contingent, if it were done; and on each we see a further contingency also depends. These eight examples are sufficient to show that the varieties of contingent assertions are too various to be considered and treated as so many distinct moods of the verb. The six first are of the kind called, by some writers, subjunctive; the two last are of the kind called, in contradistinction from the subjunctive, potential; but as they are all equally conjunctive, it suffices to give them that name: and, indeed, it is a more correct and systematic distribution of the grammatical nomenclature so to do; for the proper correlative to the term indicative is not subjunctive or potential, but some term which comprehends them both; as, for instance, the term conjunctive. The indicative asserts simply: the conjunctive asserts with modification: if the one is a mood, so is the other; but if the conjunctive is a mood, then its subdivisions cannot be properly so called; but they should rather be called sub-moods, if it were necessary to give them any peculiar denomination. 270. The effect of any degree of passion is pro tanto to interrupt Imperative. and modify the processes of reasoning. Reasoning is conducted by direct assertion, absolute or conditional. Passion goes at once to its object, assuming it as the consequence of an indirect assertion. Thus, if the fact be that I desire that a person should go to any place, it is not necessary for me to state my desire in the indicative mood, and his going in the infinitive or conjunctive, "I desire you to go," or "I desire that you should go;" but by the natural impulse of my feelings feelings which language conveys as clearly as it does the more gradual processes of thought-I say, in a mood different from either the indicative, infinitive, or conjunctive-Go! Now, this mood, from its frequent use in giving commands to inferiors, has been called the Imperative, and that name, as being the most general, I shall adopt. Some writers have distinguished from the imperative, the precative, the deprecative, the permissive, the adhortative, &c.; but, so far as language is concerned, these are but different applications of the same mood: the operation is the same in communicating the object of the passion, and implying the assertion that such passion exists. A few examples may serve to explain my meaning:— 2. 1. Let there be light, said God; and forthwith light Milton. Shakspeare. 3. Help me, Lysander, help me! Do thy best Ah 4. Go, but be mod'rate in your food! A chicken too might do me good. Shakspeare. Gay. In the first of these examples we have an instance of the highest imperative, that which proceeds from the Almighty power, to whose command all things created and uncreated are subject; and who, in Milton's fine paraphrase of the first chapter of Genesis, is described as calling into existence the hitherto uncreated essence of light. The second example is deprecative, or rather imprecative, in which Timon calls down on his worthless fellow-citizens the natural consequences of their profligacy. The third is precative, in which poor deserted Hermia, waking from a terrific dream, calls for help from her faithless lover Lysander. The last is permissive, in which the old dying fox, after a long harangue to dissuade the younger members of his community from pursuing their usual trade of rapine, at length permits them to go out on a similar excursion. In all these varieties of the imperative mood, the grammatical process, both of thought and expression, is the same. In all of them the assertion of desire or aversion on the part of the speaker is clearly implied. The sense is, "I command that there be light"—"I wish that confusion may prevail"—"I pray you to help me"-" I permit you to go;" but it is unnecessary to express those various assertions, because they are all implied in the imperative moods, and without those moods they could not be so implied. The imperative animates the passionate sentence, as the indicative or conjunctive animates the enunciative sentence. It converts the name of an object of passion, or will, into a manifestation that such object exists; just as the indicative or conjunctive converts the name of an object of perception or thought into an assertion that it is really existing. The original text, "God said let there be light, and there was light," affords a plain example of this operation in both ways. The conceptions in both are two; namely, existence and light. Each of these, without the verb, would remain a mere noun. word "light" does so remain; but "existence," by becoming a verb, exhibits itself first in the imperative as an object of volition, and then in the indicative as an object of perception. In the one case it implies an assertion of the Divine will that light should exist; in the other it expresses an assertion that light did exist. The authors of the "Port Royal Grammar" observe, that as the future tense is often taken for an imperative mood (which will be presently noticed), so the imperative is frequently used for a future; and this they ascribe to an imitation of the Hebrews. But in truth there must in all languages be a community of signification between these two portions of a verb; because, as Apollonius remarks, "we can command only in regard to the time to come." "Steal not," and "thou shall not steal," have therefore the same signification. The 66 271. The Optative mood seems at first sight to imply only a minor Optative. degree of the same passion, which is more energetically expressed by the imperative: and hence I was formerly inclined to agree with those grammarians who think it unnecessary to make the former a separate mood. But the Greek and some other languages distinguish it by a peculiar form; and on reflection it appears to me, for the reasons above stated, that the distinction is well grounded. I cannot, indeed, adopt the language of Scaliger (lib. iv., c. 144), differunt, quòd imperativus respicit personam inferiorem, optativus potentiorem: they differ in this, that the imperative regards an inferior person, the optative a superior;" for that difference is altogether accidental. Moreover, it makes no provision for the common case of wishes expressed between equals; and again, how are we to determine whether a request is addressed to a person in one character rather than another? Or why should we not have moods to designate