another; or, that a person should be thought the proper object of regard, viewed in that relation or connexion, of which he is not the proper object himself, singly and separately; or, which is still the same thing, that a person should be thought worthy of respect on the account of the merit of the other person to whom he stands related, taking the word here as it has been explained.

2. Whenever one is thus viewed, as having a merit of respect on the account of another to whom he stands related, the merit of the other person is imputed to him; and these persons so far are substituted the one in the place of the other. This is plain; for the person now accepted, has not that merit in himself considered alone, but only as related to another that has merit in himself, and so is respected for the sake of the merit of that other; which is the very same thing as, in our consideration, transferring that merit from the other person to him, and viewing it in him as his merit, a merit whose recommending influence becomes his in some degree; so that in all such cases there is an imputation and substitution in some dogree. The recommending influence of the one, becomes the recommending influence of the other, or influence that prevails to ecommend the other; which is the same thing. Thus it is when any one respects a near relation, or the child or spouse of a friend, that is very dear and greatly esteemed for such a friend's sake, or shows the relative or friend greater regard, seeks his welfare more, and shows him more kindness than he would do if he were viewed out of such a relation or connexion, and entirely by himself. Thus it is reasonable and natural, that one should be respected for the merit of another, and so his merit be in some degree imputed to another, and one person be substituted for another, according to the natural sense of all mankind.

3. As it is the relation of one to another, or his union with him, that is the ground of respect shown him for the other's sake and so the ground of substitution of the other in his stead, and of the imputation of the other's merit in some degree as has been observed; so it is manifest, that the greater or nearer that relation is, and the stricter the union, so much the more does it prevail for the acceptance of the person, or the object of respect, for the sake of him to whom he is united.

4. If there be any such thing as an union of one person to another, as, for instance, a patron to a client, in such degree or manner as that on such account it shall be peculiarly fit to look upon them as completely one and the same, as to all that concerns the interest of the client, with relation to the regard of the friend of the patron; then especially may the patron be taken by his friend as the substitute of the client, and his merit be imputed to him.

§ 22. If it be inquired, what degree or manner of union may be looked upon as complete? I answer, When the patron's heart is so united to the client, that when the latter is to be destroyed, he from love, is willing to take his destruction on himself, or what is equivalent thereto, so that the client may escape; then he may be properly accepted as perfectly one with regard to the interest of the client; for this reason, that his love is such as thoroughly puts him into the place of the client in all that concerns his interest. His love actually puts him in the room of the beloved, in that suffering or calamity which, being his total destruction, swallows up and consumes all his interest, without leaving the least part of it. Therefore, love that will take that destruction, evidently takes in his whole interest. It appears to be an equal balance for it. His love puts him thoroughly in his client's stead. If his love were such as made him willing to put himself in the other's stead, in many cases where his interest was concerned, but yet not in a case where all is concerned, the union is not complete; he is partially, and not thoroughly united. But when the love of the patron is such as to go through with the matter, and makes him willing to put himself in the other's stead, even in the case of the last extremity-and where the beloved is to be utterly and perfectly destroyed-then he is, as to his love, sufficiently united, so as to be accepted as completely one by his friend, in all that concerns the client's welfare.

§ 23. Especially is the client's welfare properly and naturally regarded, for the sake of the patron that is very dear and worthy in the eyes of any person, when the way in which the patron expresses his desire of the client's welfare, is by suffering and being at expense of his own personal and private welfare in any degree, for the welfare of the client. Expending one's good or interest for another, is properly transferring the interest in the good expended, into the good sought: the expended good, which is the means, is properly set aside and removed, in the regard of him that is at the expense, and whose regard is placed on that good which is the end. The good of the price is parted with, for the good of the thing purchased; and, therefore, here is a proper substitution of one in the place of the other. In such a case, therefore, in a more special manner, will it be proper and natural for one in whose eyes the patron is very worthy and to whom he is very dear, to have regard to the welfare of the client for the patron's sake, or for the sake of the patron's merit; as, suppose the client of the excellent and dear patron, be a child or spouse in captivity, and the patron lays out himself exceedingly for the client's redemption, and goes through many and very great hardships, and is at vast expense for obtaining it.

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$24. If the patron who seeks the welfare of the client, particularly and directly applies himself to the person who has so high an esteem and affection for him, expressing his desires of the client's welfare, and that what is expended for his sake be given to him; then especially is it natural that the person of whom his client's welfare is sought, should be ready to grant it for his sake, and it is still more highly proper and natural to regard the client's welfare on account of the patron's merit, or to reckon the merit of the patron to his client's account; if the merit of the patron consists, or especially appears in what he does for his client's welfare; or if the virtues and worthy qualities have their chief exercise, and do chiefly exhibit their amiableness in those excellent and amiable acts which he performs in seeking the good of the client. In this case, it is peculiarly natural to accept the client, on the account of the merit of the patron; for the merit is on his account, and has its existence for the sake of the client. More especially is it natural, when his merit, above all, consists and appears in the very expense of his own welfare for the welfare of the client, or in the act of expending or exchanging the one for the other. For, as was observed before, such expense is properly regarded as a price of the client's welfare; but when such merit is added to the price, this merit becomes the worth, value, or preciousness of the price; preciousness of another kind, besides merely the value of the natural good parted with. It adds a moral good to the price, equal to the natural good expended; so that the worthiness of the patron, and the value expended, are offered both together in one, as the price of the welfare of the client. The thus accepting of the patron's merit, as being placed to the account of the client, will be more natural still, if the patron puts himself in the place of that client, undertaking to appear for him, to represent him, and act in his stead, by an exceeding great change in his circumstances, clothes himself with the form of his client, goes where he is, takes his place in the universe, puts himself into his circumstances, and is, in all things, made like unto him, wherein this may be consistent with maintaining his merit inviolable. If the client be unworthy, and an offender, and has deserved ill of the person whose favour he needs, then abating and dismissing resentment, or lessening or withholding the evil deserved, for the sake of the merit of the patron, is equivalent to a positive favour for his sake, in case of no offence and demerit of punish

ment.

