vered the treason, he ordered his physician to be executed. 18. Not to be outdone in magnanimity, he immediately sent to Rome all his prisoners without ransom, and again desired to negociate a peace: but the Romans still refused, upon any other conditions than had been offered before'. 19. After an interval of two years, Pyr'rhus, having increased his army by new levies, sent one part of it to oppose the march of Len'tulus, while he, with the other, went to attack Cu'rius Denta'tus, before his colleague could come up. 20. His principal aim was to surprise the enemy by night; but, unfortunately, passing through woods, and the light failing him, his men lost their way; so that at the approach of morning, he saw himself in sight of the Roman camp, with the enemy drawn out ready to receive him. The vanguard of both armies soon met, in which the Romans had the advantage. 21. Soon after, a general engagement ensuing, Pyrrhus, finding the balance of the victory turning still against him, had once more recourse to his elephants. 22. These, however, the Romans were now too well acquainted with, to feel any vain terrors from ; and having found that fire was the most effectual means to repel them, they caused a number of balls to be made, composed of flax and rosin, which were lighted and thrown against them as they approached the ranks. 23. The elephants rendered furious by the flame, and boldly opposed by the soldiers, could no longer be brought on; but ran back on their own army, bearing down their ranks, and filling all places with terror and confusion: thus victory, at length, declared in favour of Rome. 24. Pyr'rhus, in vain, attempted to stop the flight and slaughter of his troops; he lost not only twenty-three thousand of his best soldiers, but his camp was also taken. 25. This 1 They, however, released an equal number of Tarentine and Samnite prisoners. served as a new lesson to the Romans, who were ever open to improvement. They had formerly pitched their tents without order; but, by this new capture, they were taught to measure out their ground, and fortify the whole with a trench; so that many of their succeeding victories are to be ascribed to their improved method of encamping. 26. Pyrrhus, thus finding all hopes fruitless, resolved to leave Italy,, where he found only desperate enemies, and faithless allies; accordingly, calling together the Taren' tines, he informed them that he had received assurances from Greece of speedy assistance, and desiring them to await the event with tranquillity, the night following he embarked his troops, and returned undisturbed into his native kingdom, with the remains of his shattered forces, leaving a garrison in Taren'tum merely to save appearances and in this manner ended the war with Pyr'rhus after six years' continuance. 27. As for the poor luxurious Taren'tines, who were the original promoters of the war, they soon began to find a worse enemy in the garrison that was left for their defence, than in the Romans who attacked them from without. The hatred between them and Milo, who commanded their citadel for Pyr'rhus, was become so great, that nothing but the fear of their old inveterate enemies, the Romans, could equal it. 28. In this distress they applied to the Carthaginians, who, with a large fleet, came and blocked up the port of Taren'tum; so that this unfortunate people, once famous through Italy for their refinements and pleasures, now saw themselves contended for by three different armies, without a choice of a conqueror. 29. At length, however, the Romans found means to bring over the garrison to their interest, after which they easily became masters of the city, and demolished its walls, granting the inhabitants Questions for Examination. 1. What report did Cineas give of the Romans? 2. By what means did Pyrrhus become convinced of its truth? 3. Who headed this deputation? 4. What reception did he experience? 5. What farther trial was made of his disposition? 6. What effect did this produce in Fabricius? 7. In what way did Pyr'rhus evince his satisfaction? 8. In what state was the Roman army at this time? 9. Where did the rival armies meet? 10. What was the event of the engagement? 11. Did it cost the enemy dear? 12. Was the war continued? 13. What proposal was made to Fabricius ? 14. How was this proposal received? 15. How was this done? 16. What effect had this conduct on Pyrrhus? 17. What followed? 18. What return did he make to the Romans? 19. How was this war carried on? 20. What views had he in this, and how did they succeed? 21. What expedient did Pyrrhus have recourse to, to insure the victory? 22. How did the Romans endeavour to counteract it? 23. What was the consequence? 24. What loss did Pyrrhus sustain ? 25. What advantage did the Romans gain from this victory? 26. What resolution did Pyrrhus form, and how did he effect it? 27. What became of the Tarentines? 28. To whom did they have recourse? 29. How did this terminate? CHAPTER XIV. SECT. I. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND, WHEN THE ROMANS BEGAN TO GROW POWERFUL BY SEA.-U. c. 493. 1. THE Romans having destroyed all rival pretensions at home, began to pant after foreign conquests. 2. The Carthagin'ians were at that time in possession of the greatest part of Sicily, and, like the Romans, only wanted an opportunity of embroiling the natives, in order to become masters of the whole island. 3. This opportunity at length offered. Hi'ero, king of Sy'racuse, one of the states of that island, which was as yet unconquered, entreated their aid against the Mam'ertines, an insignificant people of the same country, and they sent him supplies both by sea and land1. 4. The Mam'ertines, on the other hand, to shield off impending ruin, put themselves under 1 Hi'ero had been, for many years, a firm friend to the Romans; and though their protecting a city, which would otherwise have fallen into his hands, occasioned a temporary interruption of that friendship, it was soon resumed, and continued unshaken during the remainder of a long reign. The happy effects of this prudent conduct were experienced by his subjects; for, while the other states of the island witnessed scenes of carnage and ruin, Sy'racuse enjoyed the sweets of tranquillity and the protection of Rome. 5. The Romans, not thinking the Mam'ertines worthy of the name of allies, instead of professing to assist them, boldly declared war against Carthage; alleging as a reason the assistance which Carthage had lately sent to the southern parts of Italy against the Romans. In this manner a war was declared between two powerful states, both too great to continue patient spectators of each other's increase. 6. Carthage, a colony of the Phoeni'cians, was built on the coast of Africa, near the place where Tunis now stands, about a hundred and thirty-seven years before the foundation of Rome. 7. As it had been long growing into power, so it had extended its dominions all along the coasts but its chief strength lay in its fleets and commerce. 8. Thus circumstanced, these two great powers began what is called the First Punic war. The Carthaginians were possessed of gold and silver, which might be exhausted; the Romans were famous for perseverance, patriotism, and poverty, which gathered strength by every defeat. 9. But there seemed to be an unsurmountable obstacle to the ambitious views of Rome, as they had no fleet, or at least none that deserved the title; while the Carthagin'ians had the entire command at sea, and kept all the maritime towns in obedience1. 10. In such a situation, under disadvantages which nature seemed to have imposed, any people but the Romans would have rested; but nothing could conquer or intimidate them. 11. A Carthagin'ian vessel happened to be driven on shore, in a storm, and this was sufficient to serve as a model. They began to apply themselves to maritime affairs; and though with 1 The vessels in which they had hitherto transported their troops, were principally hired from their neighbours the Locrians, Tarentines, &c. It is certain that the Romans had ships of war before this period, but from the little attention they had hitherto paid to naval affairs, they were, probably, badly constructed and ill managed. |