the different degrees of superiority and inferiority? The fact seems to be, that the more distant and indirect influence of the will on its object, has given rise, in some languages, to a peculiar form of the verb, generally called the optative mood. Yet even this distinction does not appear to be very accurately observed in practice, for we sometimes see the optative used, where the imperative might have been more naturally expected. Thus, in the Electra of Sophocles, when Orestes is forcing Ægisthus into the palace, to kill him in the apartment where he had murdered Agamemnon, he says to his reluctant victim: Χωροῖς ἂν εἴσω σὺν τάχει λόγων γὰρ ἐ where the optative xwpois undoubtedly expresses a strong volition that Ægisthus should do what he was unwilling to perform. The common distinction between the optative and the imperative is nearly expressed by the English use of the auxiliaries "may" and "let." Thus, the following passage in the hymn to Sabrina is an example of the optative, expressed by may : Virgin daughter of Locrine, With many a tow'r and terras round? Interrogative. The tribute from the rills, the beryls rolled ashore, and the crown of towers and terraces were matters not within the power or control of the speaker, and which he, therefore, could only wish for. On the contrary, when the speaker can command the execution of his wishes, he uses the word let, as the king, in Hamlet : It is observed by Vossius, that the Latin optative is no other than the conjunctive-and, indeed, the form is the same in both; for we say, utinam amem, or cùm amem; utinam amarem, or cùm amarem ; utinam amaverim, or cùm amaverim; utinam amavissem, or cùm amavissem. And so, in the passive voice, utinam amarer, or cùm amarer; utinam amer, or cùm amer; utinam amatus sim, or cùm amatus sim, &c. The mood, however, is not to be determined by the form, but by the signification; for it often happens that particular languages do not possess distinct forms for the different moods; and where they do, the form of one mood is frequently used with the force of another. This even takes place in the Greek language, which possesses the richest abundance of inflections in its verbs. The Greek indicative is often used for the subjunctive and optative, and that through almost all its tenses, as VIGER has shown at large in his celebrated treatise on Greek idioms: and in return, the optative, especially in the Attic dialect, is used for the indicative. 272. Besides the four moods which I have reckoned as principal, some grammarians hold that there are two others of equal importance, namely, the Interrogative and the Infinitive; these therefore I shall proceed to examine. And first, as to the interrogative: Varro speaks of the mode of interrogating as different from that of answering. No doubt the state of the mind in these two acts is widely different; but as both acts must, of course, relate to the same conception, and to the same direct assertion, categorical or hypothetical, it is not surprising that the grammatical forms expressive of those acts should nearly approach each other, or be sometimes the very same; and hence that some grammarians should deny the necessity of an interrogative mood. "In written language" (says an able writer), "take away the mark of interrogation, and in spoken language the peculiar tone of voice, and the interrogative and indicative modes appear precisely the same.” * Of this there is a remarkable instance in the speech of Venus, in the 10th book of the Eneid: Cernis, ut insultent Rutuli, Turnusque feratur Per medios insignis equis, tumidusque secundo where, if read without the accent of interrogation, the word "cernis" * Encycl. Brit., art. Grammar. Virg. Æn., 10, 20. is in the indicative mood, "you see;" but if read (as it certainly ought to be) with that accent, it is clearly in the interrogative, and should be translated "do you not see?" In like manner, the beauty of the following lines of Catullus would be lost, if read without the interrogative accentuation, though the form is simply indicative :— Jam te nil miseret, dure, tui dulcis amiculi? Jam me prodere jam non dubitas fallere, perfide ?* Of a question put in the form of an assertion (says the same learned person) we have a remarkable instance in the Gospel of St. Matthew. When Christ stood before Pilate, the governor asked him, saying, “ Σὺ εἶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ιεδαίων.”† Now this is literally "Thou art the king of the Jews;" but pronounced in an interrogative tone, it must have signified, "Art thou the king of the Jews?" And so it seems to have been understood. Indeed, in colloquial English, nothing is more common than to use the indicative form interrogatively, and with the interrogative intonation, as " you took a ride this morning?" meaning "did you [or rather did you not] take a ride?" On these grounds the writer alluded to concludes, that "the [so called] interrogative mood is a useless distinction," and one which (he says) is "not found in any language." I confess that at one time these reasons appeared to me to have much weight; but when I reflect that the mental energy exercised by an interrogator is altogether different from that exercised by a respondent or a narrator; and that it is marked in all languages either by a change of the arrangement or accentuation of the words, or by some additional word or particle, or perhaps even by a peculiar inflection, I cannot but agree with those who add an interrogative mood to the four abovementioned. nature. 273. This mood may be said to partake both of the enunciative Its mixed and of the passionate character. On the one hand, it requires from the party interrogated a direct assertion, affirmative or negative, either of the existence of some fact, the precise nature of which is presumably unknown to the interrogator, or else of some unknown circumstance of person, place, time, or the like, relating to the fact in question; and, on the other hand, it implies in the interrogator the indirect assertion of some sort of passion, varying from the simple desire of information, to the height of pleasure, or to that tumult of painful feelings, which renders thought itself a chaos of doubt and confusion. Thus, Ismene, ignorant of the nature of the act, in which Antigone wishes her to take part, asks— What is the act? What danger? What intent ? * Catull. 30. |