fearful example, or as far beyond the reach of its influence as men themselves. Reinhard justly replies to this hypothesis, that "it supposes a mere possibility, which can by no means be proved; nor is it to be maintained that the deterring of others is the true object in punishment; but it is undeniable that the chief end must be the refor mation of the punished." And Dr. Knapp lays it down as a principle, that "just at that point where punishment ceases to be salutary to the person who endures it, however salutary it may be to others as an example; just at that point does it become an evidence of the ignorance and imperfection of those by whom it is inflicted. But how can we suppose that God, who knows what kinds of punishment are necessary for the benefit of the offender, and who has every mode of punishment at command, would ever punish any one more severely than was necessary for his own benefit, merely for the sake of making him a terrible example to others?"

Incidental, or closely allied with this hypothesis is the assumption that endless punishment will be inflicted for the general good, the good of the whole, the greatest happiness of the universe, etc. These have been very favorite expressions in this country. In the opinion of those who use this phraseology, endless punishment is not only consistent with the general good, the greatest happiness of the whole, but, what is unfortunate, is

absolutely necessary to its attainment! Dr. Strong who belonged to this school, defines benevolence to be a regard to the greatest quantity of happiness in society, and not the happiness of every individual. . . . The good of the whole, or the greatest happiness of intellectual being, is the object of benevolence. . . The happiness of every individual,and the greatest happiness of the whole, are considerations entirely separate, and the benevolence of God will choose the latter."

According to this metaphysical speculation, the happiness of the individual is nothing, or a matter of very little importance in the sight of God; for he looks only upon the whole, and consults the greatest good of the universe. But does not this scheme strangely overlook the rather important as well as obvious fact, that the general good, the greatest happiness of the whole, is made up simply of the good, the happiness of individuals? Take away the individuals, and what becomes of the whole? Take away the happiness of individuals, and where is the greatest happiness of the universe of which men speak so much?

But aside from all this, I would humbly inquire, how the endless punishment of a part of the human race is to contribute to the good of the whole ? How indeed can it be consistent with the general good? It avails nothing to assume that it will prove so; that assumption is not allowable. I might assert that the perpetual misery of one

member of every family on earth, would greatly increase the general happiness; and this, I suppose, is as reasonable as the assumption before us, but would not men be ready to ask for proof? But Dr. Strong very coolly tells that they "are under no obligations to show the manner in which eternal misery will promote the greatest good." Certainly not; nor am I under any obligations to believe that it is possible.

SEC. 10. Endless Punishment is just and proper, according to the analogies of both natural and civil

laws.

This argument of analogy is often insisted upon, in order to render the doctrine of endless punishment less improbable and obnoxious to reason. "In the sickly debauchee, never regaining perfect health," says Bp. Delancey, “and in the victim of the scaffold or the block, never restored to life, may be seen the natural indications of the perpetuity of punishment, of a worm that never dies, of a fire that is unquenched." Dr. Cheever also, in his defence of capital punishment, does not hesitate to acknowledge the analto exist between the endogy which he supposes less torments of hell, and capital punishments here in this world; and he seems to fear that the abolition of the latter will only prove a precursor of the rejection of the former. But let us examine these analogies.

We have two before us; one drawn from the

action of natural, and the other from that of civil laws, both of which are untenable. There is, in the first place, obviously no analogy between capital and endless punishments. When a man is executed, he is, so far as human government possesses the power, utterly annihilated. With the death stroke the victim of civil law passes forever beyond its reach. True, he is " never restored to life again ;" nor is he subject to another pain, another fear. Capital punishment is to civil governments what total annihilation would be to the divine; but there is no analogy between instantaneous death without torture, and endless life in torment! The former may, in some cases, perhaps be a blessing; the latter must always be an unmitigated curse.

The analogy drawn from the action of natural laws is quite as groundless. The sickly debauchee may never regain perfect health;' but he will either regain enough of health to make life a blessing, or friendly death will soon close at once his existence and his sufferings. God has in infinite goodness so ordered, that human sufferings can never be protracted beyond certain limits. When you can point me to the individual, whose life has been preserved for long, tedious years, along whose pathway no sunlight has failen, no goodness been manifested; but who has been preserved in being only to suffer; then, and not before, will you have presented a case ex

hibiting a faint, infinitismal analogy to the miseries and horrors of endless punishment.

But says Dr. Burthogge, "If mortal men kill the body temporally in their anger, it is like the immortal God to damn the soul eternally in his." The two actions would probably spring from the same angry and revengeful feelings; and if it is like the immortal God to damn the soul eternally in his anger, it must also be very like God in men to torture and kill one another. The Inquisition was, on this view of the case, a very godly and reverend institution, and many of those who have been the worst of men, have proved themselves the greatest imitators of God that ever lived!

The fact is, the doctrine of endless punishment, if true, stands unsupported by a single analogy in the whole universe. Neither the dealings of God, nor the governments of men, imperfect and erring as they are, furnish a single analogy for it that has any weight or deserves a moment's consideration.

SEC. 11. Sinners will have contracted such a bias to sin that they will never cease, but continue to sin forever; hence they may be justly punished without end. This is the famous argument of Leibnitz against the Demonstration of Soner. "Although we concede, therefore," says he, "that no sin is of itself infinite, yet it may be said that the sins of the damned are infinite in number, since they will persevere in sinning through all eternity. Where