"outsider." These native inhabitants, in turn, by a similar Hebrew termination of the word for "Canaanites," are thereby designated in a manner exactly answering to our "lowlanders," or "Netherlanders." Amid the multitude of subjects in Old Testament study, some notice of all which seems desirable, and almost imperative, a few exercises, at least, should be devoted to the branch which has been glanced at, the structure of words in their primary forms as distinct from their changes by inflection. It is due to the student that he be directed in the path. Here, as elsewhere, it will rest with him to follow it until conducted into that real acquaintance with a language which transfers the principles and statements of grammars and lexicons from without to within, so that they are a part of the man. Exception has sometimes been taken to the 'declensions' of Gesenius, as cumbrous and artificial, and even then as not entirely exhaustive. Undoubtedly, statements can be framed, like Ewald's, inclusive under four or five heads, of the changes underlying all the nouns which Gesenius distributes into nine declensions. It may be questioned, however, whether we have not in Gesenius the most convenient method for determining, after an instant's thought, the forms of a noun throughout its whole inflection, of which it is so desirable to be possessed. A useful page is added by the translator, with the modestly expressed hope that it will perhaps make the complicated inflection of the segholates somewhat plainer. It is believed that the plural in the absolute and with light suffixes points for its origin to the prevalence in the older state of the language of the form, so common in Aramaean. In the Syntax, Dr. Davies has added on many points foot-notes of a suggestive and illustrative character, or directing to fuller information, as in the case of several references to Ewald's Grammar. He has also appended to the Grammar a Hebrew Reading-Book, with Exercises in Grammar and Composition, designed to aid the student in acquiring the inflections and constructions by presenting suitable matter for translation and analysis, accompanied with copious references to the forms and rules of the grammar. It is prefaced by some very judicious remarks upon the most approved method of studying Hebrew, in which the author espouses, correctly, we think, the side of a full grammar, rather than a skeleton, or outline, for the beginner, though not insisting that every point should be mastered at first by all learners alike. He makes reference to the views of Gesenius and Winer on this important subject, which were first presented to English readers in the Appendix to Dr. Hackett's Hebrew Exercises, now for many years out of print. The exercises before us, though not so full and elaborate upon some points, are constructed upon the same general plan as those of the work first named, and may be very profitably employed by the instructor. It is a great advantage of the Student's Hebrew Lexicon, which is dedi cated to Dr. Roediger, that it contains frequent and valuable references to the Student's Hebrew Grammar. The special and exact adjustment of the works to each other, combined with their inexpensive, convenient, and highly attractive form, may well induce the teacher to recommend them together to the beginner. If the latter shall at a further stage wish to possess a Gesenius or Fürst unabridged, the substantial merits of this compendious book will still cause it to be retained upon his shelves. For, as Dr. Davies says, the work may be regarded as new, though not claiming to be original; presenting everywhere freshness, indicating a measure of independence and of endeavor after progress not, however, in a dogmatic, but in a tentative, spirit. The direction of his efforts may be indicated, according to the author's own characterization of them, as follows: Fuller indications and illustrations of the affinities and interchanges of the letters have been given, and also of their formative uses or their effect in word-building. In dealing with derivatives, and particularly those that seem to have more than three radical letters, many improvements have been essayed. The Onomatopoetic origin of many roots is surmised, to which the theory has not been heretofore extended, and notwithstanding the objection of some Sanscrit scholars to such derivation. As the Assyrian tongue has taken its place among the branches of the Semitic family, the names of the monarchs of that empire occurring in the Bible have tentative Semitic etymologies assigned them. Comparative philology has been laid under requisition to produce affinities and analogies between words in different forms and of various dialects or languages. A few of the interesting examples under this head may be mentioned. The word, meaning heat, comes from a root found in Syriac and Arabic, as well as in Hebrew. From this Semitic source, says Dr. Davies (the same root being also found in Coptic) came, through the Arabic, our alchymy, chymist, having reference to heat, as the dissolvent or means of analyzing substances. Hence chymistry is fitly said to be the science of heat. From , bosom, is deduced, through the Arabic, the Italian alcovo our alcove, and (by insertion of the liquid) kóλπos= Italian golfo our gulf; compare Latin sinus, also German busen, for both bosom and bay. The "devouring element" of penny-a-liners has a respectable ancestry in, first, 'to browse, feed upon'; secondly, 'to consume with fire.' This root is regarded as probably mimetic, and traced in the Greek Boрá (ẞi- Врú- σкw), Welsh pawr, poru, bara, Latin voro, English forage, browse, bread, German brod. Among those who encouraged Dr. Davies to undertake this volume and render this service to Hebrew learning, he mentions Dr. Payne Smith, the successor of Dean Alford, at Canterbury; Dr. Gotch, President of Bristol Baptist College; Dr. Hackett, of Rochester Theological Seminary; and Dr. W. Wright, now Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge, England. They certainly must feel, in looking upon the completed work, that it is well adapted to the end which the author declares will be, by the favor of God, the coveted reward of his labor—the real aiding of the student to gain a good knowledge of the Old Testament scriptures in the original tongues. ARTICLE X. DR. HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. AN orator recently addressing the Massachusetts Medical Society remarked that "progress is the pride of the day; and the charm of antiquity is broken. In the early history of the country, medicine and theology were allied together, each having firm faith in the infinite and none in the infinitesimal; but now sugar is the staple article both in theological and medical dispensaries." In the system of theology which Dr. Hodge is giving to the public, there are signs of progress. It contains more of the saccharine element than is found in the older treatises emanating from his school. Still, it is in the main, allopathic rather than homoeopathic in its treatment of its patients. It is in this respect as it should be. It gives evidence of its author's sound mind and extensive learning. It is written in a vigorous and flexile style. It presents theology in a compact form. The spirit of it is candid and fair. It propounds various theories