The second point is whether this is a case for prohibition. When there is a conflict of evidence as to fact on which the jurisdiction of the County Court Judge depends, although if we see that he has perversely decided his decision is not conclusive, yet, if there is reasonable ground for upholding his decision, this Court will not interfere by prohibition where he has honestly and fairly exercised his judgment upon the evidence before him. But where there is no conflict of evidence, and, by reason of an erroneous decision in point of law, he has exercised an authority or jurisdiction which does not by law exist, then prohibition should issue. BLACKBURN J. On the first point I agree with the decision in In re Brown v. Cocking (a) that the rent intended by stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 11. is the rent as between the parties to the action, and the fact that other persons had agreed for a higher rent than that paid by the defendant is not conclusive as to the value. In the case of mineral property the annual value of the subject-matter would change though the rent payable to the owner of the mine would remain the same, so that the subletting value is not conclusive. A ground rent affects the value of the interest of the lessor, who pays it, but not the value of the subject-matter in respect of which the action is brought. It is to be ascertained much in the same way as the rateable value under The Parochial Assessments Act, 6 & 7 W. 4. c. 97. Therefore the County Court Judge took a wrong guide for ascertaining the value. Secondly. Is this a case for prohibition? The rule as (a) Ante, p. 503. 1868. In re ELSTONE V. ROSE. 1868. In re ELSTONE V. ROSE. to prohibition is nowhere better stated than by Patteson J., delivering the judgment of the Court in Thompson v. Ingham (a). After stating that the point whether the title was in question must arise upon the evidence, and as soon as it appeared that it was in question the jurisdiction of the County Court ceased, he said, "The Judge must, of necessity, determine that point for the time, because on it depends whether he hears the case on the merits. Is then his determination conclusive? We think that it is not. The objection is analogous to a plea to the jurisdiction in other Courts, which is indeed determined in the first instance by the Court in which it is pleaded, but is subject to a writ of error." He proceeded to say that as the County Court Act gives no writ of error or appeal, the question whether the County Court had exceeded its jurisdiction must be open to the superior Courts on motion for a prohibition. In the present case, the question of fact being whether the value exceeded 201., I think the case is one for prohibition; and this is consistent with In re Brown v. Cocking (b), where this Court refused to interfere with the decision of the County Court Judge upon conflicting evidence. Though his decision in such a case is not conclusive, yet, for practical purposes, a strong and peculiar case must be made out to justify us in reversing it and coming to the conclusion that he was wrong. To that extent I agree with In re Brown v. Cocking. In the present case the Judge did not decide the value, except in this way, that if he deducted the ground rent the value would be below 20%, but if the ground rent was not deducted the value (b) Ante, p. 503. (a) 14 Q. B. 710. would exceed 207. And we may hold, in accordance with Thompson v. Ingham (a), that he was wrong in the conclusion to which he came because he applied a wrong test to determine the value. LUSH J. In making this rule absolute we follow the ordinary rule of construction, by giving to the language of stat. 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 11. its plain and ordinary meaning. Add to which, the cognate section which immediately follows (sect. 12) gives the County Court jurisdiction to try actions in which the title comes in question "where neither the value of the lands, &c. in dispute, nor the rent payable in respect thereof," exceeds 201. by the year. The argument of Mr. Oppenheim requires that we should construe sect. 11 as if the words were "the value of the plaintiff's interest in the lands, &c."; but I agree with my Lord and my brother Blackburn that the value intended is that determined by the rent at which the premises would let. HANNEN J. concurred. Rule absolute, with costs (b). 1868. In re ELSTONE V. ROSE. (a) 14 Q. B. 710. (b) See the preceding case. 1868. Wednesday, Interroga- DOBSON against RICHARDSON and others. 1. Per Cockburn C. J. In allowing interrogatories under The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. s. 51., a Court of common law is not confined within the same limits as a Court of equity on a bill of discovery. 2. In an action for breach of an agreement to deliver up bills of exchange of a certain Company, the Court allowed the defendant to administer interrogatories to the plaintiff as to the solvency of the Company and the amount of damage which he had sustained by reason of the nondelivery of the bills. THIS action was brought to recover damages for the breach of an agreement by the defendants to deliver up to the plaintiff bills of exchange to the amount of 15,000l. of The Railway Finance Company, Limited. The defendants pleaded payment into Court of 1s. in satisfaction of any damages the plaintiff might have sustained by reason of the non-delivery of the bills of exchange. On the 3rd June, Smith J. made an order that the defendants be at liberty to deliver the following interrogatories for the examination of the plaintiff:— "(1.) Is it not the fact that the said Railway Finance Company, Limited, at the time of the making of the said agreement, was wholly insolvent? And has not the said Company since then continually been, and is it not now, insolvent? And is it not a fact that its finances were and are in such a state that the creditors thereof will never receive any dividend upon or in respect of their claims? "(2.) Is it not a fact that if the bills mentioned in the said agreement had been delivered up to you in accordance with such agreement you could not and would not have received any money whatever from the said Railway Finance Company Limited, upon or in respect of the same? And would not the said bills have then been, and are they not now, valueless? And is it not the fact that by reason of the bills being of no value, or on some other and what account, you have sustained and will sustain no actual damage by reason of the non-delivery of the said bills? If you have sustained or will sustain any damage, state the nature of such damage, how and in what manner you have been or will be so damnified. "(3.) Are you a debtor to the said Railway Finance Company (Limited) to any, and if any what, amount ?" Murphy moved to rescind the order of Smith J.-The defendants by their interrogatories ask whether the sum which they have paid into Court is not enough. In a bill of discovery a Court of equity would not allow these interrogatories. [Cockburn C. J. We are not confined within the same limits as a Court of equity; interrogatories under The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. s. 51., are adapted to a concise system of pleading in respect of the statement of the ground of action and the defence, which is different from a bill and answer in Courts of equity and indeed every other system: we supplement the pleadings by interrogatories and answers, and we ought not to be niggard in requiring information to be given so as to enable both parties to understand what they go down to try.] In Jourdain v. Palmer (a), which was an action for breach of an agreement to pay the stamp duty on letters patent, whereby they became void and the plaintiff lost the profits which he would have derived from working the patent, (a) 4 H. & C. 171. 1868. DOBSON V. RICHARDSON. |