a fifth, Resemblance. This was a arrangement of things into classes, species of attribute which we found such as the class metal, or the class it impossible to analyse; for which man, is grounded indeed on a resemno fundamentum, distinct from the blance among the things which are objects themselves, could be assigned. placed in the same class, but not on a Besides propositions which assert a inere general resemblance: the resemsequence or co-existence between two blance it is grounded on consists in phenomena, there are therefore also the possession by all those things of propositions which assert resemblance certain common peculiarities; and between them; as, This colour is like those peculiarities it is which the that colour;-The heat of to-day is terms connote, and which the propoequal to the heat of yesterday. It is sitions consequently assert; not the true that such an assertion might resemblance. For though when I with some plausibility be brought say, Gold is a metal, say by impliwithin the description of an affirma- cation that if there be any other tion of sequence, by considering it as metals it must resemble them, yet if an assertion that the simultaneous there were no other metals I might contemplation of the two colours is still assert the proposition with the followed by a specific feeling termed same meaning as at present, namely, the feeling of resemblance. But there that gold has the various properties would be nothing gained by encum- implied in the word metal; just as it bering ourselves, especially in this might be said, Christians are men, place, with a generalisation which even if there were no men who were may be looked upon as strained. not Christians. Propositions, thereLogic does not undertake to analyse fore, in which objects are referred to mental facts into their ultimate ele- a class, because they possess the ments. Resemblance between two attributes constituting the class, are phenomena is more intelligible in so far from asserting nothing but itself than any explanation could resemblance, that they do not, promake it, and under any classification perly speaking, assert resemblance must remain specifically distinct from at all. the ordinary cases of sequence and co-existence. It is sometimes said, that all propositions whatever, of which the predicate is a general name, do, in point of fact, affirm or deny resemblance. All such propositions affirm that a thing belongs to a class; but things being classed together according to their resemblance, everything is of course classed with the things which it is supposed to resemble most; and thence, it may be said, when we affirm that Gold is a metal, or that Socrates is a man, the affirmation intended is, that gold resembles other metals, and Socrates other men, more nearly than they resemble the objects contained in any other of the classes co-ordinate with these. There is some slight degree of foundation for this remark, but no more than a slight degree. The But we remarked some time ago (and the reasons of the remark will be more fully entered into in a subsequent Book*) that there is sometimes a convenience in extending the boundaries of a class so as to include things which possess in a very inferior degree, if in any, some of the characteristic properties of the class,provided they resemble that class more than any other, insomuch that the general propositions which are true of the class will be nearer to being true of those things than any other equally general propositions. For instance, there are substances called metals which have very few of the properties by which metals are commonly recognised; and almost every great family of plants or animals has a few anomalous genera or *Book iv. ch. vii. species on its borders, which are admitted into it by a sort of courtesy, and concerning which it has been matter of discussion to what family they properly belonged. Now when the class-name is predicated of any object of this description, we do, by so predicating it, affirm resemblance and nothing more. And in order to be scrupulously correct, it ought to be said, that in every case in which we predicate a general name, we affirm, not absolutely that the object possesses the properties designated by the name, but that it either possesses those properties, or, if it does not, at any rate resembles the things which do so, more than it resembles any other things. In most cases, however, it is unnecessary to suppose any such alternative, the latter of the two grounds being very seldom that on which the assertion is made: and when it is, there is generally some slight difference in the form of the expression, as, This species (or genus) is considered, or may be ranked, as belonging to such and such a family: we should hardly say positively that it does belong to it, unless it possessed unequivocally the properties of which the class-name is scientifically significant. There is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance, the class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or rather simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say they are alike in this, and not alike in that, but because we feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When, therefore, I say, The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness, in both cases the attribute I affirin of the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance-simple likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had those names bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general names, are connotative; but they connote a mere resemblance. When predicated of any individual feeling, the information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by the same name. Thus much may suffice in illustration of the kind of propositions in which the matterof-fact asserted (or denied) is simple Resemblance. or Existence, Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Resemblance: one other of these is asserted (or denied) in every proposition which is not merely verbal. This fivefold division is an exhaustive classification of matters-of-fact; of all things that can be believed or tendered for be lief; of all questions that can be propounded, and