own state of mind.

bling-block was one as

the word explanation, and which the reviewer would have us think can only be found in referring phenomena to a will. When Thales and Hippo held that moisture was the universal cause and external element of which all other things were but the infinitely various sensible manifestations; when Anaximenes predicted the same thing of air, Pythagoras of numbers, and the like, they all thought that they had found a real explanation, and were content to rest in this explanation as ultimate. The ordinary sequences of the external universe appeared to them, no less than to their critic, to be inconceivable without the supposition of some universal agency to connect the antecedents with the consequents; but they did not think that Volition, exerted by minds, was the only agency which fulfilled this requirement. Moisture, or air, or numbers, carried to their minds a precisely similar impression of making intelligible what was otherwise inconceivable. and gave the same full satisfaction to the demands of their conceptive faculty.

"Their stum-lation of physical facts to other to the nature physical facts the kind of mental of the evidence they had to expect satisfaction which we connect with for their conviction. They had not seized the idea that they must not expect to understand the processes of outward causes, but only their results and consequently, the whole physical philosophy of the Greeks was an attempt to identify mentally the effect with its cause, to feel after some not only necessary but natural connection, where they meant by natural that which would per se carry some presumption to their own mind. They wanted to see some reason why the physical antecedent should produce this particular consequent, and their only attempts were in directions where they could find such reasons,' In other words, they were not content merely to know that one phenomenon was always followed by another; they thought that they had not attained the true aim of science unless they could perceive something in the nature of the one phenomenon from which it might have been known or presumed previous to trial that it would be followed by the other; just what the writer, who has so clearly pointed out their error, thinks that he perceives in the nature of the phenomenon Volition. And to complete the statement of the case, he should have added that these early speculators not only made this their aim, but were quite satisfied with their success in it; not only sought for causes which should carry in their mere statement evidence of their efficiency, but fully believed that they had found such causes. The reviewer can see plainly that this was an error, because he does not believe that there exist any relations between material phenomena which can account for their producing one another; but the very fact of the persistency of the Greeks in this error shows that their minds were in a very different state: they were able to derive from the assimi

* Prospective Review for February 1850.

It was not the Greeks alone who "wanted to see some reason why the physical antecedent should produce this particular consequent," some connection "which would per se carry some presumption to their own mind." Among modern philosophers, Leibnitz laid it down as a self-evident principle that all physical causes without exception must contain in their own nature something which makes it intelligible that they should be able to produce the effects which they do produce. Far from admitting Volition as the only kind of cause which carried internal evidence of its own power, and as the real bond of connection between physical antecedents and their consequents, he demanded some naturally and per se efficient physical antecedent as the bond of connection between Volition itself and its effects.

He distinctly refused to admit the will of God as a sufficient explanation of anything except miracles; and insisted upon finding something that would account better for the phenomena of nature than a mere reference to divine volition.*

on the occasion of a flint and steel coming together, or to break an egg on the occasion of its falling on the ground.

