dum quid; but the theory assumes it to be true absolutely, and infers that increase of money is increase of riches, even when produced by means ubversive of the condition under which alone money can be riches. founded not on the same proposition, | that he is not debarred from employbut on some other, resembling it suffi- ing his money in such purchases. The ciently to be mistaken for it. In-premise, therefore, is only true secuntances of this fallacy will be found in almost all the argumentative discourses of unprecise thinkers, and we need only here advert to one of the obscurer forms of it, recognised by the schoolmen as the fallacy à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. A second instance is, the argument This is committed when, in the pre- by which it used to be contended, bemises, a proposition is asserted with a fore the commutation of tithe, that qualification, and the qualification lost tithes fell on the landlord, and were sight of in the conclusion; or oftener, a deduction from rent; because the when a limitation or condition, though rent of tithe - free land was always not asserted, is necessary to the truth higher than that of land of the same of the proposition, but is forgotten quality, and the same advantages of when that proposition comes to be situation, subject to tithe. Whether employed as a premise. Many of the it be true or not that a tithe falls on bad arguments in vogue belong to rent, a treatise on Logic is not the this class of error. The premise is place to examine; but it is certain some admitted truth, some common that this is no proof of it. Whether maxim, the reasons or evidence for the proposition be true or false, tithewhich have been forgotten, or are not free land must, by the necessity of the thought of at the time, but if they had case, pay a higher rent. For if tithes been thought of would have shown the do not fall on rent, it must be because necessity of so limiting the premise they fall on the consumer; because that it would no longer have sup- they raise the price of agricultural ported the conclusion drawn from it. produce. But if the produce be raised Of this nature is the fallacy in what in price, the farmer of tithe-free as is called, by Adam Smith and others, well as the farmer of tithed land gets the Mercantile Theory in Political the benefit. To the latter the rise is Economy. That theory sets out from but a compensation for the tithes he the common maxim, that whatever pays; to the first, who pays none, it brings in money enriches; or that is clear gain, and therefore enables every one is rich in proportion to the him, and if there be freedom of comquantity of money he obtains. From petition forces him to pay so much this it is concluded that the value of more rent to his landlord. The quesany branch of trade, or of the trade tion remains, to what class of fallacies of the country altogether, consists in this belongs. The premise is, that the the balance of money it brings in; owner of tithed land receives less rent that any trade which carries more than the owner of tithe-free land; the money out of the country than it conclusion is, that therefore he redraws into it is a losing trade; that ceives less than he himself would retherefore money should be attracted ceive if tithe were abolished. But the into the country and kept there, by premise is only true conditionally; the prohibitions and bounties; and a train owner of tithed land receives less than of similar corollaries. All for want of what the owner of tithe-free land is reflecting that if the riches of an indi- enabled to receive when other lands are vidual are in proportion to the quan- tithed; while the conclusion is applied tity of money he can command, it is to a state of circumstances in which because that is the measure of his that condition fails, and in which, power of purchasing money's worth; by consequence, the premise will not and is therefore subject to the proviso | be true. The fallacy, therefore, is à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. 529 premise for proving others, is the condition of time. It is a principle of political economy that prices, profits, wages, &c., "always find their level;" but this is often interpreted as if it meant that they are always, or generally, at their level; while the truth is, as Coleridge epigrammatically expresses it, that they are always finding their level, "which might be taken as a paraphrase or ironical definition of a storm." Under the same head of fallacy (à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter) might be placed all the errors which are vulgarly called misapplications of abstract truths: that is, whe a principle, true (as the commo pression is) in the abstract, the modifying causes being sup sent, is reasoned on as if it we absolutely, and no modifying c A third example is the opposition sometimes made to legitimate interferences of government in the economical affairs of society, grounded on a misapplication of the maxim, that an individual is a better judge than the government of what is for his own pecuniary interest. This objection was urged to Mr. Wakefield's principle of colonisation; the concentration of the settlers, by fixing such a price on unoccupied land as may preserve the most desirable proportion between the quantity of land in culture and the labouring population. Against this it was argued, that if individuals found it for their advantage to occupy extensive tracts of land, they, being better judges of their own interest than the Legislature, (which can only proceed on general rules,) ought not to be re-stance could ever by possibility strained from doing so. But in this This very common form of erro. argument it was forgotten that the not requisite that we should exemfact of a person's taking a large tract of plify here, as it will be particularly land is evidence only that it is his in-treated of hereafter in its application. terest to take as much as other people, to the subjects on which it is most but not that it might not be for his frequent and most fatal, those of poliinterest to content himself with less, if tics and society.