This, however, is no more than the neceflary confequence of human imperfection. It cannot be denied, and it may, without any hefitation, be confeffed, that men are liable to err, and that many have erred in the application of this rule. But, who can from thence juftly infer, that it is not of fufficient clearnefs, to direct thofe who will honeftly make ufe of it, and to lay the error of those who are milled entirely at their own door?

It pleafed God to write his law upon the heart of man at first. And the great lines of duty, however obfcured by our original apoftacy, are still fo vifible, as to afford an opportunity of judging, what conduct and practice is, or is not agreeable to its dictates. It will be found from experience, that men are able to determine on this point, with far greater certainty, than on any other fubject of religion: that is to say, they can perceive the excellency of the end, when they are in much doubt about the means, in themfelves, or separately confidered.

Such authority hath natural confcience ftill in man, that it renders thofe who, in their own conduct, defpife its reproofs, inexcufeable in the fight of God. But it is of importance in the prefent argument to observe, that every one is able to pass a far furer judgment on the moral character of another, than his own. The pollution of the heart brings a corrupt biafs on the judgment, in a man's own cafe, and makes him palliate and defend those fins, to which he is strongly inclined, or of which he hath been already guilty: whereas in determining the characters of others, this biafs is lefs fenfibly felt. This is per

haps the true and only reafon why any deference is paid to virtue as praife-worthy, by thofe who are enemies to it in their hearts, or any public honor and respect given to to the service of God in the world, where fo great a majority are evidently in the interefts of another mafter.

One fingular excellence of this rule is, its being the moft univerfally intelligible. It is level to the capacity of men of all degrees of underflanding. There is little dif ference, if any, in this refpect, between the wife and the

Rom. i. 20.-i. 14.

unwife, the learned and the ignorant. Perhaps this circumftance alone ought to give it, in juftice, the preference, to every other teft of religious truth. Religion is the concern of all alike, and therefore, what relates to it fhould be open to all. It was the character, and the glory of the gofpel, at its first publication, that it was preached to the poor. And by this it is ftill diftinguifhed, not only from many or moft falfe religions, but efpecially from thofe philofophical fpeculations, in which the enemies of all religion place their chief ftrength. When we peruse a fyf tem or theory of moral virtue, the principles of which are very refined, or the reafoning upon it abftracted and above the comprehenfion of the vulgar, it may be ingenious, but it carries in itself a demonstration, that, because it is unfit, it could never be intended for general use.

Here then, lies the great advantage of the rule laid down by our Saviour. The bulk of mankind, thofe of lower rank, and even thofe among them of weakeft.or leaft cultivated understanding, are able to judge of the effects of principles, or to fee the beauty of an excellent character, when they are not able to examine a doctrine, or apprchend the reafoning upon which it is founded. The dictates of confcience are often immediate and clear, when the deductions of reafon are long and involved. To make intricate refearches in theory, requires great natural abili ties, which are the portion of very few: but to judge of a vifible character requires only an impartial fenfe of right and wrong. Of this the plain man is as fufceptible as the moft acute by nature, or the moft enlightened by education. In God Almighty, infinite knowledge and infinite holinefs are united, and, we have reason to think, that in their perfection they are infeparable. But we know, by experience, that they do not bear an exact proportion to one another in inferior natures, at leaft, among finful creatures. There may be, and there often is, great virtue and codnefs in a mean capacity, and great depravity in perfons of eminent ability.

From thefe confiderations it is plain, that this rule of trying a doctrine by its effects, as a tree by its fruits, may be applied by the meaneft as well as the greateft, and

with as little danger of mistake. Perhaps it might have been fafely affirmed with lefs danger of mistake. Great intellectual abilities, and great natural advantages of every kind, are very ready to fwell the mind with pride and felf-conceit, than which no difpofition is, in itself more odious in the fight of God, or more unfavorable to the dif covery of truth. This feems to be confirmed by experience, and it is plainly the view given us of our present ftate in the holy Scriptures. Thus the apoftle Paul fays, "Ye fee your calling, brethren, how that not many wife "men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble "are called. But God hath chofen the foolish things of "the world, to confound the wife; and God hath chofen "the weak things of the world to confound the things "which are mighty, and bafe things of the world, and "things which are defpifed hath God chofen, yea, and "things which are not, to bring to nought things that are: "that no flesh fhould glory in his prefence."* For the very fame thing we find our bleffed Redeemer adoring the depth and fovereignty of divine Providence, in the following terms, "In that hour Jefus rejoiced in fpirit, and “faid, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, "that thou haft hid these things from the wife and pru"dent, and haft revealed them unto babes even fo, Fa"ther, for so it seemed good in thy fight."+

