ver they are in themfelves, being no more than implicit faith and party prejudice in thofe who embrace them.

The fame vifible ftate of the world, which gives occafion of triumph to the enemies of religion, gives often, no fall uneafinefs and anxiety to its friends, particularly to the best and moft difpaffionate of every party. Serious and confcientious perfons, when they reflect upon the divifions that prevail, when they are witneffes to the contention and mutual accufation of different parties, are ready to be overwhelmed with melancholy upon the profpect, as well as involved in doubt and perplexity, as to what courfe they themselves fhould hold. It is not uncommon to find perfons of every rank in this fituation, not only thofe of better education, who are able to take an extenfive view of the ftate of things, in this and in preceding ages; but alfo thofe of lefs knowledge and comprehenfion, when any violent debates happen to fall within the fphere of their own obfervation.

Thefe reafons have induced me to make choice of the paffage now read as the fubject of difcourfe at this time. It contains the rule to which our Saviour appeals in his controverfy with the Pharifees, and by which he, once' and again, defires that their pretenfions may be judged. I ap prehend from the context, that it is equaily applicable to their characters and their principles, their integrity before God in their offices of teachers of others, and the foundness of their doctrine as to its effects upon those who fhould receive it. Thefe two things are, indeed, in a great meafure connected together, or rather they are mutually involved in one another, though it is poffible, and, in fome few cafes, profitable, to make a diftinction between them. What is further propofed, through the affiftance of divine grace, in the profecution of this fubject, is,

I. To fhow, that the rule here given by our Saviour is the beft that could have been given, and that it is fufficient to diftinguifh truth from error.

II. That this is in fact the rule by which all good men, and, indeed, mankind in general, fo far as they are fincere, do judge, of religious principles and pretenfions.

III. To conclude with fome reflections on the fubject for the benefit both of minifters and people.

In the first place then it is propofed to fhow, That the rule here given by our Saviour is the beft that could have been given, and that it is fufficient to diftinguish truth from error. To lay a foundation for this, it will be neceffary to begin by fettling, in a as precife a manner as poffible, the meaning of the rule, and to what cafes it can be juftly applied. "Ye fhall know them by their fruits," faith our Saviour.-That is to fay, when any perfon affumes the character of a divine teacher, and proposes any thing to your belief, as from God, fee whether its fruits be really fuitable to its pretenfions: particularly you are to lay down this as a principle, that, as he is holy in his nature, every thing that proceeds from him muft be holy in its tendency, and produce holiness as its fruit. In proportion as you fee this effect in him who teaches it, and thofe who, embrace it, fo receive it as true, or reject it as falfe.

By laying down the rule in these terms, I do not mean to deny, that, when a revelation is firft propofed as from God, or when the credit of fuch revelation in general is examined, miracles are a diftin&t and conclusive proof of a divine commiflion. I am perfuaded that nothing is more vague and indeterminate, and at the fame time, a more manifeft inverting the natural order of things, than to fay with some, We must judge of the truth of a miracle by the nature of the doctrine in fupport of which it is, wrought; and, if this laft is worthy of God, we may then admit the honorary teftimony of the mighty work in its behalf. They do not attend to the great ignorance of man in all fpiritual and divine things without revelation, and to the boldness of human pride, who fpeak in this manner. would rather include this as one of the proper fruits of a divine commiffion to teach any new doctrine, that figns be given of a fuperior power accompanying the prophet. Thus we fee the Jews made this demand of our Saviour, "What fign fheweft thou then, that we may fee and be lieve thee? What doft thou work?"* It is true, in

I

some instances, when, after many miracles, they perfifted in afking new figns of their own devifing, he condemns their obftinacy and refufes to gratify it. Notwithstanding this, we find him often appealing to his works as an atteftation of the truth of his miffion: thus he fays, " Be"lieve me that I am in the Father and the Father in me, "or else believe me for the very work's fake."* And elsewhere, "If I had not done among them the works that "none other man did, they had not had fin: but now they have both feen, and hated both me and my Fa ther." Agreeably to this, we find Nicodemus draw. ing the conclufion, "Rabbi, we know thou art a teacher "come from God, for no man can do the miracles that "thou doft, except God be with him."I

There is no doubt, however, that this must be infeparably joined with a purity of character, and fanctity of purpofe. When these are wanting, it gives the jufteft ground of fufpicion, leads to the ftricteft examination of miraculous pretenfions, and will certainly end in the discovery of fuch as are falfe. For this is the very excellence of the rule laid down by our Saviour, that, though reason may be very unfit to pafs an independent judgment upon truth and error, confcience may, with little danger of mistake, reject what is evil, and yield its approbation to what is good.

