CHAPTER VII,

OF PARTICIPLES.

221. ALTHOUGH, in accordance with the generality of the gram- Definition. marians, I have enumerated the Participle as a distinct part of speech, yet it is in truth (as may be seen by the Table in Chapter III.) a subdivision of the noun agreeing with the adjective in expressing an attribute or quality; but differing from the adjective in expressing a quality not simply, but as being, or having been, in action. Inasmuch, therefore, as action implies time, the participle partakes, in this respect, of the nature of the verb; and hence it received the designation Participium, a parte capiendâ; for, as was said, partem capit a nomine, partem a verbo. The definitions given by many ancient grammarians of this part of speech were founded on its characteristics in the learned languages. Thus Vossius says, Participium est vox variabilis per casus, significans rem cum tempore." But here the variation per casus is a mere accident of the Greek and Latin tongues; and the word rem must not be taken as expressing a substance, but a quality. The words cum tempore, indeed, apply to a principle of Universal Grammar; and, so far, the definition is correct. Upon the whole, however, Spinoza's definition in his Hebrew Grammar is more worthy of attention. He says, 66 Participia sunt Adjectiva, quæ actionem vel omne quod Verbo significari solet tanquam Rei affectionem vel modum, cum relatione ad tempus exprimunt."

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does not

222. The participle differs essentially from the verb in this, that The Participle it simply names a conception, but does not assert anything concerning assert. it. The words, "loving, moving, reading, thinking," &c., assert nothing respecting these acts; they merely name the acts, or rather they name the conceptions, as in action. It is said that the participle should be ranked among nouns when it constitutes the subject of a logical proposition, and among verbs when it forms the predicate; but this is not accurate: a participle, as such, can never form the subject of a proposition. The example given is, Militat omnis amans, Πᾶς ὁ ἐρῶν πολεμεῖ ; but in this instance amans has an adjectival force, agreeing with homo understood; and it is the same in the Greek. Again, when the participle is a predicate, as Socrates est loquens, it equally fills the office of an adjective, and is not to be treated as a verb, at least in the sense which I have attached to the latter term. 223. The adsignification of time is proper to the participle. This Adsignificapoint, however, Mr. Tooke contests, upon the ground that the Latin participles, present, past, and future, are not confined to the times from which they respectively receive their designations. Proficiscens is a participle of the present tense; yet Cicero says, abfui proficiscens,

tion of time.

Variety of participles.

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thus connecting time present with time past. So profecturo tibi dedi literas, connecting the past with the future: and again, quos spero societate victoria tecum copulatos fore; where spero is present, copulatos past, and fore future. None of these examples, however, prove anything against the expression of time by the participles, but merely that time is contemplated in various lights by the mind in one and the same sentence. Thus, in the phrase abfui proficiscens, the first word relates to the time of speaking, and the second to the time of acting. The going was present, when the absence (which is now past) was present. Again, dedi refers to a time past; but when that time was present, the departure (expressed in profecturo) was future. A thousand such cases as these would lead to no inference whatsoever against the expression of time by the participle. It is necessary to observe, however, that words which express time express it in two ways, either as simple existence or as relative to the different portions of duration. Thus, when we say justice is at all times mercy," the present is a mere expression of existence, a present continuous. So when we say, "the sun rises every day," we speak of an act habitually present. It is the nature of the human mind to be able thus to contemplate duration; but this in no degree interferes with, still less contradicts, the view which we take of different portions of time, as past, present, and future, with relation to each other. The assertion, for instance, that the sun rises every day, does not at all clash with the assertion that the sun is rising at this moment. In both cases time is referred to a certain portion of time is designated in the one case which coincides with the general assertion in the other; and, in fact, the difference between the two assertions does not depend on the verb itself, but on the accompanying words every day" and "this moment." In these respects the verb and participle agree. The participle is an adjective so far participating the nature of the verb as to signify action, and it cannot signify action without the capability of adsignifying time.

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224. Particular languages may or may not have separate words adapted by inflection to signify the different portions of time in a participial form. In truth, the notion of time is in all such cases a new element in the compound conception, which compound conception may be expressed by one word or by several, The complexity of conception may go still further: it may include the distinctions of active and passive, of absolute and conditional; and, in short, all those which I shall have to consider when I come to treat of the verb. Hence we see, that languages may have as great a variety of participles as they may of moods and tenses: and it does not seem of the nature of language altogether to exclude participles from the parts of speech; for Mr. Harris is perfectly right in saying, that if we take away the assertion from a verb there will remain a participle. He is speaking of the signification, and not of the sound; and therefore Mr. Tooke's ridicule of this passage is entirely mis

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placed. It is an observation, as old as Aristotle, that the words "Socrates speaks" are equal in signification to the words "Socrates is speaking;" but it is evident that the assertive part of this sentence consists entirely in the word " is," which word being taken away, the word "speaking" still expresses a quality of Socrates, and expresses that quality in action, and is therefore a participle. And so it will happen with every verb, as is instanced by Harris in the verbs, ypápɛɩ, γράφων, writeth," writing." Tooke misrepresents Harris as saying, that, by removing & and eth, he takes away the assertion; whence he concludes, that Harris supposed the assertion to be implied in those syllables; but Harris says nothing about taking away ε and eth. He says what is very true, that the words ypápa and writeth imply assertions, and that in the words ypápwv and writing, the assertion is taken away; and yet there remains the same time, and the same attribute; which expressions of time and attribute, without assertion, constitute a participle.