all answers that can be returned to them. Professor Bain* distinguishes two kinds of Propositions of Co-existence. "In the one kind, account is taken of Place; they may be described as propositions of Order in Place." In the other kind, the co-existence which is predicated is termed by Mr. Bain Coinherence of Attributes. "This is a distinct variety of Propositions of Co-existence. Instead of an arrangement in place with numerical intervals, we have the concurrence of two or more attributes or powers in the same part or locality. A mass of gold contains, in every atom, the concurring attributes that mark the substance-weight, hardness, colour, lustre, incorrosibility, &c. An animal, besides having parts situated in place, has coinhering functions in the same parts, exerted by the very same masses and molecules of its substance. The Mind, which affords no Propositions of Order in Place, has coinhering functions. We affirm mind to contain Feeling, Will, and Thought, not in local separation, but in commingling exercise. The concurring properties of minerals, of plants, and of the bodily and the mental structure of animals, are united in affirmations of coinherence." The distinction is real and important. But, as has been seen, an Attribute, when it is anything but a simple unanalysable Resemblance between the subject and some other things, consists in causing impressions of some sort on consciousness. Consequently, the coinherence of two attributes is but the co-existence of the two states of consciousness implied in their meaning: with the difference, however, that this co-existence is sometimes potential only, the attribute being considered as in existence though the fact on which it is grounded may not be actually, but only potentially present. Snow, for instance, is, with great convenience, said to be white even in a state of total darkness, because, though we are not now conscious of the colour, we shall be conscious of it as soon as morning breaks. Coinherence of attributes is therefore still a case, though a complex one, of co-existence of states of consciousness: a totally different thing, however, from Order in Place. Being a part of simultaneity, it belongs not to Place but to Time. We may, therefore, (and we shall sometimes find it a convenience,) instead of Co-existence and Sequence, say, for greater particularity, Order in Place and Order in Time: Order in Place being a specific mode of coexistence, not necessary to be more particularly analysed here; while the mere fact of co-existence, whether between actual sensations, or between the potentialities of causing them, known by the name of attributes, may be classed, together with Sequence, under the head of Order in Time. § 7. In the foregoing inquiry into the import of Propositions, we have thought it necessary to analyse directly those alone in which the terms of the proposition (or the predicate at least) are concrete terms. But, in doing so, we have indirectly analysed those in which the terms are abstract. The distinction between an abstract term and its corresponding concrete, does not turn upon any difference in what they are appointed to signify; for the real signification of a concrete general name is, as we have so often said, its connotation; and what the concrete term connotes forms the entire meaning of the abstract name. Since there is nothing in the import of an abstract name which is not in the import of the corresponding concrete, it is natural to suppose that neither can there be anything in the import of a proposition of which the terms are abstract, but what there is in some proposition which can be framed of concrete terms. And this presumption a closer examination will confirm. An abstract name is the name of an attribute, or combination of attributes. The corresponding concrete is a name given to things, because of, and in order to express, their possessing that attribute, or that combination of attributes. When, therefore, we predicate of anything a concrete name, the attribute is what we in reality predicate of it. But it has now been shown that in all propositions of which the predicate is a concrete name, what is really predicated is one of five things: Existence, Co-existence, Causation, Sequence, or Resemblance. An attribute, therefore, is necessarily either an existence, a co-existence, a causation, a sequence, or a resemblance. When a proposition consists of a subject and predicate which are abstract terms, it consists of terms which must necessarily signify one or other of these things. When we predicate of anything an abstract name, we affirm of the thing that it is one orother of these five things; that it is a case of Existence, or of Co-existence, or of Causation, or of Sequence, or of Resemblance. 66 66 It is impossible to imagine any pro-lowing :-" Prudence is a virtue." position expressed in abstract terms, Let us substitute for the word virtue which cannot be transformed into a an equivalent but more definite exprecisely equivalent proposition in pression, such as a mental quality which the terms are concrete; namely, beneficial to society," or a mental either the concrete names which con- quality pleasing to God," or whatever note the attributes themselves, or the else we adopt as the definition of names of the fundamenta of those virtue. What the proposition asserts attributes; the facts or phenomena on is a sequence, accompanied with causawhich they are grounded. To illus- tion: namely, that benefit to society, trate the latter case, let us take this or that the approval of God, is conseproposition, of which the subject only quent on, and caused by, prudence. is an abstract name, "Thoughtlessness Here is a sequence; but between is dangerous." Thoughtlessness is what? We understand the consean attribute, grounded on the facts quent of the sequence, but we have which we call thoughtless actions; and yet to analyse the antecedent. Pruthe proposition is equivalent to this, dence is an attribute; and, in conThoughtless actions are dangerous. nection with it, two things besides itIn the next example the predicate as self are to be considered; prudent well as the subject are abstract names: persons, who are the subjects of the "Whiteness