CHAPTER XII. OF THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OR ART; INCLUDING MORALITY AND POLICY. § 1. IN the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to characterise the present state of those among the branches of knowledge called Moral which are sciences in the only proper sense of the term, that is, inquiries into the course of nature. It is customary, however, to include under the term Moral Knowledge, and even (though improperly) under that of Moral Science, an inquiry the results of which do not express themselves in the indicative, but in the imperative mood, or in periphrases equivalent to it; what is called the knowledge of duties, practical ethics, or morality. Now, the imperative mood is the characteristic of art, as distinguished from science. Whatever speaks in rules or precepts, not in assertions respecting matters of fact, is art; and ethics or morality is properly a portion of the art corresponding to the sciences of human nature and society.* The Method, therefore, of Ethics, can be no other than that of Art, or Practice, in general: and the portion yet uncompleted, of the task which we proposed to ourselves in the concluding Book is to characterise the general Method of Art, as distinguished from Science. § 2. In all branches of practical business, there are cases in which individuals are bound to conform their practice to a pre-established rule, while there are others in which it is part of their task to find or construct the rule by which they are to govern their conduct. The first, for example, is the case of a judge under a definite * It is almost superfluous to observe, that there is another meaning of the word Art, in which it may be said to denote the poeti cal department or aspect of things in general, in contradistinction to the scientific. In the text, the word is used in its older, and, I hope, not yet obsolete sense. written code. The judge is not called upon to determine what course would be intrinsically the most advisable in the particular case in hand, but only within what rule of law it falls; what the legislature has ordained to be done in the kind of case, and must therefore be presumed to have intended in the individual case. The method must here be wholly and exclusively one of ratiocination or syllogism; and the process is obviously what in our analysis of the syllogism we showed that all ratiocination is, namely, the interpretation of a formula. In order that our illustration of the opposite case may be taken from the same class of subjects as the former, we will suppose, in contrast with the situation of the judge, the position of the legislator. As the judge has laws for his guidance, so the legis lator has rules and maxims of policy; but it would be a manifest error to suppose that the legislator is bound by these maxims in the same manner as the judge is bound by the laws, and that all he has to do is to argue down from them to the particular case, as the judge does from the laws. The legislator is bound to take into consideration the reasons or grounds of the maxim; the judge has nothing to do with those of the law, except so far as a consideration of them may throw light upon the intention of the lawmaker, where his words have left it doubtful. To the judge, the rule, once positively ascertained, is final; but the legislator, or other practitioner, who goes by rules rather than by their reasons, like the old-fashioned German tacticians who were vanquished by Napoleon, or the physician who preferred that his patients should die by rule rather than recover contrary to it, is rightly judged to be a mere pedant, and the slave of his formulas. Now, the reasons of a maxim of policy, or of any other rule of art, can be no other than the theorems of the corresponding science. The relation in which rules of art stand to doctrines of science may be thus characterised. The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premises, therefore, which Art supplies is the original major premise, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept. § 3. It deserves particular notice that the theorem or speculative truth is not ripe for being turned into a precept until the whole, and not a part merely, of the operation which belongs to science has been performed. Suppose that we have completed the scientific process only up to a certain point; have discovered that a particular cause will produce the desired effect, but have not ascertained all the negative conditions which are necessary, that is, all the circumstances which, if present, would prevent its production. If, in this imperfect state of the scientific theory, we attempt to frame a rule of art, we perform that operation prematurely. Whenever any counteracting cause, overlooked by the theorem, takes place, the rule will be at fault; we shall employ the means, and the end will not follow. No arguing from or about the rule itself will then help us through the difficulty; there is no thing for it but to turn back and finish the scientific process which should have preceded the formation of the rule. We must reopen the investigation to inquire into the remainder of the conditions on which the effect depends; and only after we have ascertained the whole of these are we prepared to transform the completed law of the effect into a precept, in which those circumstances or combinations of circumstances which the science exhibits as conditions are prescribed as means. It is true that, for the sake of convenience, rules must be formed from something less than this ideally perfect theory; in the first place, because the theory can seldom be made ideally perfect; and next, because, if all the counteracting