§ 25. If the person that needs favour, be an offender, and unworthy, then, in order to a proper influence and effect of the union and merit of a patron, to induce his friend to receive him into favour on his account, the union of the patron with his client, and his undertaking and appearing as his patron to

seek favour for him, should be in such a manner, and attended with such circumstances, as not to diminish his merit, i. e. so as that his union with, and intercession for the client, shall not in the least infringe on these two things, viz. the patron's own union with his friend, whose favour he seeks for the client, and his merit strictly so called, i. e. his own virtue. For if his own worthiness be diminished, by his union with one that is unworthy, then his influence to recommend the client one way, is destroyed one way, at the same time that it is established another. For that recommending influence consists in these two things, viz. his merit and his union with the client. Therefore, if one of these is diminished, or destroyed, as the other is advanced and established, nothing is done on the whole toward recommending the client. Therefore, in order that, on the whole, the client be effectually recommended, it is necessary that the patron's union to an offending, unworthy client, should be attended with such circumstances, that it shall not be at all inconsistent with these two things, his regard to his friend, and his regard to virtue and holiness: for in these two things consists his merit in the eye of his friend; and, therefore, it is necessary, that his appearing united to his unworthy and offending client should be with such circumstances as most plainly to demonstrate, that he perfectly disapproves of his offence, and unworthiness, and to show a perfect regard to virtue, and to the honour and dignity of his offended, injured friend. There is no way that this can be so thoroughly and fully done, as by undertaking himself to pay the debt to the honour and rights of his injured friend, and to honour the rule of virtue and righteousness the client has violated, by putting himself in the stead of the offender, into subjection to the injured rights and violated authority of his offended friend, and under the violated law and rule of righteousness belonging to one in the client's state; and so, for the sake of the honour of his friend's authority, and the honour of the rule of righteousness, suffering the whole penalty due to the offender, and which would have been requisite to be suffered by him, for the maintaining the honour and dignity of those things; and himself, by such great condescension, and under such self-denial, honouring those rights and rules by his obedience and perfect conformity to them; hereby giving the most evident testimony to all beholders, that although he loves his client and seeks his welfare, yet he had rather be humbled so low, deny himself so greatly, and suffer so much, than that his welfare should be in the least diminished, his authority weakened, and his honour and his dignity degraded.

§ 26. If the patron be, in the eyes of him whose favour is sought, of very great dignity, it is agreeable to reason and nature that this should have influence to procure greater favour

to the client than if he were of less dignity. And when it is inquired, whether there be a sufficiency in the patron and his relation to his client, to answer to such a degree of favour as is proposed to be attained for him; the dignity of the patron is one thing that is to be estimated and put into the scales, with the degree of favour sought, in order to know whether it be sufficient to countervail it. By dignity, I here intend, not only the degree of virtue and relation to his friend, of whom he seeks favour, but the greatness of the person of the patron, If, in adjusting this matter, the dignity that is viewed in the patron and his friend's regard to him, be so great, that, considered with the degree of the patron's union with his client, there is a sufficiency to countervail all the favour that the client needs, or the utmost that he is capable of receiving, then there is a perfect sufficiency in the patron for the client, or a sufficiency completely to answer and support the whole interest of the client; or a sufficiency in his friend's regard to the patron, wholly to receive, take in, and comprehend the client with regard to his whole interest, or all that pertains to his welfare; or, which is the same thing, a sufficiency fully to an swer for him as his representative and substitute, in all that pertains to his welfare.

§ 27. If the patron and client are equals as to greatness of being or degree of existence, and the degree of the patron's union with his client should be such (and that were possible) that he regarded the interest of the client equally with his own personal interest; then it would be natural for the patron's friend to regard the client's welfare for the sake of the patron, as much as he regards the patron's own personal welfare : because, when the case is so, the patron is as strictly united to the client as he is to himself, and his client's welfare becomes perfectly, and to all intents and purposes, his own interest, as much as his personal welfare; and therefore, as the love of his friend to him disposes him to regard whatever is his interest, to such a degree as it is his interest; so it must dispose him to regard the client's welfare in an equal degree with his own personal interest; because, by the supposition, it is his interest in an equal degree. But this must be here provided or supposed, viz. not only that so strict an union of the patron and client be possible, but also that it be proper, or that there be no impropriety or unfitness in it because, if it be unfit, then the patron's being so strictly united to him, diminishes his merit; because merit, at least in part, consists in a regard to what is proper and fit; and if the degree of union be unfit, it diminishes the influence of that union to recommend the client one way, as much as it increases it another. But if the patron and client are not equals, but the patron be greater and vastly superior as to rank and degree of existence, it gives