All this, undoubtedly, shows that it is the disposition of mankind in general not to be satisfied with knowAgain, and conversely, the action ing that one fact is invariably anteof mind upon matter (which, we are cedent and another consequent, but now told, not only needs no explana- to look out for something which may tion itself, but is the explanation of seem to explain their being so. But all other effects) has appeared to we also see that this demand may be some thinkers to be itself the grand completely satisfied by an agency inconceivability. It was to get over purely physical, provided it be much this very difficulty that the Cartesians more familiar than that which it is invented the system of Occasional invoked to explain. To Thales and Causes. They could not conceive that Anaximenes it appeared inconceivthoughts in a mind could produce able that the antecedents which we movements in a body, or that bodily see in nature should produce the conmovements could produce thoughts. sequents, but perfectly natural that They could see no necessary connec- water or air should produce them. tion, no relation à priori, between a The writers whom I oppose declare motion and a thought. And as the this inconceivable, but can conceive Cartesians, more than any other school that mind, or volition, is per se an of philosophical speculation before or efficient cause; while the Cartesians since, made their own minds the mea- could not conceive even that, but sure of all things, and refused, on peremptorily declared that no mode principle, to believe that Nature had of production of any fact whatever done what they were unable to see was conceivable, except the direct any reason why she must do, they agency of an omnipotent being. Thus affirmed it to be impossible that a giving additional proof of what finds material and a mental fact could be new confirmation in every stage of causes one of another. They regarded the history of science, that both what them as mere Occasions on which the persons can, and what they cannot, real agent, God, thought fit to exert conceive is very much an affair of his power as a Cause. When a man accident, and depends altogether on wills to move his foot, it is not his their experience and their habits of will that moves it, but God (they thought; that by cultivating the resaid) moves it on the occasion of his quisite associations of ideas, people will. God, according to this system, may make themselves unable to conis the only efficient cause, not quá ceive any given thing; and may make mind, or qua endowed with volition, themselves able to conceive most but qua omnipotent. This hypothe- things, however inconceivable these sis was, as I said, originally suggested may at first appear and the same by the supposed inconceivability of facts in each person's mental hisany real mutual action between Mind tory which determine what is or is and Matter; but it was afterwards ex- not conceivable to him, determine tended to the action of Matter upon Matter, for on a nicer examination they found this inconceivable too, and therefore, according to their logic, impossible. The deus ex machina was ultimately called in to produce a spark

also which among the various sequences in nature will appear to him so natural and plausible as to need no other proof of their existence; to be evident by their own light, independent equally of experience and of explanation.

By what rule is any one to decide the muscles only through the nerves. between one theory of this descrip- Though it were granted, then, that tion and another? The theorists do every phenomenon has an efficient, not direct us to any external evidence; and not merely a phenomenal cause, they appeal each to his own subjective and that volition, in the case of the feelings. One says, The succession C, peculiar phenomena which are known B, appears to me more natural, con- to be produced by it, is that efficient ceivable, and credible per se, than the cause, are we therefore to say, with succession A, B; you are therefore these writers, that since we know of mistaken in thinking that B depends no other efficient cause, and ought upon A; I am certain, though I can not to assume one without evidence, give no other evidence of it, that C there is no other, and volition is the comes in between A and B, and is direct cause of all phenomena? A the real and only cause of B. The more outrageous stretch of infer. other answers, The successions C, B, ence could hardly be made. Because and A, B, appear to me equally natu- among the infinite variety of the ral and conceivable, or the latter more phenomena of nature there is one, so than the former: A is quite cap- namely, a particular mode of action able of producing B without any other of certain nerves, which has for its intervention. A third agrees with the cause, and, as we are now supposing, first in being unable to conceive that for its efficient cause, a state of our A can produce B, but finds the se- mind; and because this is the only quence D, B, still more natural than efficient cause of which we are conČ, B, or of nearer kin to the subject-scious, being the only one of which matter, and prefers his D theory to the C theory. It is plain that there is no universal law operating here, except the law that each person's conceptions are governed and limited by his individual experiences and habits of thought. We are warranted in saying of all three, what each of them already believes of the other two, namely, that they exalt into an original law of the human intellect and of outward nature, one particular sequence of phenomena, which appears to them more natural and more conceivable than other sequences, only because it is more familiar. And from this judgment I am unable to except the theory that Volition is an Efficient Cause.

I am unwilling to leave the subject without adverting to the additional fallacy contained in the corollary from this theory; in the inference that because Volition is an efficient cause, therefore it is the only cause, and the direct agent in producing even what is apparently produced by something else. Volitions are not known to produce anything directly except nervous action, for the will influences even

in the nature of the case we can be conscious, since it is the only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify us in concluding that all other phenomena must have the same kind of efficient cause with that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly human or animal phenomenon? The nearest parallel to this specimen of generalisation is suggested by the recently revived controversy on the old subject of Plurality of Worlds, in which the contending parties have been so conspicuously successful in overthrowing one another. Here also we have experience only of a single case, that of the world in which we live, but that this is inhabited we know absolutely, and without possibility of doubt. Now if on this evidence any one were to infer that every heavenly body without exception, sun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star or nebula, is inhabited, and must be so from the inherent constitution of things, his inference would exactly resemble that of the writers who conclude that because volition is the efficient cause of our own bodily motions, it must be the efficient cause of every

