minds make almost all their induc- | language: when it is our own, it is tions, and that we all do so in the generally experience long past; unless, cases in which familiar experience therefore, it were recorded by means forces our conclusions upon us with- of artificial signs, little of it (except in out any active process of inquiry on cases involving our intenser sensations our part, and in which the belief or or emotions, or the subjects of our daily expectation follows the suggestion of and hourly contemplation) would be the evidence with the promptitude retained in the memory. It is hardly and certainty of an instinct.* necessary to add, that when the inductive inference is of any but the most direct and obvious nature-when it requires several observations or experi the comparison of one of these with another-it is impossible to proceed a step without the artificial memory which words bestow. Without words, we should, if we had often seen A and B in immediate and obvious conjunction, expect B whenever we saw A; but to discover their conjunction when not obvious, or to determine whether it is really constant or only casual, and whether there is reason to expect it under any given change of circumstances, is a process far too complex to be performed without some contrivance to make our remembrance of our own mental operations accurate. Now, language is such a contrivance. When that instrument is called to our aid, the difficulty is reduced to that of making our remembrance of the meaning of words accurate. This being secured, whatever passes through our minds may be remembered accurately by putting it carefully into words, and committing the words either to writing or to memory. § 3. But though inference of an inductive character is possible without the use of signs, it could never, with-ments in varying circumstances, and out them, be carried much beyond the very simple cases which we have just described, and which form, in all probability, the limit of the reasonings of those animals to whom conventional language is unknown. Without language, or something equivalent to it, there could only be as much reasoning from experience as can take place without the aid of general propositions. Now, though in strictness we may reason from past experience to a fresh individual case without the intermediate stage of a general proposition, yet without general propositions we should seldom remember what past experience we have had, and scarcely ever what conclusions that experience will warrant. The division of the inductive process into two parts, the first ascertaining what is a mark of the given fact, the second whether in the new case that mark exists, is natural, and scientifically indispensable. It is, indeed, in a majority of cases, rendered necessary by mere distance of time. The experience by which we are to guide our judgments may be other people's experience, little of which can be communicated to us otherwise than by * Mr. Bailey agrees with me in thinking that whenever from something actually present to my senses, conjoined with past experience, I feel satisfied that something has happened, or will happen, or is hap; pening beyond the sphere of my personal observation," I nay with strict propriety be said to reason, and of course to reason inductively, for demonstrative reasoning is excluded by the circumstances of the case. (The Theory of Reasoning, 2nd ed., p. 27.) The function of Naming, and particularly of General Names, in Induction may be recapitulated as follows. Every inductive inference which is of cases; and, that the inference may good at all is good for a whole class have any better warrant of its correctness than the mere clinging together of two ideas, a process of experimen tation and comparison is necessary, in which the whole class of cases must be brought to view, and some uniformity in the course of nature evolved and ascertained, since the existence of such an uniformity is required as we could get on without any other a justification for drawing the infer- general names than the abstract names ence in even a single case. This uni- of attributes; all our propositions formity, therefore, may be ascertained might be of the form “such an indionce for all; and if, being ascertained, vidual object possesses such an attriit can be remembered, it will serve as bute," or "such an attribute is always a formula for making, in particular | (or never) conjoined with such another cases, all such inferences as the pre- attribute.” In fact, however, manvious experience will warrant. But kind have always given general names we can only secure its being remem- to objects as well as attributes, and bered, or give ourselves even a chance indeed before attributes; but the of carrying in our memory any con- general names given to objects imply siderable number of such uniformi- attributes, derive their whole meaning ties, by registering them through the from attributes, and are chiefly usemedium of permanent signs, which ful as the language by means of which (being, from the nature of the case, we predicate the attributes which they signs not of an individual fact, but of connote. an uniformity, that is, of an indefinite number of facts similar to one another) are general signs, universals, general names, and general propositions. It remains to be considered what principles are to be adhered to in giving general names, so that these names, and the general propositions in which they fill a place, may conduce most to the purposes of Induction. CHAPTER IV. PHICAL LANGUAGE, AND THE PRIN- § 4. And here I cannot omit to notice an oversight committed by some eminent thinkers, who have said that the cause of our using general names is the infinite multitude of individual objects, which, making it OF THE REQUISITES OF A PHILOSOimpossible to have a name for each, compels us to make one name serve for many. This is a very limited view of the function of general names. Even if there were a name for every individual object, we should require general names as much as we now do. Without them we could not express the result of a single comparison, nor record any one of the uniformities existing in nature; and should be hardly better off in respect to Induction than if we had no names