I see not the slightest evidence of any especial fear, or any especial care or concern, on the part of the ceding States, in regard to this particular part of the jurisdiction ceded to Congress. And, I think, I can ask, on the other side, a very important question for the consideration of the gentleman himself, and for that of the Senate and the country; and that is, would Congress have accepted the cession with any such restraint upon its constitutional power, either express or understood to be implied? I think not. Looking back to the state of things then existing, and especially to what Congress had done so recently before, when it accepted the cession of the North-western Territory, I entertain no doubt whatever, that Congress would have refused the cession, altogether, if offered with any condition or understanding that its constitutional authority to exercise exclusive legislation over the District in all cases whatsoever should be abridged.

The Senate will observe that I am speaking solely to the point of plighted faith. Upon other parts of the resolution, and upon many other things connected with it, I have said nothing. I only resist the imposition of new obligations, or a new prohibition, not to be found, as I think, either in the constitution or any act of Government. I have said nothing on the expediency of abolition, immediate or gradual, or the reasons which ought to weigh with Congress, should that question be proposed. I can well conceive, I think, what would be a natural and fair mode of reasoning on such an occasion.

When it is said, for instance, by way of argument, that Congress, although it have the power, ought not to take a lead in the business of abolition, considering that the interest which the United States have in the whole subject is vastly less than that which the States have in it, I can understand the propriety and pertinency of the observation. It is, as far as it goes, a pertinent and appropriate argument, and I shall always be ready to give it the full weight belonging to it. When it is argued that, in a case so vital to the States, the States themselves should be allowed to maintain their own policy, and that the Government of the United States ought not to do any thing which shall, directly or indirectly, shake or disturb that policy, this is a line of argument which I can understand, whatever weight I may be disposed to give to it; for I have always not only admitted, but insisted, that slavery, within the States, is a subject belonging absolutely and exclusively to the States themselves.

But the present is not an attempt to exhibit any such course of reasoning as this. The attempt is to set up a pledge of the public faith, to do the same office as a constitutional prohibition, in terms, would do; that is, to set up a direct bar, precluding all exercise of the discretion of Congress over the subject. It has been often

said, in this debate, and I believe it is true, that a decided majority of the Senate do believe that Congress has a clear constitutional power over slavery in this District. But while this constitutional right is admitted, it is at the same moment attempted to be effectually counteracted, overthrown, and done away with, by the affirmation of plighted faith, as asserted in the resolution before us.

Now, I have already said I know nothing to support this affirmation. Neither in the acts of cession, nor in the act of Congress accepting the District, nor in any other document, history, publication, or transaction, do I know a single fact or suggestion, supporting this proposition, or tending to support it. Nor has any gentleman, so far as I know, pointed out, or attempted to point out, any such fact, document, transaction, or other evidence. All is left to the general and repeated statement, that such a condition must have been intended by the States. Of all this I see no proof whatever. I see no evidence of any desire on the part of the States thus to limit the power of Congress, or thus to require a pledge against its exercise. And, indeed, if this were made out, the intention of Congress, as well as that of the States, must be inquired into. Nothing short of a clear and manifest intention of both parties, proved by proper evidence, can amount to plighted faith. The expectation, or intent of one party, if excited, founded on something not provided for nor hinted at in the transaction itself, cannot plight the faith of the other party.

In short, I am altogether unable to see any ground for supposing that either party to the cession had any mental reservation, any unexpressed expectation, or relied on any implied, but unmentioned and unsuggested pledge, whatever. By the constitution, if a district should be ceded to it for the seat of Government, Congress was to have a right, in express terms, to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever. The cession was made and accepted, in pursuance of this power. Both parties knew well what they were doing. Both parties knew that by the cession the States surrendered all jurisdiction, and Congress acquired all jurisdiction; and this is the whole transaction.

As to any provision in the acts of cession stipulating for the security of property, there is none, except only what I have already observed; this condition, that no right of individuals in the soil should be construed to be transferred, but only the jurisdiction. But, no doubt, all rights of property ought to be duly respected by Congress, and all other Legislatures.

And since the subject of compensation to the owners of emancipated slaves has been referred to, I take occasion to say, that Congress, if it should think that a wise, just, and politic legislation for this District required them to make compensation for slaves emancipated here, they have the same constitutional authority to make

such compensation as to make grants for roads and bridges, almshouses, penitentiaries, and other similar objects in the District. A general and absolute power of legislation carries with it all the necessary and just incidents belonging to such legislation.

[Mr. CLAY having made some remarks in reply-]

Mr. WEBSTER rejoined. The honorable member from Kentucky (said Mr. W.) asks the Senate to suppose the opposite case; to suppose that the seat of Government had been fixed in a free State, Pennsylvania, for example; and that Congress had attempted to establish slavery in a district, over which, as here, it had thus exclusive legislation - he asks whether, in that case, Congress could establish slavery in such a place? This mode of changing the question does not, I think, vary this argument; and I answer, at once, that however improbable or improper such an act might be, yet, if the power were universal, absolute, and without restriction, it might unquestionably be so exercised. No limitation being expressed or intimated in the grant itself, or any other proceeding of the parties, none could be implied.