correspond

225. It has been laid down as a rule by some writers, that there Where no can be no participles but what are derived from verbs; and hence ing verb. they deny that such words as togatus, galeatus, &c., are to be called participles. Augustinus Saturnius, who treats particularly of this point, calls them, by way of distinction, participials. It is manifest, however, that this is a distinction altogether nugatory, in regard to Universal Grammar. When Othello says

My demerits may speak unbonneted,

he uses exactly the same form of speech as if he had said uncovered, and the one word is as truly a participle as the other; for although there may be no authority for the use of the verb "to bonnet," or "to unbonnet," such verbs would be perfectly consistent with the principles of Universal Grammar; and, indeed, as much so with the English idiom, as the verbs "to veil," and "to unveil," both which are used by Milton. Uncovered, unveiled, and unbonneted equally express an action of past time, viz., the removing the cover, veil, or bonnet from the head; and it is by this signification, and not by their etymology, that the part of speech to which they belong is to be determined.

other.

226. We must not be surprised to find, that participles of different Pass into each classes pass into each other. Many active participles come to have a passive signification. The word evidens, which was originally active, is found with a passive meaning, from whence our common adjective, evident, is derived. This is a circumstance not peculiar to participles; for when I come to treat more at large of those transitions of meaning, which are the groundwork of sound Etymology, it will be found that they apply to every part of speech indifferently. Men cannot always find a separate term to express each distinct shade of thought, and they naturally avail themselves of those expressions which come the pearest to their meaning.

Admit of comparison.

Used substantively.

Gerunds.

227. From what has before been said on the subject of comparison, it is clear that participles, as well as adjectives, when they express qualities capable of intension and remission, may admit the three degrees of comparison: thus we may say amantior as well as durior, amantissimus as well as durissimus. It matters not, that in soine languages the idiom will not allow of expressing the degrees of comparison by inflection; that, for example, in English we cannot say lovinger, or lovingest; this is a mere accident of the particular language, depending principally on circumstances connected with its sound; and it is to be observed, that however barbarous such words as lovinger or lovingest might sound to the ear, yet they would be perfectly intelligible to the mind: there would be nothing absurd or contradictory in the combination of the thoughts; for the same combination is effected by the words "more loving," and "most loving; and in all languages there must be means more or less concise, or circuitous, to express such combinations.

228. We have seen how the conception of a quality considered alone, and rendered the subject of assertion, becomes a noun substantive; and this applies, in principle, as well to those qualities which are expressed by participles as to those which are expressed by adjectives. Whether the same or a different word shall be employed for this purpose is, again, a matter of particular idiom. In English, we use the very same word for both purposes. Thus, " singing,' dancing," &c., may be used in construction as adjectives, or as substantives of the sort commonly called abstract. We may say a singing man,' a dancing woman ;" or we may say, "singing is an accomplishment," "dancing is a recreation," &c. In Latin, the idiom is different: cantans, saltans, &c., can only be used in the former of these two ways; but, nevertheless, a similar principle is observable in the use of what are called gerunds and supines.

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229. Scaliger gives the following account of the Gerund: "From these (participles) our ancestors chose certain tenses, by means of which they might imitate those Greek terms λεκτέον, μαχητέον, &c., but with a more ample and extensive use. These they called gerunds, assigning to them three cases, pugnandi, pugnando, pugnandum; of which the second preserved the power of a participle, but so much the more aptly as the verbs were excelled by the participles. For, as the cause of action is more plainly shown by saying 'cædens vulneravi,' than by saying cecidi, and better still by saying 'quia cæderem vulneravi,' the whole of this is expressed by the gerund 'cædendo vulneravi.' Moreover, in many things the form and the end are the same; but the end is partly out of us, as the ship is a thing out of the ship-builder; and partly within us, in our minds, as is that which is called an idea, by which we are impelled to the external end. Now both of these they very skilfully expressed; for both pugnandi and pugnandum signify the end. Thus I may say, pugnandi causa equum ascendi, I mounted my horse for the purpose of

fighting; or pugnandum est ex equo, I must fight (or the fighting must be) on horseback." "Hence it appears that these (gerunds) are participles, differing little from other participles, either in nature, or use, or even in form." Again he observes: "Some writers have called these gerunds from their use participial nouns; for they are neither pure nouns, since they govern a case, nor are they pure participles, since, with a passive voice, they bear an active signification."

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230. The same author thus speaks of the Supine: "Nearly similar Supines. is the explanation to be given of the Supines; but these latter express the same meaning more forcibly. Thus, eo ad pugnandum signifies a future action; eo pugnatum expresses the future so as to be quite absolute." "Hence it signifies activity with actives, and passiveness with passives: eo factum injuriam, or injuria mihi factum itur; but indeed it always savours, in some degree, of passiveness; for it does not so much mean eo ut faciam, as it means eo ut hoc fiat; as if one were to say, I am going indeed for the purpose of doing so and so, but I hope it is already done; and like Sosia's speech, Dictum puta, 66 suppose it said." Since, therefore, the end (or aim) of an action was to be thus signified, the other extreme was not improperly expressed by a different word." Hence Scaliger explains the different use of the supines in um and u, the latter of which he regards as a sort of ablative case. "There is equally a movement," says he, “from and to an object; and therefore we rightly say venatu venio, as we do venatum vado." He goes at length into these considerations, opposing in some measure what other grammarians had said of the supine in u; but these questions are beside my present object: and all that is necessary here to be shown is the chain of connection which unites the participle, as an adjective, on the one hand with the noun substantive, and on the other with the gerunds and supines.