contingencies, whether of frequent or of rare occurrence, were included, the rules would be too cumbrous to be apprehended and remembered by ordinary capacities, on the common occasions of life. The rules of art do not attempt to comprise more conditions than require to be attended to in ordinary cases; and are therefore always imperfect. In the manual arts, where the requisite conditions are not numerous, and where those which the rules do not specify are generally either plain to common observation or speedily learnt from practice, rules may often be safely acted on by persons who know nothing more than the rule. But in the complicated affairs of life, and still more in those of states and societies, rules cannot be relied on, without constantly referring back to the scientific laws on which they are founded. To know what are the practical contingencies which require a modification of the rule, or which are altogether exceptions to it, is to know what combinations of circumstances would interfere with, or entirely counteract, the consequences of those laws; and this can only be learnt by a reference to the theoretic grounds of the rule. By a wise practitioner, therefore, rules of conduct will only be con- nalism and political oratory; a misapprehension of the functions of Deduction which has brought much discredit, in the estimation of other countries, upon the spirit of generalisation so honourably characteristic of the French mind. The commonplaces of politics, in France, are large and sweeping practical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards to particular applications, and this they call being logical and consistent. For instance, they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure ought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which the form of government is founded; of the principle of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be answered, that if these be really practical principles, they must rest on speculative grounds; the sovereignty of the people (for example) must be a right foundation for government, because a government thus constituted tends to produce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are § 4. The error is therefore apparent of those who would deduce the line of conduct proper to particular cases from supposed universal practical maxims, overlooking the neces-attended with more or fewer inconsity of constantly referring back to the veniences, and since these cannot principles of the speculative science, usually be combated by means drawn in order to be sure of attaining even from the very causes which produce the specific end which the rules have them, it would be often a much in view. How much greater still, stronger recommendation of some then, must the error be of setting up practical arrangement that it does such unbending principles, not merely not follow from what is called the as universal rules for attaining a given general principle of the government, end, but as rules of conduct generally; than that it does. without regard to the possibility, not ment of legitimacy, the presumption only that some modifying cause may is far rather in favour of institutions prevent the attainment of the given of popular origin; and in a demoend by the means which the rule pre-cracy, in favour of arrangements tendscribes, but that success itself may conflict with some other end, which may possibly chance to be more desirable. This is the habitual error of many of the political speculators whom I have characterised as the geometrical school; especially in France, where ratiocination from rules of practice forms the staple commodity of jour Under a govern ing to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live. ever, difficult to understand what the nature of these intermediate principles must generally be. After framing the most comprehensive possible conception of the end to be aimed at, that is, of the effect to be produced, and determining in the same comprehensive manner the set of conditions on which that effect depends, there remains to be taken a general survey of the resources which can be com $5. The grounds, then, of every | art of Descriptive Geometry, as conrule of art are to be found in theorems ceived by M. Monge. It is not, howof science. An art, or a body of art, consists of the rules, together with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of those rules. The complete art of any matter includes a selection of such a portion from the science as is necessary to show on what conditions the effects which the art aims at producing depend. And Art in general consists of the truths of science, arranged in the most convenient order for prac-manded for realising this set of contice, instead of the order which is the inost convenient for thought. Science groups and arranges its truths so as to enable us to take in at one view as much as possible of the general order of the universe. Art, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them only into such of their detailed consequences as have led to the formation of rules of conduct, and brings together from parts of the field of science most remote from one another the truths relating to the production of the different and heterogeneous conditions necessary to each effect which the exigencies of practical life require to be produced.