at all. With none but names of individuals, (or, in other words, proper names,) we might, by pronouncing the name, suggest the idea of the object, but we could not assert any proposition, except the unmeaning ones formed by predicating two proper names one of another. It is only by means of general names that we can convey any information, predicate any attribute, even of an individual, much more of a class. Rigorously speaking, § 1. In order that we may possess a language perfectly suitable for the investigation and expression of general truths, there are two principal and several minor requisites. The first is, that every general name should have a meaning, steadily fixed and precisely determined. When, by the fulfilment of this condition, such names as we possess are fitted for the due performance of their functions, the next requisite, and the second in order of importance, is that we should possess a name wherever one is needed; wherever there is anything to be designated by it, which it is of importance to express. The former of these requisites is that to which our attention will be exclusively directed in the present chapter. § 2. Every general name, then, must have a certain and knowable mean- | which the name expresses with them, ing. Now the meaning (as has so when they predicate it of an object, often been explained) of a general is a confused feeling of resemblance connotative name resides in the con- between that object and some of the notation; in the attribute on account other things which they have been of which, and to express which, the accustomed to denote by the name. name is given. Thus, the name ani- They have applied the name Stone to mal being given to all things which various objects previously seen; they possess the attributes of sensation see a new object, which appears to and voluntary motion, the word con- them somewhat like the former, and notes those attributes exclusively, and they call it a stone, without asking they constitute the whole of its mean- themselves in what respect it is like, ing. If the name be abstract, its or what mode or degree of resemblance denotation is the same with the con- the best authorities, or even they themnotation of the corresponding con- selves, require as a warrant for using crete; it designates directly the attri- the name. This rough general imbute which the concrete term implies. pression of resemblance is, however, To give a precise meaning to general made up of particular circumstances names is, then, to fix with steadiness of resemblance; and into these it is the attribute or attributes connoted the business of the logician to analyse by each concrete general name, and it-to ascertain what points of redenoted by the corresponding ab- semblance among the different things stract. Since abstract names, in the commonly called by the name have order of their creation, do not pre-produced in the common mind this cede but follow concrete ones, as is proved by the etymological fact that they are almost always derived from them, we may consider their meaning as determined by and dependent on the meaning of their concrete; and thus the problem of giving a distinct meaning to general language is all included in that of giving a precise connotation to all concrete general names. This is not difficult in the case of new names of the technical terms created by scientific inquirers for the purposes of science or art. But when a name is in common use, the difficulty is greater; the problem in this case not being that of choosing a convenient connotation for the name, but of ascertaining and fixing the connotation with which it is already used. That this can ever be a matter of doubt is a sort of paradox. But the vulgar (including in that term all who have not accurate habits of thought) seldom know exactly what assertion they intend to make, what common property they mean to express, when they apply the same name to a number of different things. All vague feeling of likeness-have given to the things the similarity of aspect which has made them a class, and has caused the same name to be bestowed upon them. But though general names are imposed by the vulgar without any more definite connotation than that of a vague resemblance, general propositions come in time to be made, in which predicates are applied to those names, that is, general assertions are made concerning the whole of the things which are denoted by the name. And since by each of these propositions some attribute, more or less precisely conceived, is of course predicated, the ideas of these various attributes thus become associated with the name, and in a sort of uncertain way it comes to connote them; there is a hesitation to apply the name in any new case in which any of the attributes familiarly predicated of the class do not exist. And thus, to common minds, the propositions which they are in the habit of hearing or uttering concerning a class make up in a loose way a sort of connotation for the class-name. Let us take, for instance, the word Civilised. How cannot possibly have been brought few could be found, even among the most educated persons, who would undertake to say exactly what the term Civilised connotes. Yet there is a feeling in the minds of all who use it that they are using it with a meaning; and this meaning is made up, in a confused manner, of everything which they have heard or read that civilised men or civilised communities are or may be expected to be. It is at this stage, probably, in the progress of a concrete name, that the corresponding abstract name generally comes into use. Under the notion that the concrete name must of course convey a meaning, or, in other words, that there is some property common to all things which it denotes, people give a name to this common property; from the concrete Civilised, they form the abstract Civilisation. But since most people have never compared the different things which are called by the concrete name, in such a manner as to ascertain what properties these things have in com. mon, or whether they have any; each is thrown back upon the marks by which he himself has been accustomed to be guided in his application of the term; and these, being merely vague hearsays and current phrases, are