* he could be assured that other people would do so too; an assurance which nothing but a government regulation can give. If all other people took much, and he only a little, he would Is not the word reap none of the advantages derived in italics frequently omitted? Might any from the concentration of the popula-man honestly try to do for himself all that tion and the consequent possibility of procuring labour for hire, but would have placed himself, without equivalent, in a situation of voluntary inferiority. The proposition, therefore, that the quantity of land which people will take when left to themselves is that which is most for their interest to take, is true only secundum quid: it is only their interest while they have no guarantee for the conduct of one another. But the argument disregards the limitation, and takes the proposition for true simpliciter. One of the conditions oftenest dropped, when what would otherwise be a true proposition is employed as a (Formal Logic, p. 270,) "is sometimes guilty of the argument à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter it is his business to do for his client all that his client might honestly do for himself. * "An advocate," says Mr. De Morgan, counsel frequently try to do for him? We are often reminded of the two men who stole the leg of mutton; one could swear he had not got it, the other that he had not taken it. The counsel is doing his duty by his client, the client has left the matter to tention of the client and the unintended execution of the counsel there may be a wrong done, and, if we are to believe the usual maxims, no wrong-doer." his counsel. Between the unexecuted in The same writer justly remarks (p. 251) that there is a converse fallacy, à dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, called by the scholastic logicians fallacia accia dicto secundum quid ad dictum secundum dentis; and another, which may be called alterum quid (p. 265). For apt instances of both, I must refer the reader to Mr. De Morgan's able chapter on Fallacies. CHAPTER VII. FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. § 1. UNDER this fifth and last class it is convenient to arrange all those fallacies in which the source of error is not so much a false estimate of the probative force of known evidence, as an indistinct, indefinite, and fluctuating conception of what the evidence is. At the head of these stands that multitudinous body of fallacious reasonings in which the source of error is the ambiguity of terms: when something which is true, if a word be used in a particular sense, is reasoned on as if it were true in another sense. In such a case there is not a malestimation of evidence, because there is not properly any evidence to the point at all; there is evidence, but to a different point, which, from a confused apprehension of the meaning of the terms used, is supposed to be the same. This error will naturally be oftener committed in our ratiocinations than in our direct inductions, because in the former we are deciphering our own or other people's notes, while in the latter we have the things themselves present, either to the senses or to the memory. Except, indeed, when the induction is not from individual cases to a generality, but from generalities to a still higher generalisation; in that case the fallacy of ambiguity may affect the inductive process as well as the ratiocinative. It occurs in ratiocination in two ways: when the middle term is ambiguous, or when one of the terms of the syllogism is taken in one sense in the premises and in another sense in the conclusion. Some good exemplifications of this fallacy are given by Archbishop Whately. "One case," says he, "which may be regarded as coming under the head of Ambiguous Middle, is (what I believe logical writers mean by 'Fallacia Figure Dictionis') the fallacy built on the grammatical structure of language, from men's usually taking for granted that paronymous (or conjugate) words, i.e. those belonging to each other, as the substantive, adjective, verb, &c., of the same root, have a precisely corresponding meaning; which is by no means universally the case. Such a fallacy could not indeed be even exhibited in strict logical form, which would preclude even the attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as sense. But nothing is more common in practice than to vary continually the terms employed, with a view to grammatical convenience; nor is there anything unfair in such a practice, as long as the meaning is preserved unaltered; e.g. 'murder should be punished with death; this man is a murderer, therefore he deserves to die,' &c. Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) that to commit murder, and to be a murderer,—to deserve death, and to be one who ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent expressions; and it would frequently prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind of liberty; but the abuse of it gives rise to the fallacy in question; e.g. projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a project, therefore he is unfit to be trusted: here the sophist proceeds on the hypothesis that he who forms a project must be a projector; whereas the bad sense that commonly attaches to the latter word, is not at all implied in the former. This fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the Middle, but in one of the terms of the Conclusion; so that the conclusion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the premises, though it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words: e.g. to be acquainted with the guilty is a presumption of guilt; this man is so acquainted, therefore we may presume that he is guilty: this argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence between presume and presumption, which, however, does not 531 really exist; for 'presumption' is "scarcity of money." In the language commonly used to express a kind of commerce "money" has two meanof slight suspicion; whereas, to 'pre-ings: currency, or the circulating sume' amounts to actual belief. There medium; and capital seeking investare innumerable instances of a non-ment, especially investment on loan. correspondence in paronymous words, In this last sense the word is used similar to that above instanced; as when the "money market" is spoken between art and artful, design and of, and when the "value of money designing, faith and faithful, &c.; and is said to be high or low, the rate the more slight the variation of the of interest being meant. The conmeaning, the more likely is the fal- sequence of this ambiguity is, that as lacy to be successful; for when the soon as scarcity of money in the latter words have become so widely removed of these senses begins to be felt,-as in sense as 'pity' and 'pitiful,' every soon as there is difficulty of obtaining one would perceive such a fallacy, nor loans, and the rate of interest is high, would it be employed but in jest.