* Science, therefore, following one cause to its various effects, while art traces one effect to its multiplied and diversified causes and conditions, there is need of a set of intermediate scientific truths, derived from the higher generalities of science, and destined to serve as the generalia or first principles of the various arts. The scientific operation of framing these intermediate principles, M. Comte characterises as one of those results of philosophy which are reserved for futurity. The only complete example which he points out as actually realised, and which can be held up as a type to be imitated in more important matters, is the general theory of the * Professor Bain and others call the selection from the truths of science made for the purposes of an art, a Practical Science; and confine the name Art to the actual rules. ditions; and when the result of this survey has been embodied in the fewest and most extensive propositions possible, those propositions will express the general relation between the available means and the end, and will constitute the general scientific theory of the art, from which its practical methods will follow as corollaries. § 6. But though the reasonings which connect the end or purpose of every art with its means belong to the domain of Science, the definition of the end itself belongs exclusively to Art, and forms its peculiar province. Every art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed from science; that which enunciates the object aimed at, and affirms it to be a desirable object. The builder's art assumes that it is desirable to have buildings; architecture, (as one of the fine arts,) that it is desirable to have them beautiful or imposing. The hygienic and medical arts assume, the one that the preservation of health, the other that the cure of disease, are fitting and desirable ends. These are not propositions of science. Propositions of science assert a matter of fact: an existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance. propositions now spoken of do not assert that anything is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be. They are a class by themselves. proposition of which the predicate is expressed by the words ought or should be, is generically different from one The A which is expressed by is or will be. | that certain consequences follow from It is true that, in the largest sense certain causes, and that to obtain of the words, even these propositions certain ends, certain means are the assert something as a matter of fact. most effectual. Whether the ends The fact affirmed in them is, that themselves are such as ought to be the conduct recommended excites in pursued, and if so, in what cases and the speaker's mind the feeling of ap- to how great a length, it is no part of probation. This, however, does not his business as a cultivator of science go to the bottom of the matter, for to decide, and science alone will the speaker's approbation is no suffi- never qualify him for the decision. cient reason why other people should In purely physical science there is approve; nor ought it to be a conclu- not much temptation to assume this sive reason even with himself. For ulterior office; but those who treat the purposes of practice, every one of human nature and society invarimust be required to justify his appro-ably claim it; they always undertake bation; and for this there is need of general premises, determining what are the proper objects of approbation, and what the proper order of precedence among those objects. to say, not merely what is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is indispensable. A scientific theory, however perfect, of the subject-matThese general premises, together ter, considered merely as part of the with the principal conclusions which order of nature, can in no degree may be deduced from them, form (or serve as a substitute. In this respect rather might form) a body of doctrine, the various subordinate arts afford a which is properly the Art of Life, in misleading analogy. In them there its three departments, Morality, Pru- is seldom any visible necessity for dence or Policy, and Esthetics; the justifying the end, since in general Right, the Expedient, and the Beauti- its desirableness is denied by noful or Noble, in human conduct and body, and it is only when the works. To this art (which, in the question of precedence is to be demain, is unfortunately still to be cided between that end and some created) all other arts are subordi- other, that the general principles of nate; since its principles are those Teleology have to be called in; but which must determine whether the a writer on Morals and Politics respecial aim of any particular art is quires those principles at every step. worthy and desirable, and what is its The most elaborate and well-digested place in the scale of desirable things. exposition of the laws of succession Every art is thus a joint result of and co-existence among mental laws of nature disclosed by science, social phenomena, and of their relaand of the general principles of what tion to one another as causes and has been called Teleology, or the effects, will be of no avail towards Doctrine of Ends; * which, borrow- the art of Life or of Society, if the ing the language of the German meta-ends to be aimed at by that art are physicians, may also be termed, not improperly, the principles of Practical Reason. A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show * The word Teleology is also, but inconveniently and improperly, employed by some writers as a name for the attempt to explain the phenomena of the universe from final causes. or left to the vague suggestions of the intellectus sibi permissus, or are taken for granted without analysis or questioning. § 7. There is, then, a Philosophia Prima peculiar to Art, as there is one which belongs to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowledge, but first principles of Conduct. There must be some standard by which to |