is a colour;' or "The attribute, and prudential conduct, colour of snow is a whiteness. These which may be called the foundation attributes being grounded on sensa. of it. tions, the equivalent propositions in the concrete would be, The sensation of white is one of the sensations called those of colour,-The sensation of sight, caused by looking at snow, is one of the sensations called sensations of white. In these propositions, as we have before seen, the matter-of-nor can they be acceptable to a good fact asserted is a Resemblance. In the following examples, the concrete terms are those which directly correspond to the abstract names; connoting the attribute which these denote. "Prudence is a virtue : this may be rendered, "All prudent persons, in so far as prudent, are virtuous : "Courage is deserving of honour," thus, "All courageous persons are deserving of honour in so far as they are courageous : which is equivalent to this" All courageous persons deserve an addition to the honour, or a diminution of the disgrace, which would attach to them on other grounds.' In order to throw still further light upon the import of propositions of which the terms are abstract, we will subject one of the examples given above to a minuter analysis. The proposition we shall select is the fol Now is either of these the antecedent? and, first, is it meant that the approval of God, or benefit to society, is attendant upon all prudent persons? No, except in so far as they are prudent; for prudent persons who are scoundrels can seldom on the whole be beneficial to society, being. Is it upon prudential conduct, then, that divine approbation and benefit to mankind are supposed to be invariably consequent? Neither is this the assertion meant, when it is said that prudence is a virtue; except with the same reservation as before, and for the same reason, namely, that prudential conduct, although in so far as it is beneficial to society, may yet, by reason of some other of its qualities, be productive of an injury outweighing the benefit, and deserve a displeasure exceeding the approbation which would be due to the prudence. Neither the substance, therefore, (viz. the person,) nor the phenomenon, (the conduct,) is an antecedent on which the other term of the sequence is universally consequent. But the proposition, "Prudence is a virtue," is an universal proposition. What is it, then, upon which the proposition CHAPTER VI. OF PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL. § 1. As a preparation for the inquiry which is the proper object of Logic, namely, in what manner propositions are to be proved, we have found it necessary to inquire what they contain which requires, or is susceptible of, proof; or (which is the same thing) what they assert. In the course of this preliminary investigation into the import of Propositions, we examined the opinion of the Conceptualists, that a proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas; and the doctrine of the extreme Nominalists, that it is the expression of an agreement or disagreement between the meanings of two names. We decided that, as general theories, both of these are erroneous; and that, though propositions may be made both respecting names and respecting ideas, neither the one nor the other are the subject-matter of Propositions considered generally. We then exa affirms the effects in question to be universally consequent? Upon that in the person, and in the conduct, which causes them to be called prudent, and which is equally in them when the action, though prudent, is wicked; namely, a correct foresight of consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the object in view, and repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with the deliberate purpose. These, which are states of the person's mind, are the real antecedent in the sequence, the real cause in the causation, asserted by the proposition. But these are also the real ground, or foundation, of the attribute Prudence; since wherever these states of mind exist we may predicate prudence, even before we know whether any conduct has followed. And in this manner every assertion respecting an attribute may be transformed into an assertion exactly equivalent respecting the fact or phenomenon which is the ground of the attribute. And no case can be assigned, where that which is predi-mined the different kinds of Propocated of the fact or phenomenon does not belong to one or other of the five species formerly enumerated: it is either simple Existence, or it is some Sequence, Co-existence, Causation, or Resemblance. sitions, and found that, with the exception of those which are merely verbal, they assert five different kinds of matters of fact, namely, Existence, Order in Place, Order in Time, Causation, and Resemblance; that in every And as these five are the only things proposition one of these five is either which can be affirmed, so are they the affirmed, or denied, of some fact or only things which can be denied. "No phenomenon, or of some object the unhorses are web-footed," denies that known source of a fact or phenomenon. the attributes of a horse ever co-exist In distinguishing, however, the difwith web-feet. It is scarcely neces-ferent kind of matters of fact asserted sary to apply the same analysis to in propositions, we reserved one class particular affirmations and negations. of propositions, which do not relate to "Some birds are web-footed," affirms any matter of fact, in the proper sense that, with the attributes connoted by of the term, at all, but to the meanbird, the phenomenon web-feet is ing of names. Since names and their sometimes co-existent : "Some birds signification are entirely arbitrary, are not web-footed," asserts that there such propositions are not, strictly are other instances in which this co- speaking, susceptible of truth or existence does not have place. Any falsity, but only of conformity or further explanation of a thing which, disconformity to usage or convention; if the previous exposition has been and all the proof they are capable assented to, is so obvious, may here of, is proof of usage; proof that be spared. the words have been employed by others in the acceptation in which the |