But what I have chiefly in view is, that fuppofing the truth of the gofpel in general, particular opinions and practices must be tried in this manner. As the gospel is allowed on all hands to be a doctrine according to godli nefs, when differences arife, and each oppofite fide pretends to have the letter of the law in its favor, the great rule of decifion is, which doth most immediately and moft certainly, promote piety and holiness in all manner of converfation. In this way every doctrinal opinion, every form of government, and every rite and practice in worfhip, may be brought to the teft, and tried by its fruits, As opinions, fo characters, must be tried in the fame The truth is this, though deferving particular

manner.

* John xiv. 11. † John xv. 24.

John ii. 2.

mention, is included in, or is but a part and branch of the other. To pass a judgment on particular characters is of very small moment, or rather, a peremptory decifion of this kind is both unneceffary and improper, unless when it is of weight in a caufe. It is only prophets and teachers that fall to be fingly, or perfonally tried, because they are fuppofed to exhibit, in their own practice, an example of the force and influence of their principles. If on them they have no effect that is good, there is not the leaft pretence for infifting that others fhould embrace them.

Nothing farther feems neceflary by way of explication of this rule, fave to obferve from the context, that fair and plaufible pretences, either of opinions or characters, muft be examined with particular care, as being moft ready to deceive; and the trial muft be more by facts than by reafoning, as is implied in the very language ufed in the text, "By their fruits ye fhall know them."

The excellency of this rule may be comprehended under the two following particulars, 1ft, Its certainty. zdly, Its perfpicuity.

The first of these will admit of little difpute. As God is infinitely holy in his own nature, every difcovery that he has made to any of his creatures, muft carry this impreffion upon it, and have a tendency to promote holiness in them. And, as this is manifeftly the defign of the facred oracles, and that fyftem of divine truth which they contain, every thing by way of opinion, or practice, that pretends to derive its authority from them, may lawfully be tried by this rule, Will it make us more holy than before?

It is of moment here to obferve, that this rule hath a deep and folid foundation. It proceeds upon the suppofition, that all natural are inferior to moral qualities; that even the nobleft intellectual abilities are only fo far valuable, as they are fubfervient to moral perfection; or in other words, that truth is in order to goodnefs. It is not (as has been often faid) in his Almighty power, his infinite wisdom, or the immensity of his being, that the glory of God chiefly confifts, but in his immaculate holinefs and fpotlefs purity. Each part of the divine character, in

deed, derives a luftre from the other. It is the union of greatness and goodness, that makes him truly God. His moral excellence becomes infinite in value and efficacy by refiding in an infinite object. But if it were poffible to feparate his natural perfection from his moral excellence, or could we fuppofe them joined to malignity of difpofition, he would be the proper object flet us speak it with reverence) not of fupreme love, but of infinite deteftation.

This is more than fufficient to fupport the order in which things are reprefented above, and how, that its moral influence is the proper touchstone and trial of religious truth, Thefe doctrines only come from God, which tend to form us after the divine image. Thus far, perhaps, all will allow it to be true; at leaft the affertion is common. But be pleased to obferve, that this neceffarily fuppofes the fure and infallible efficacy of real truth in promoting holiness, and the infufficiency of error and falfhood for this purpose. If these were not both alike certain, the rule would be equivocal and abfurd. If men by believing lies could attain to unfeigned goodness and true holiness, then their moral effect could not in the leaft ferve to diftinguish between truth and error. It is no lefs plain that if so abfurd a fuppofition is admitted but for a moment, the value of truth is wholly deftroyed, and no wife man will employ his time and pains in endeavoring to discover, to communicate, or to defend it.

The other particular comprehended under the excellence of this rule, is its perfpicuity; That, it is not only fure and infallible in itfelf, but capable of an eafy application by those who have occafion to use it. Here, if any where, there is room for doubt and difputation. Here, it may be alledged, all the confufion and uncertainty returns, which was before complained of, and for which a remedy was required. Men will ftill differ in their opinions as to what is true goodness. Befides, they will ftill debate the fincerity of many pretenfions, and the reality of many appearances; and, as art and hypocrify will always be used on the one hand, delufion must be the unavoidable confe quence on the other.