Case. with the proper distinction, that "She caused him to destroy it." Then we know with certainty what before we knew not, viz., that the promoter was a woman; that her instrument was the hero; and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city. 251. Case is another distinction, not essential to the noun, but accidental. It is therefore to be ranked among the accidents of the pronoun; yet, so frequent is the occasion to use pronouns, that many of them, especially those which are particularly denominated personal, have the variations of case, even in languages which vary their nouns in this respect very little or not at all. When a person speaks of himself as the performer of any action, he seems naturally led to adopt a different phraseology from that which he employs in speaking of the action as done toward him; and hence the difference between I and me, thou and thee, runs throughout far the greater number of known languages. After all, Universal Grammar only furnishes the reason for this difference when it exists, but does not prove its existence to be necessary. There may be languages of which the pronouns have no cases; but where they have cases, the same function is performed by each case in the pronoun as in the noun. CHAPTER IX. OF VERBS. definition. 252. A VERB is a part of speech, so called from the Latin verbum, Aristotle's which seems to have been intended to correspond to the Greek 'Pñμa; though the latter word was used by different Grecian writers in very different senses. Aristotle defines 'Pñμa, " a complex word, significant, with time, of which no part is significant by itself;"* but this definition, which differs from that which he had before given of the noun,' only in the words "with time," is manifestly referable to the Greek language, and not to Universal Grammar. Some philologists understand Aristotle in one instance to apply the designation 'Pñμa to the adjective λɛvròs, white; but this seems to be a misapprehension. It however led Ammonius to maintain that every word which forms the predicate in a logical proposition is a 'Pñua.† Some of the Stoics contended that the only genuine 'Pμa was the infinitive mood of a verb. Others, again, disputed whether or not the copula, in a logical proposition, should be deemed a 'Pñua. Words answering this purpose were called by most Greek writers 'Phμara vπаρктiкà, verbs of existence; by Latin authors, verba substantiva; and in English grammars, "verbs substantive:" but Aristotle seems, in his Poetics, to refuse to them the title of 'Phuara, considering them, perhaps, as mere Σύνδεσμοι, connectives. He defines the Σύνδεσμος 66 a word not significant, which is fitted to make of several significant words one significant word" (or rather sentence). And further on he says, "not every sentence consists of 'Phμara and nouns;"§ "but it is possible that there may be a sentence without a 'Pñμa," || as an instance of which (it seems) he refers to "the definition of man." ¶ The passage is rather obscure, but it would seem from the context that he means this:-If we say man is an animal," the sentence is perfect, but there is no 'Pμa in it; for the word "is" serves merely as a connective to make of two nouns, "man" and "animal," one significant sentence; but in itself it signifies neither substance nor at 66 * Φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντική, μετὰ χρόνου, ἧς οὐδὲν μέρος σημαίνει καθ ̓ αὑτό. Poetic., s. 34. † Πᾶταν φωνὴν κατηγορούμενον ὅρον ἐν προτάσει ποιοῦσαν Ῥῆμα καλεῖσθαι. Ad Arist., De Interp. † Φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μίας, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκῦια μίαν σημαντικὴν φωνήν. Poetic., s. 34. § Οὐ γὰρ ἅπας λόγο; ἐκ ῥημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται. || Αλλ' ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ ῥημάτων εἶναι λόγον. Ibid. [ Οἷον ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁρισμός. Ibid. Ibid. Tooke's statements. tribute, neither does it mark time, and for these reasons it is not to be deemed a Ρῆμα. 253. If these explanations of the nature of a verb are not very satisfactory, still less so is the manner in which this part of speech was treated by Mr. Tooke. So early as the year 1778, he published a letter to Mr. Dunning, in which he advanced some propositions concerning language, which were thought at the time rather paradoxical. These were amplified and extended in 1786, in the first volume of his "Diversions of Purley." He there laid it down that "in English, and in all languages, there are only two sorts of words which are necessary for the communication of our thoughts, viz., the noun and the verb.' He said, "he was inclined to allow the rank of parts of speech only to these necessary words;"† that "a consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things, would lead us no farther than to nouns ;”‡ and that "the other part of speech, the verb, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication; that it is in fact the communication itself, and therefore well denominated 'Pñua, dictum; for the verb is QUOD loquimur, the noun DE QUO."§ And with this mysterious hint the readers of the first volume were obliged, so far as regarded the verb, to be content. In that volume, and also in the second, which was published in 1805, he asserted many words to be moods, tenses, or participles of certain verbs (remarking, however, incidentally, that mood, tense, number, and person, are no parts of the verb), but still the verb itself he neither defined nor explained, further than by saying that it was the noun and something more."¶ At the close of the second volume his supposed colloquial friend asks this very pertinent question, "What is the verb ? What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of a noun, constitutes the verb ?" Is the verb 1. Dictio variabilis, quæ significat actionem vel passionem? 2. Or, dictio variabilis per modos ? 3. Or, quod adsignat tempus sine casu? 4. Or, quod agere, pati, vel esse significat? 5. Or, nota rei sub tempore? 6. Or, pars orationis præcipua sine casu ? 7. Or, an assertion? 8. Or, nihil significans, et quasi nexus et copula, ut verba alia quasi animaret ? 9. Or, un mot declinable indeterminatif? 