Mistakes, however, after all there will be, and fome differences even among the beft; but, from this very cir cumftance, I derive another great excellence of the above rule laid down, that, it is not only the teft of truth for a man's felf, but the measure of forbearance with regard to others. By carefully examining their fruits, men may not only be directed what to embrace, and what capital and fundamental errors wholly to reject, but alfo in what particulars to exercife mutual forbearance, and, though fmaller differences ftill fubfift, to receive one another to the glory of God. If in any perfon or perfons, of whatever party, you perceive the spirit of true and undefiled re

* 1 Cor. i. 26.—29.

+ Luke x. 21.

VOL. I.

Pp

ligion, they are accepted of God, and fhould not be con demned by you. This ought not, in juftice, to induce you to approve or embrace every one of their principles, or every part of their practice, of which perhaps you have feen or felt the bad tendency; yet fhould it engage you to love them with unfeigned affection as fincere, though, in fome measure, miftaken fervants of our common Lord.

I hope it appears from the preceding obfervations, that this rule, of trying every principle or profeffion by its fruits, is the beft that could have been given. It is certain and infallible in itfelf, and we are lefs liable to miftake in the use of it, than of any other. There feems, indeed, to be an exact analogy between this rule in religious matters, and reafon in our common and civil concerns. Reason is the beft guide and director of human life. There is certainly an effential difference between wisdom and folly, in the nature of things. They are alfo fenfibly oppofite to one another in their extremes. Innumerable actions, however, there are, or modes of action, of a more doubtful and difputable nature, as to the wifdom or weaknefs of which, hardly any two men would be entirely of the fame opinion. Let the enemy of religion make the application, who denies its reality, becaufe all good men are not of the fame mind; or because there are different parties and profeffions, who oppofe one another in fome opinions and practices. He acts juft the fame part, as he, who feeing the differences of judgment among men, upon almost every fubject that falls under their deliberation, fhould renounce the ufe of reason, or deny that there is in nature, any fuch thing.

We now proceed to the fecond thing propofed, to fhow, That the rule above explained and defended, is that by which, in fact, all ferious perfons, and indeed, mankind in general, fo far as they are fincere, do judge of religious principles and pretenfions.

By ferious perfons, I understand all thofe who are truly religious, in oppofition to those who have only a nominal and cuftomary profeffion. If we would fpeak with precifion, or reafon in a juft and conclufive manner, we must keep this diftinction conftantly in view. Nothing does

more harm to any caufe, than a treacherous friend, or bofom enemy and nothing does more hurt to the intereft of religion, than its being loaded with a great number, who, for many obvious reafons, aflume the form, while they are ftrangers to the power of it. The fallacy of almost all the reafonings of infidels lies here. They confider religion as anfwerable for all the hypocrify of thofe who profefs it, and all the wickednefs of thofe who have not renounced the profeffion; as if in order to its being true, it must be impoffible for any to counterfeit it. If that were the cafe, no thanks would be due to impartial enquiry. All color of objection being taken away, the affent would not be yielded, but compelled. This, doubtlefs, the prefumptuous wifdom of man ordinarily dictates, but according to the fuperior wifdom of God "offences muft come" and "herefies alfo, that they that are approved may be "made manifeft."

Suppofing, therefore, the important diftinction between real and nominal Chriftians, all of the first character, of every age, and of every party, are fo far from being under the influence of implicit faith, that they try the truth by its fruits, and adhere to it for its effects. There is fomething more in the cafe of every good man, than barely a rational perfuafion of the truth of religion in general, from the arguments adduced to fupport it. The truths of the gofpel give him fuch a view of himfelf, and his own ftate, as experience fhews him to be true. In the gofpel he finds a remedy propofed for his guilt and mifery, which, befides all the other evidences of its divine original, is exactly fuited to his felt condition. Add to both these, that he immediately experiences its happy effect, not only in laying the beft foundation for his peace, but in operating a thorough change in his heart and life. Thus hath every real Chriftian, an inward and experimental proof of the truth of the gofpel, not contrary, but fuperior to, ftronger and more stable than any fpeculative reafoning. In this fenfe we are to underftand the words of the apoftle John, "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the wituels in "hintelf." This is common to all real believers of

1 John v. 9.