, and of which many grammarians have been fully aware; but there is another truth, which seems to have been less apprehended, namely, that these subordinate and accessory words act as such a very different part from that which they sustained as principals in a sentence. The mind dwells on them more slightly; they express a more transient operation of the intellect. In process of time some of them come to lose their original meaning, and to be only significant as modifying other nouns and verbs. It cannot be denied that the words and, the, with, and the like, have no distinct meaning, at present, in our language, except that which depends on their association and connection with other words. The etymologist may succeed, or he may not succeed, in his attempts to trace these non-significant words to the significant words from which they are derived; but whether he be successful or unsuccessful, the fact will be no less certain, that in their secondary use they lose their primary character and signification; they are no longer nouns or verbs, but inferior parts of speech, commonly termed articles, prepositions, con