which we regard as untenable, and defends the real truth by some arguments which we regard as inconclusive. The excellences and the faults of the system the excellences being greater than the faults— appear in almost every chapter. Let us look, for example, at volume one, part one, chapter one, entitled "Origin of the Idea of God." Dr. Hodge supposes that the existence of God can be proved, and also that it is self-evident. We have an "innate knowledge" of his being. Dr. Hodge defines innate knowledge to be "that which is due to our constitution as sentient, rational, and moral beings." "The soul is so constituted that it sees certain things to be true immediately in their own light. They need no proof. Men need not be told or taught that the things thus perceived are true." These immediate perceptions are called "intuitions," "primary truths," "laws of belief," "innate knowledge or ideas" 1 Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. Two Vols. pp. 648 and 732. New York: Charles Scribner and Company; London and Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons. 1872. (I. 195). "All that is meant is that the mind is so constituted that it perceives certain things to be true without proof and without instruction” (I. 192). "What is seen immediately without the intervention of proof to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively" (I. 193). Among the truths of which we have an innate knowledge, Dr. Hodge specifies the following: "The part of a thing is less than the whole;” “A straight line is the shortest distance between two points;" "Nothing cannot be a cause;" Every effect must have a cause;" "Sin deserves pun ishment," etc. 66 Dr. Hodge places the truth of God's existence in the same category with the axioms which we have now specified, and affirms that it is a "primary truth," one of which we have an "immediate perception," "intuition," "innate knowledge," "innate idea." I. Let us inquire whether Dr. Hodge has shown that the perception of God's existence is so immediate as to prove the perception to be innate. Has he shown that we believe in God's existence as soon as the truth is presented to us, and without the intervention of any other truth? If there be the intervention of another truth, then this truth is perceived through a medium; and not being perceived immediately, it is not perceived intuitively. Dr. Hodge says: "All the faculties and feelings of our minds and bodies have their appropriate objects; and the possession of the faculties supposes the existence of those objects. The senses suppose the existence and reality of the objects of sense. The eye, in its very structure, supposes that there is such an element as light; the sense of hearing would be unaccountable and inconceivable without sound; and the sense of touch would be inconceivable were there no tangible objects. The same is true of our social affections; they necessitate the assumption that there are relations suited to their exercises. Our moral nature supposes that the distinction between right and wrong is not chimerical or imaginary. In like manner, our religious feelings, our sense of dependence, our consciousness of responsibility, our aspirations after fellowship with some Being higher than ourselves, and higher than anything which the world or nature contains, necessitates [necessitate] the belief in the existence of God” (I. 200). From the fact that a fish has an instinct for the water we may draw the inference that there is water in which the fish has the power to swim. Dr. Hodge will not doubt that this is an inference, and is not an independent belief. From the fact that a bird has an instinct for flying we may come to the conclusion that there is an atmosphere in which the bird has the power to fly; but Dr. Hodge will not say that this conclusion is a “primary perception." He may, indeed, say that we have a primary perception of an atmosphere, but not on the ground that there exists an instinct to fly in it, or an apparatus for breathing it. From the thirst of a young animal for milk we may derive an inference that milk is somewhere provided for it, and is good for it; but this inference is not innate knowledge. "From the very structure of the eye" we may draw the conclusion that there is such an element as light; but will Dr. Hodge affirm that this conclusion is "a law of belief?" He may say that light is seen "in its own light," but is it not a self-contradiction to say that it is seen "intuitively," "primarily," in "the very structure of the eye?" If we learn that there is a being endued with a sense of hearing we infer that there will be sound which he can hear, but this belief in sound is not derived from sound itself, but from another object; it comes through a medium, and is not immediate. If we are informed of a being who has the sense of touch, we conclude that there will be objects which he can touch; but this conclusion is not "innate knowledge." Dr. Hodge says that the sense of hearing and of touch would be inconceivable without audible and tangible objects. (I. 200). He might as well say that audible and tangible objects would be inconceivable without the sense of hearing and touch. We cannot form an apprehension of the sense without forming an apprehension of its objects; nor can we form an apprehension of its objects without forming an apprehension of the sense; but a mind may think of visible, audible, and tangible objects, before it believes in the existence of any sense to recognize them, and it may think of a sense of sight, sound, and touch, before it believes in the existence of any visible, audible, or tangible objects to be recognized. If we are told of beings who have a constitutional love for parents and children, we reason in favor of the proposition that parents and children do or will exist. The idea of a parent involves the idea of a child, and vice versa; but the idea of a parent does not imply the actual existence of a child, and the idea of a child does not imply the actual existence of a parent. Our reasoning in favor of their actual existence is the opposite of an "innate knowledge" of it. "In like manner our religious feelings" constitute a premise from which we reason in favor of the existence of an object on which these feelings may rest; but the belief that there actually exists such an object forms the conclusion, and this conclusion is, of course, not a "fundamental law of belief." Dr. Hodge says that our sense of dependence "necessitates" our belief in the divine existence; so does our perception of the adaptation of means to ends throughout the material universe. First, we are conscious of a sense of dependence; secondly, we recognize the truth taught by observation that all our constitutional feelings have their appropriate objects; thirdly, we apply this truth in our argument proving that our constitutional sense of dependence has its appropriate object-God. Dr. Hodge says that our "consciousness of responsibility" necessitates our belief in the being of God. What is our consciousness of responsibility? It is a consciousness of accepting as true the statement that we are responsible. What is the accepting of this statement as true? It is the acceptance of the statement as true that we shall receive a reward for doing well, and a punishment for doing ill. So |