without object, since we should at once have seen what its processes alone can now reveal to us. Analysis, therefore, may be truly said to be the art of the blind: its necessity arises from the imperfection of sense, and its usefulness consists in remedying the defect of sense.

From this view of the nature and operation of analysis we are led to perceive the exact object of scientific research, and to understand what it accomplishes, and only what it accomplishes when successful. Its object is, to ascertain the elements of which a substance is composed, and the series of changes of which it is the subject or the agent: for to know perfectly all the separate bodies which co-exist in a substance, and all the different modes in which it is capable of affecting other substances and of being affected by them, is to have the most perfect knowledge of that substance which the human mind can acquire.

And this precisely is the object of mental science. But here a difficulty occurs. The mind, say some, is simple, the mind is indivisible, the mind does not consist of parts, the mind is not made up of different elements that can be separated, precipitated, dissected and what not; the mind is one. The very idea of applying such a process as that of analysis to the mind is therefore in itself absurd. Under the name of spiritualism or of some other term of the like signification or rather of no signification, this we apprehend is a view which is, at present, very commonly taken of this subject.

Å slight attention to the business of Naming would dissipate the confusion of ideas in which most objections of this nature have their origin, and would set the matter in its true light.

As we perceive chiefly aggregates, we have constant occasion to speak of aggregates. We must therefore of necessity possess marks by which these aggregates may be denoted. The invention of such marks is the business of language, and language has devised an abundance of them under the denomination of general terms; the word body, for example, is one of these marks, one of these general terms: the word mind is another : each of these terms includes a large aggregate.

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The human body is made up of a number of organized substances; these substances are moulded into distinct and various forms, thus constituting definite structures which are termed organs these organs are endowed with the power of performing specific actions, which are called functions. Now all these structures and functions are included and expressed by the single term, "body;" yet an analysis of what is included in this term, finds abundance of employment for two extensive branches of science-anatomy and physiology.

In like manner the human mind is made up of a number of sensations, ideas, feelings, affections, passions; that is, it is capable of existing in different states of consciousness: or it is susceptible of various affections. All these different statesall these various affections form one great aggregate which are included under the general term, Mind. But some of these states are simple, others are complex; some are pleasurable, others are painful; some are good, others are bad; some are to be cherished and strengthened by all possible means; others are to be weakened and discouraged by all the expedients that can be brought into operation. Analysis, therefore, is a process which is applicable to the human mind; and which when actually applied to it, is found to open a field of inquiry as extensive as, and far more difficult than, that afforded by an examination into the constitution of the body; and which, like the former, finds abundance of occupation for two great branches of science, mental and moral philosophy.

There are then mental as well as physical aggregates, and the business of the mental philosopher is to deal with these mental aggregates just as the natural philosopher deals with the physical. The states or affections of the mind at any given moment constituting the consciousness of that moment, are generally exceedingly complex. There is no chemical substance, into whatever number of elements it is capable of being resolved, which possesses a more compound nature than most of the thoughts that pass through the mind, and all the feelings that agitate the heart. Many of these affections consist of entire trains of thought which have recurred again and again; and the point of consciousness, constituting the particular affection of the moment, could not have existed without the previous existence of all these trains, with all their repetitions. By mental analysis, these complex states are capable of being resolved into more simple states; the most simple constitute the elements of which the complex are composed: the laws according to which these elements combine, so as to form the complex states, are capable of being determined, and the order in which, when formed, they succeed each other, is capable of being ascertained. And to know all this, to know all the elements which enter into the composition of all the complex states of thought and feeling, of which our varied consciousness consists,-to know the laws by which these combinations are formed,-to know the order in which they succeed each other, to know what antecedents are invariably followed by what consequents,-is to know the mind. To be able to obtain this species of knowledge indeed, to be able to make for ourselves the requisite analysis, in any particular case,

with promptitude and accuracy, is a power which can be acquired only by diligent study and frequent exercise, but which to have once acquired, is to have obtained the mastery over the mind..

We do not doubt that many of our readers will demand how? They will ask, what relation can there be between the knowledge of the phenomena and the command of them? Admitting that without the knowledge there cannot be the command, does the knowledge ensure the command ?

The knowledge of steam, the construction of the steamengine, and the application of it to the Calais Packet, do not ensure to any man that on any given day he will go by that packet from London to Calais: but at all events, in knowing that there is such a packet, the means of going from London to Calais are known to every man. To have analysed, in the most perfect manner, a mental combination; to have shown the process by which that combination is effected; to have expounded the laws by which, after the combination is formed, it succeeds to other combinations, and causes other combinations to succeed to it, does not ensure that if it be pleasurable and good, the proper expedients will be adopted to render it as constantly and powerfully present to the mind as possible; or, on the other hand, that if it be painful and evil, the proper expedients will be adopted to render it as constantly absent or as feebly present as possible. To do that is the business, not of the mental philosopher, but of the moral instructor: and to form the habit of doing it with regard to a great number of mental states, is a main object, and an unspeakably important object of education. In the mean time, by performing such an analysis, the mental philosopher does two things for the moral instructor-he furnishes him with an instrument, and at the same time teaches him how to use it. Were mental analyses performed with the sincere and earnest desire to turn them to this practical account, and were those who are engaged in the business of education sincerely and earnestly to endeavour to avail themselves of such helps when placed within their reach-were this done with regard to all the mental phenomena which most materially influence men's conduct and happiness, let any one set himself to imagine (it will be an instructive employment) what the intellectual and the moral state of large numbers of human beings would speedily become.