And, in the other cases, of forts, arsenals, &c., if Congress has exclusive and absolute legislative power, it must, of course, have the power, if it could be supposed to be guilty of such folly, whether proposed to be exercised in a district within a free State, to establish slavery, or in a district in a slave State, to abolish or regulate it. If it be a district over which Congress has, as it has in this District, unlimited power of legislation, it seems to me that whatever would stay the exercise of this power, in either case, must be drawn from discretion, from reasons of justice and true policy, from those high considerations which ought to influence Congress in questions of such extreme delicacy and importance; and to all these 'considerations I am willing, and always shall be willing, I trust, to give full weight. But I cannot, in conscience, say that the power, so clearly conferred on Congress by the constitution, as a power to be exercised, like others, in its own discretion, is immediately taken away again by an implied faith that it shall not be exercised at all.

REMARKS

MADE IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 17, 1838, IN RELATION TO THE COMMONWEALTH BANK, BOSTON.

MR. WEBSTER rose to submit the following resolution : —

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be requested to obtain information, and lay the same before the Senate, with as little delay as possible, respecting any payments of pensions, by the late pension agent of Boston, or of fishing bounties, recently made by the collector at Boston, in bills of the Commonwealth Bank of that city; and the whole amount of such payments; and that he further inform the Senate by what authority or direction payment of such pensions and bounties has been made in such bills; and that he further inform the Senate whether any, and, if any, how much, of the public money of the United States is in deposit at said bank; and, if any of such money be therein deposited, at what time or times such deposits were made.

In presenting this resolution, Mr. W. said he felt it to be his duty to call the attention of the Senate to the circumstances here alluded to, at the earliest opportunity, in order to the institution of an official inquiry into the facts of the case, and to obtain information with respect to the manner in which the duty of public officers had been discharged, in reference to the causes, by which a severe loss had been made to fall upon a large number of industrious and meritorious citizens. Mr. W. did not submit this resolution for inquiry on the ground of mere newspaper rumor. He had received letters from highly-respectable private sources, informing him of the general facts of the case. He understood the case to be that, at the period when the fishing bounties became due, money well and hardly earned, by a laborious, industrious, and worthy class of citizens,application for payment was made to the collector at Boston, he being the officer charged on the part of the Government with the duty and business of paying this money. That officer paid the fishermen, not as the law directs, in specie, or bills equivalent to specie, but in the bills of this now broken bank, or in checks upon it, which checks, of course, it was known would not be paid in specie. Mr. W. had been given to understand that this officer refused to pay the bounty due in Treasury notes, when asked to do so; and that he refused also to pay the money in specie, although requested; and that, substantially and in effect,

the parties entitled to payment were put to the option of taking the paper of this bank, or of taking nothing at all! This, he said, was his information.

Mr. W. held in his hand a letter from one of the most considerable fishing towns in the State, namely, Marblehead, and he was thereby informed that, very shortly before this bank failed, that is, within a week or two, or some such period, the money due from Government to these fishermen had been paid in the manner described, a large amount of it entirely in the bills and notes of this bank. The whole amount of bills of this bank paid out by the Government officer on the part of Government, Mr. W. could not tell. In Marblehead alone, his letter mentioned ten thousand dollars; and he had heard of other similar payments, in other towns; the whole amounting, as report said, to fifty or a hundred thousand dollars, and paid out when the bank was on the eve of a total crash, and within a few days of its failure!

Well, sir, (continued Mr. W.) when the money in these large quantities had been paid out, the bank failed; and all that these poor fishermen had received in payment from the United States is now dead on their hands.

Mr. W. wished that a proper inquiry should be made by Congress into such a state of things, and for this object he had drawn the attention of the Senate to the circumstances of the case, with a view to the obtaining of information on two points 1st. As to the facts; how far the public officer of the Government had been engaged in paying out the notes of this bank for the dues of the United States; and 2dly. As to the authority; that is, by what legal authority the officer of the United States' Government had made such payments, and whether it was done by the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, or whether it had been permitted and allowed by him.

Mr. W. thought that however much gentlemen might differ in opinion as to the resolution of 1816, whether that resolution was the law of the land, or whether it were a mere recommendation or admonition, as some had maintained, (though Mr. W. himself had always considered it to be a law,) however that question might be settled, Mr. W. had thought that the law now existing, respecting payments by the Government, was at least clear and indisputable; so that no one would venture to defend the act of the Government, of paying in notes of banks known to be of less value than specie. Mr. W. begged to refer to the solemn enactment of Congress, made only two years ago. It would be found in the second section of the Appropriation bill of 14th April, 1836, and is as follows:

"SEC. 2. Avl be it further enacted, That hereafter no bank notes of less denomination than ten dollars, and that from and after the third day of March,