not the same in any two persons, nor in the same person at different times. Hence the word (as Civilisation, for example) which professes to be the designation of the unknown common property, conveys scarcely to any two minds the same idea. No two persons agree in the things they predicate of it; and when it is itself predicated of anything, no other person knows, nor does the speaker himself know with precision, what he means to assert. Many other words which could be named, as the word honour, or the word gentleman, exemplify this uncertainty still more strikingly. It needs scarcely be observed that general propositions, of which no one can tell exactly what they assert, to the test of a correct induction. Whether a name is to be used as an instrument of thinking, or as a means of communicating the result of thought, it is imperative to determine exactly the attribute or attributes which it is to express to give it, in short, a fixed and ascertained connotation. § 3. It would, however, be a complete misunderstanding of the proper office of a logician in dealing with terms already in use, if we were to think that because a name has not at present an ascertained connotation, it is competent to any one to give it such a connotation at his own choice. The meaning of a term actually in use is not an arbitrary quantity to be fixed, but an unknown quantity to be sought. In the first place, it is obviously desirable to avail ourselves, as far as possible, of the associations already connected with the name; not enjoining the employment of it in a manner which conflicts with all previous habits, and especially not so as to require the rupture of those strongest of all associations between names, which are created by familiarity with propositions in which they are predicated of one another. A philosopher would have little chance of having his example followed if he were to give such a meaning to his terms as should require us to call the North American Indians a civilised people, or the higher classes in Europe savages; or to say that civilised people live by hunting, and savages by agriculture. Were there no other reason, the extreme difficulty of effecting so complete a revolution in speech would be more than a sufficient one. endeavour should be that all generally received propositions into which the term enters should be at least as true after its meaning is fixed as they were before; and that the concrete name, therefore, should not receive such a connotation as shall prevent it The from denoting things which, in com-perties most generally known may mon language, it is currently affirmed not be those which serve best to mark of. The fixed and precise connota- out the class from all others. We tion which it receives should not be should therefore select from among in deviation from, but in agreement the common properties (if among (as far as it goes) with the vague and them any such are to be found) those fluctuating connotation which the on which it has been ascertained by term already had. experience, or proved by deduction, that many others depend; or at least which are sure marks of them, and from whence, therefore, many others will follow by inference. We thus see that to frame a good definition of a name already in use is not a matter of choice but of discussion, and discussion not merely respecting the usage of language, but respecting the properties of things, and even the origin of those properties. And hence every enlargement of our knowledge of the objects to which the name is applied is liable to suggest an improvement in the definition. It is impossible to frame a perfect set of definitions on any subject until the theory of the subject perfect; and as science makes progress, its definitions are also progressive. To fix the connotation of a concrete name, or the denotation of the corresponding abstract, is to define the name. When this can be done without rendering any received assertions inadmissible, the name can be defined in accordance with its received use, which is vulgarly called defining not the name but the thing. What is meant by the improper expression of defining a thing, (or rather a class of things-for nobody talks of defining an individual,) is to define the name, subject to the condition that it shall denote those things. This, of course, supposes a comparison of the things, feature by feature and property by property, to ascertain what attributes they agree in; and not unfrequently an operation strictly inductive, for the purpose of ascertaining some unobvious agreement, which is the cause of the obvious agreement. For, in order to give a connotation to a name consistently with its denoting certain objects, we have to make our selection from among the various attributes in which those objects agree. To ascertain in what they do agree is, therefore, the first logical operation requisite. When this has been done as far as is necessary or practicable, the question arises, which of these common attributes shall be selected to be associated with the name? For if the class which the name denotes be a Kind, the common properties are innumerable; and even if not, they are often extremely numerous. Our choice is first limited by the preference to be given to properties which are well known and familiarly predicated of the class; but even these are often too numerous to be all included in the definition, and, besides, the pro § 4. The discussion of Definitions, in so far as it does not turn on the use of words but on the properties of things, Dr. Whewell calls the Explication of Conceptions. The act of ascertaining, better than before, in what particulars any phenomena which are classed together agree, he calls in his technical phraseology, unfolding the general conception in virtue of which they are so classed. Making allowance for what appears to me the darkening and misleading tendency of this mode of expression, several of his remarks are so much to the purpose, that I shall take the liberty of transcribing them. * He observes, that many of the controversies which have had an important share in the formation of the existing body of science have "assumed the form of a battle of Definitions. For example, the inquiry *Novum Organum Renovatum, pp. 35-37. |