And this train of thought brings us to another objection, which is at the same time a very common and a very old one; namely, that, after all, knowledge is not virtue: that every body knows more than any body does: that what is wanted is a

commanding motive, a sure and steady impulse to do, not a better knowledge of what is right to be done.

Clear, exact, certain knowledge, is itself that commanding motive; of itself affords that sure and steady impulse. The difficulty is, to get the knowledge with the requisite clearness, exactness, certainty. The moment this is obtained, all difficulty is at an end the actions of the man may be calculated with as much certainty as the mechanist can calculate the movements of any part of his machine.

That knowledge is virtue, is an aphorism, therefore, that contains a no less certain, and a far more profound and sublime truth, than the more celebrated and less-doubted aphorism, that "knowledge is power." The clear, exact, and certain knowledge of what is conducive to happiness, in the truest and most comprehensive sense of that term, as surely determines the course of conduct which is denominated virtuous (as far as that knowledge extends) as the most perfect acquaintance with any given physical phenomena can ensure the production of any given physical result. Men are no more capable of doing voluntarily what they are CERTAIN will involve them in misery, than a stone is capable, of its own accord, of flying upwards. Were it otherwise, human beings would possess no moral nature, and would be capable of no moral conduct. Mental and moral antecedents, mental and moral consequents, are as fixed and invariable as physical, and in some cases at least, are capable of being ascertained with equal certainty. And as no man voluntarily thrusts his hand into the fire, because no man is ignorant that such an act will occasion him useless suffering, so no man does, and no man is capable of doing, any moral action which he knows will as surely occasion him a preponderance of intense pain, as that fire will burn. The physical antecedents that produce pain are in general well known to every one, and therefore, as far as avoidance is possible, they are avoided but the mental and the moral antecedents that produce pain are sometimes not well known: with regard to all that are not well known, the perception of the certainty of the sequence can be neither universal nor irresistible. In all their true interests, intellectual, moral, and political, men require to be instructed, and the necessity of mental and moral science is founded in this very want of man's nature. Nevertheless, the circumstances that invariably promote those interests, the circumstances that invariably counteract them, are as uniform as those that produce any physical phenomena: some of these circumstances are already ascertained: as far as they are ascertained, the knowledge of them is capable of being com

municated with regard to all these known mental and moral antecedents and consequents, at least, it must be possible as strongly to associate in the mind the idea of invariableness of relation, as with those that are purely physical. To teach the student for his own sake, and to teach the instructor for the sake of others, with regard to what mental and moral states this is to be done, and how it is to be done, is the ultimate object of this science. The full power of education to communicate this highest kind of instruction, has never yet been tried. When shall we see it tried upon our youth in the public institutions of our country ?

There is another way in which mental science is capable of influencing human happiness, to a far greater extent than is commonly apprehended; namely, by rendering familiar to the mind, the sources of pleasurable or of painful emotions in others, and by regulating, in conformity to that knowledge, the external deportment. This acquaintance with mental phenomena affords the only true and solid foundation of politeness, if by politeness be meant the manner of conducting the business of life, so as to give the least pain and the greatest pleasure. The man whose feelings are refined and delicate, and whose manners the habitual cultivation of such feelings has polished, exerts the charm over others for which he is distinguished, in consequence of possessing a quick perception of what will produce, in those with whom he converses, agreeable or painful trains of thought and feeling, and an exquisite tact in exciting the former, and in avoiding the latter: a perception and tact which cannot have been acquired without careful attention to the impressions occasioned by slight modifications of discourse and deportment; a look, an accent, a tone, a gesture. Chesterfield, who did not wholly neglect the mental phenomena, regarded them in a much less philosophical, and therefore in a much less perfect manner (perfect for his purpose) than was requisite for the acquisition of politeness, in this its truest and highest sense : on the other hand, the aristocracy occupy themselves exclusively about the mere ceremonials of behaviour. And what is the result? A pleasing exterior, which is compatible with the constant indulgence of the lowest and most vulgar feelings of a base nature. If some anecdotes which are told of the late "first gentleman in Europe" be true, a slight analysis of the impressions that must have been produced by the actions related, would prove that he possessed a mind essentially and grossly vulgar; and were the analysis extended to the effects occasioned by the admitted practices of his admirers, who assume to take the lead in forming the manners of the people, the same charge