* -it is concluded that this must arise from causes acting upon the quantity of money in the other and more popular sense; that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought to be increased. I am aware that, independently of the double meaning of the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities, giving an apparent support to this error; but the ambiguity of the language stands on the very threshold of the subject, and intercepts all attempts to throw light upon it. "The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather, perhaps, may be regarded as a branch of, that founded on etymology; viz. when a term is used at one time in its customary, and at another in its etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word representative: assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb 'represent,' the sophist persuades the multitude that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and, in short, to be merely their spokesman; whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on his own responsibility." Another ambiguous expression which continually meets us in the political controversies of the present time, especially in those which relate to organic changes, is the phrase "influence of property," which is sometimes used for the influence of respect for superior intelligence, or gratitude for the kind offices which persons of large property have it so much in their power to bestow; at other times for the influence of fear; fear of the The following are instances of great worst sort of power, which large propractical importance, in which argu-perty also gives to its possessor, the ments are habitually founded on a verbal ambiguity. The mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the phrase * An example of this fallacy is the popular error that strong drink must be a cause of strength. There is here fallacy within fallacy; for granting that the words "strong" and "strength' were not (as they are) applied in a totally different sense to fermented liquors and to the human body, there would still be involved power of doing mischief to dependents. To confound these two is the standing fallacy of ambiguity brought against those who seek to purify the the error of supposing that an effect must be like its cause; that the conditions of a phenomenon are likely to resemble the phenomenon itself; which we have already treated of as an à priori fallacy of the first rank. As well might it be supposed that a strong poison would make the person who takes it strong. electoral system from corruption and intimidation. Persuasive influence, acting through the conscience of the voter, and carrying his heart and mind with it, is beneficial; therefore (it is pretended) coercive influence, which compels him to forget that he is a moral agent, or to act in opposition to his moral convictions, ought not to be placed under restraint. force to this ambiguity. The clergy, being called the Church, are supposed to be the real owners of what is called Church property, whereas they are in truth only the managing members of a much larger body of proprietors, and enjoy on their own part a mere usufruct, not extending beyond a life interest. The following is a Stoical argument taken from Cicero, De Finibus, book the third: "Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est. Quod autem laudabile est, omne honestum est. Bonum igitur quod est, honestum est." Here the ambiguous word is laudabile, which in the minor premise means anything which mankind are accustomed, on good grounds, to admire or value; as beauty, for instance, or good fortune; but in the major it denotes exclusively moral qualities. In much the same manner the Stoics endeavoured logically to justify as philosophical truths their figurative and rhetorical expressions of ethical sentiment: as that the virtuous man is alone free, alone beautiful, alone a king, &c. Whoever has virtue has Good, (because it has been previously determined not to call anything else good;) but, again, Good necessarily includes freedom, beauty, and even kingship, all these being good things; therefore whoever has virtue has all these. Another word which is often turned into an instrument of the fallacy of ambiguity is Theory. In its most proper acceptation, theory means the completed result of philosophical induction from experience. In that sense, there are erroneous as well as true theories, for induction may be incorrectly performed, but theory of some sort is the necessary result of knowing anything of a subject, and having put one's knowledge into the form of general propositions for the guidance of practice. In this, the proper sense of the word, Theory is the explanation of practice. In another and a more vulgar sense, theory means any mere fiction of the imagination, endeavouring to conceive how a thing may possibly have been produced, instead of examining how it was produced. In this sense only are theory and theorists unsafe guides; but because of this, ridicule or discredit is attempted to be attached to theory in its proper sense, that is, to legitimate generalisation, the end and The following is an argument of aim of all philosophy; and a conclu- Descartes to prove, in his à priori sion is represented as worthless, just manner, the being of a God. The because that has been done which, if conception, says he, of an infinite done correctly, constitutes the highest Being proves the real existence of worth that a principle for the guid- such a being. For if there is not ance of practice can possess, namely, really any such being, I must have to comprehend in a few words the made the conception; but if I could real law on which a phenomenon de-inake it, I can also unmake it; which pends, or some property or relation which is universally true of it. "The Church" is sometimes understood to mean the clergy alone, sometimes the whole body of believers, or at least of communicants. The declamations respecting the inviolability of Church property are indebted for the greater part of their apparent evidently is not true; therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype, from which the conception was derived. In this argument (which, it may be observed, would equally prove the real existence of ghosts and of witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun I, by which, in one place, is to be understood my will, in another |