cause of its author, and then all punishments from God,as well as all sins against him would be equal, which is absurd." Dr. Knapp says that theologians "resort to this statement in order to explain more easily the infiniteness of the satisfaction made by Christ, and also the eternity of the punishments of hell. Whoever, they say, breaks the laws of the Infinite Being,brings upon himself infinite guilt. But this statement, taken in the strict philosophic sense [in which alone it has any meaning] is incorrect. .. There is no infinitus reatus peccatorum-infinite criminality of sinners, nor can the object against which sin is committed be made in every case the measure of its criminality or ill-desert; certainly this cannot be done with regard to God." Dr. Dwight speaks with great caution and modesty of this argument, but yet clearly shows that he regards it as no better than a logical trick, quite unworthy of confidence. He says, "It is not my design to deny this doctrine, nor to scrutinize the arguments, by which it is usually supported. It is, however, but just to observe that neither the doctrine, nor the arguments have appeared so satisfactory to the minds of others, as they seem to have done to those by whom they have been alleged. We know nothing of infinity, but the fact that certain things are infinite. The nature of infinity we do not comprehend at all; nor form a conception of what this phraseology means. It hardly needs to be

observed, that where we have no conceptions, we can form no comparisons; and therefore can make no propositions, the truth of which can be perceived by our minds. Concerning the fact. that something is infinite, we may with sufficient care argue, to some extent, successfully. Concerning the nature of infinity, I discern no manner in which such minds as ours can argue at all. But in our discussions concerning infinity, we are prone, insensibly, to blend these two things together; and often are amused with words only, when we suppose ourselves to be employed about ideas. Hence have arisen the perplexity, and the want of satisfaction, which have attended inquiries concerning this subject. I shall, therefore, not insist on these arguments, nor on the conclusion to which they conduct us.'

When we consider the nature of the doctrine of infinite sin, its glaring assumptions, the numer ous absurdities it involves, and the disrespect in which it is held by multitudes of the staunchest advocates of endless punishment, who would gladly employ it if they could, I think we may safely conclude that it is entitled to no confidence, and deserves to be universally rejected as a shrewd and audacious device, introduced merely to bolster up the most abominable dogma ever believed or preached on earth.

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SEC. 2. Infinite punishment is but the counterpart of infinite rewards, and is therefore just.

This hypothesis is adopted by Archbp. Dawes. “It must be considered," he says, "that sin is a voluntary refusal and contempt of eternal happiness, and upon that account richly deserves eternal misery for its punishment, according to that of St. Austin, That man is well worthy of eternul punishments who hinders himself from being eternally happy. And indeed, it cannot be denied, that the eternity of the joys of heaven make the belief of the eternity of the torments of hell sit much easier upon our minds than it would otherwise have done. Had the eternity been only on the punishing side, this would have looked hard, and not altogether agreeable to our notions of the divine goodness; but being on the rewarding side likewise, we have here infinite goodness and infinite justice set one against the other; and what reason can any man possibly have to complain of this?"

The design of this modification of the exploded hypothesis of infinite sin, is very frankly confessed by the Archbishop to be to make the doctrine of the eternity of hell-torments sit more easily on the mind. A very worthy object, doubtless, but how is it to be effected? Neither the Scriptures nor reason give us any knowledge of infinite rewards in the government of God, and this therefore, like infinite punishments, must be assumed

instead of being proved. But let it be taken for granted that the rewards of obedience are infinite, and what, I pray, has this to do with infinite punishments? For as Archbishop Tillotson says, "though it be not contrary to justice to exceed in rewards, that being a matter of mere favor; yet it may be so to exceed in punishments." Justice obviously requires some proportion between the crime and the punishment of it; hence the consideration of rewards, be they greater or less, can not affect the subject at all, unless it be to assist the prejudiced in blinding themselves to the absurdity they are attempting to maintain; for, as Dr. Whitby justly remarks, "it renders not the fault the less finite, or the punishment the less infinite, and so doth not render it the less inconsistent with divine goodness and equity."

Archbishop Dawes thinks the infliction of endless punishment will very clearly express God's indignation at man's refusal of his mercy. "When God has been so abundantly gracious, as out of his own free goodness and loving kindness," says he, "to offer everlasting happiness to mankind, if they will accept it; is it not very reasonable to suppose that he will to the utmost resent their refusal and contempt of the riches of his goodness? Is it not very natural to believe that he will give the contemners of everlasting happiness, everlasting cause to remember, bewail, and repent of this their folly Doth it not seem very just that he

should everlastingly keep them in being, that so they may to all eternity think on that everlasting happiness which they have refused, and that by making them feel what an eternity of wo is, they may be sensible to the utmost what they have lost in losing an eternity of happiness"?

I should regret to think it necessary to say a single word in reply to such an argument as this. If it does not represent the Deity with the low passions of a narrow minded man; if it does not exhibit him as changing his dispositions from "free goodness and loving kindness," to malignity and implacable revenge, I have entirely failed to understand it. I will therefore leave it for some advocate of endless torments to explain if he can, how keeping sinners everlastingly in being, "so that they may to all eternity think on that everlasting happiness which they have refused, and feel what an eternity of wo is," consists with either goodness or justice. Such a doctrine I cannot but regard as a gross libel on the divine character.

The pious Christopher Love argues on much the same ground as the Archbishop above. "The godly," he says, "shall be in everlasting joy, therefore the wicked shall suffer eternal torments; their condition shall be quite contrary to one another; the torments of the one shall last as long as the joys of the other; as the one is for the glory of God's grace, so the other is for the glory of his