thing else in the universe. It is true | plete mental satisfaction which we are told there are cases in which, with acknow- is only given by volitional explanation, and others who denied the Volitional Theory ledged propriety, we generalise from on the same ground of inconceivability on a single instance to a multitude of in- which it is defended. The assertion of the stances. But they must be instances Essayist is countersigned still more posiwhich resemble the one known in- tively by an able reviewer of the Essay:" "Two illustrations," says the reviewer, stance, and not such as have no cir- "are advanced by Mr. Mill: the case of cumstance in common with it except Thales and Anaximenes, stated by him to that of being instances. I have, for have maintained, the one Moisture, and the other Air to be the origin of all things; example, no direct evidence that any and that of Descartes and Leibnitz, whom creature is alive except myself; yet I he asserts to have found the action of attribute, with full assurance, life and Mind upon Matter the grand inconceivsensation to other human beings and of these cases the author shows-what we ability. In counter-statement as to the first animals. But I do not conclude that believe now hardly admits of doubt-that all other things are alive merely be- the Greek philosophers distinctly recog cause I am. I ascribe to certain other nised as beyond and above their primal material source, the vous, or Divine Increatures a life like my own, because telligence, as the efficient and originating they manifest it by the same sort of Source of all; and as to the second, by indications by which mine is mani-proof that it was the mode, not the fact, of that action on matter, which was represented as inconceivable."

A greater quantity of historical error has seldom been comprised in a single sentence. With regard to Thales, the assertion that he considered water as a mere

fested. I find that their phenomena and mine conform to the same laws, and it is for this reason that I believe both to arise from a similar cause. Accordingly I do not extend the con- material in the hands of vous rests on a clusion beyond the grounds for it. passage of Cicero de Naturâ Deorum: and Earth, fire, mountains, trees, are re-historians of philosophy, will find that whoever will refer to any of the accurate markable agencies, but their pheno- they treat this as a mere fancy of Cicero, mena do not conform to the same resting on no authority, opposed to all the laws as my actions do, and I there evidence; and make surmises as to the fore do not believe earth or fire, mounmanner in which Cicero may have been led into the error. (See Ritter, vol. i. p. tains or trees, to possess animal life. 211, 2d ed.; Brandis, vol. i. pp. 118-119, 1st But the supporters of the Volition ed.; Preller, Historia Philosophia GræcoTheory ask us to infer that volition Romanæ, p. 10. "Schiefe Ansicht, durchaus zu verwerfen ;' "augenscheinlich causes everything, for no reason ex- folgernd statt zu berichten:" "quibus vera cept that it causes one particular sententia Thaletis plane detorquetur;" are thing; although that one pheno- the expressions of these writers.) As for menon, far from being a type of all Anaximenes, he, even according to Cicero, maintained, not that air was the material natural phenomena, is eminently pecu- out of which God made the world, but that liar, its laws bearing scarcely any the air was a god: "Anaximenes aëra deum resemblance to those of any other statuit;" or, according to St. Augustine, phenomenon, whether of inorganic or gods were made: "non tamen ab ipsis of organic nature. [Diis] aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre ortos credidit." Those who are not familiar with the metaphysical terminology of antiquity must not be misled by finding it stated that Anaximenes attributed xn (translated soul or life) to his universal element, the air. The Greek philosophers acknowledged several kinds of oxy, the nutritive, the sensitive, and the intellective. Even the moderns, with admitted correctness, attribute life to plants. As far as we can

NOTE SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE

PRECEDING CHAPTER.

The author of the Second Burnett Prize Essay (Dr. Tulloch), who has employed a considerable number of pages in controverting the doctrines of the preceding chapter, has somewhat surprised me by denying a fact which I imagined too well known to require proof-that there have been philosophers who found in physical explanations of phenomena the same com

that it was the material out of which the

* Westminster Review for October 1855. † See the whole doctrine in Aristotle de Anima, where the Openrikh yuxh is treated as exactly equivalent to θρεπτική δύναμις,