10. Or, un mot, qui presente à l'esprit un être indeterminé, designé seulement par l'idée générale de l'éxistence sous une relation à une modification ?" To all this Mr. Tooke replies-"A truce! a truce! I know yon are not serious in laying this trash before me.—No, no, We will leave *Div. of Purl., v. i. p. 65. † Ibid., p. 67. Ibid., p. 70. ¶ Ibid., p. 514. off here for the present!" And so he did; but never resumed the discussion. 254. Surely, if the verb was one of the only two necessary parts Inconclusive. of speech; if it was one of the two main pillars supporting the whole edifice of language; if Mr. Tooke himself had it constantly in view, and referred to it in his three successive publications; he might have found time, between 1778 and his death in 1812, to have given the disciples of his new school, which was to sweep away all the old grammatical doctrines as "trash," a little more distinct information on the nature of the verb, than that it was a noun, "and something more," and that both it and the noun being equally necessary for the communication of thought, the verb was distinguished from the noun by the "necessity of its use in communication." A " A "something more," of which we know nothing, is to common capacities just equal to nothing and to distinguish one of two necessary things from the other, by the common attribute of necessity, is a mode of division no less ungrammatical than illogical. 255. The verb has been differently defined (as we have seen) by Analysis. different grammarians; and indeed when we reflect on the variety of conceptions, which it often combines in one word, we must allow, that this circumstance, "throws considerable difficulties in the way of any person who attempts to analyse the verb, and ascertain its The first step in such an analysis is to distinguish those properties of the verb, which are essential to it, and are therefore necessarily to be found in all verbs, from those which are accidental, and form different combinations in different languages. I consider as essential properties of the verb, its power nature."* 1st. To signify an attribute of some substance. 2ndly. To connect such attribute with its proper substance. I consider as accidental properties, those which grammarians have commonly designated by some such terms as kind, voice, mood, tense, person, number, gender, &c. 256. The definition of a verb, so far as regards Universal Grammar, Attribute. should be confined to the essential properties of this part of speech. Before I attempt to define it, therefore, I shall examine those properties and first, as to signifying an attribute. Here the term "attribute" is to be taken largely, so as to include every conception, which can be predicated of another in a simple proposition. Therefore, the genus is to be deemed an attribute of the species, and the species of the individual. Existence, too, whether absolute or qualified, is to be deemed an attribute of the existing substance-absolute, as when "God is," or when God says, "I am;" qualified, as when "God is almighty," man is mortal;" in both which cases, we say, we say 66 Encycl. Britan., art. Grammar. Connection. the word "is" forms a verb substantive. The attributes of qualified existence are numberless. We may, however, divide them into those which are qualified by conceptions of action, and those of which the qualifying conception does not relate to action. Conceptions of action are spiritual, as, to love; mental, as, to know; or corporeal, as, to touch; and they may be of a positive or negative character, as, to live or die, to move or stop, to wake or sleep. Conceptions unconnected with action are such as, to be wise or foolish, to be hot or cold, to be honest or dishonest, tall or short, beautiful or ugly. Now, the signification of an attribute belongs to a verb in one of two ways: it is either added to the verb substantive as a necessary adjunct, or it is involved in the form of a different verb. Propositions, in which the attribute is a necessary adjunct to the verb, are such as, "Socrates is wise," ""Cicero is speaking." These necessarily contain three words, and have therefore been called, by some logicians, propositions tertü adjacentis. Propositions, in which the attribute is involved in the form of the verb itself, require but two words, as "Cicero speaks," "Victoria reigns," and have been said to be secundi adjacentis. In the former class, the attribute is absolutely necessary as an adjunct to the verb; for if we stop at "Socrates is,' "Cicero is," the sentence is so imperfect as to be unintelligible. In the latter class, the attribute is involved in the form of the verb, as in "speaks or reigns." From what has been said, it is clear that the property of signifying an attribute belongs essentially to the verb. Nevertheless this property is not the peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of a verb, for it equally belongs to adjectives and participles. or 257. The next essential property of the verb is that of connecting the conception of an attribute with the substance to which it belongs; for it may have been observed in the instances above noticed, that when an attribute was signified, it was signified not alone, but in conjunction with the subject to which it belonged. If we say, “is” or "is almighty," or "is speaking," is speaking," or "speaks," or reigns," without showing to whom or to what these attributes belong, we utter no intelligible sentence. And this is so obvious, that no one ever denied connection to be a property of the verb. Nay, some able philologists have gone so far as to maintain that connection is the characteristic peculiarity of this part of speech. From that opinion, however, I must dissent. The verb not only connects, but it does more; it declares that the connected conceptions coexist as parts of one assertion. The conjunction also connects, but it does not predicate one thing of another, or make up one proposition of two distinct terms. Thus, if we say, "he is good," the conceptions expressed by the words he and good, that is to say, the conceptions of a particular man and of goodness, are not only connected, but the one is asserted to exist in the other, and to be a quality belonging to it. Otherwise is it in the |