Το

I observe this resistance continued until the year 1631. In this year, and before, I find almost continually in the National Synods whole provinces censured because their deputation, or, as they term it, their "missive," had not this clause of submission. The Churches were with difficulty brought to make an oath so little agreeable to the doctrine which had been inspired into them, and to swear, against the principles of the new reformation, such a submission to an assembly which, after all, whatever name might be given it, was but an assembly of men (according to their principles) ever liable to mistake. that issue, however, they were fain to come. It was clear that nothing was done, unless men were finally obliged to an absolute submission, and that to leave them liberty to examine, after the last and final resolution, was to nourish pride, dissension, schism. Thus, against the principles of the new Reformation, were they fain to give other ideas, and it was resolved to insist unalterably on the submission and oath in the terms we have noted. The reason used by the Synod of Rochelle to oblige the provinces to this clause of submission to such things as should be resolved in the National Synod is, that it was "necessary to the validity of the assembly's conclusions." In general, to render the acts of an assembly valid, it would be sufficient for those of whom it should be composed to have a power of bringing to it the suffrages of those that send them; and the deputies of the Colloquies as of the Provincial Synods, came always furnished with such powers. But there was something stronger required for the National Synod; and since the ultimate resolution was to be made, to render such an act valid, and give it all its force, it was thought necessary it should be preceded by a submission as absolute as the resolution ought to appear irrevocable.

To this decision of the Synod of Rochelle, that of Tonneins added, that "the submission should be promised in proper terms to all that should be concluded and decreed, without condition and modification." Now, this is nothing but a "clause of civility," and a conditional promise, that might be made, at discretion, not only to the Provincial Synods, to the Colloquy and Consistory, but also to every particular minister. Nevertheless, they never make it to those particular ministers, nor to this Consistory, nor to these Colloquies, nor to these Provincial Synods. Why so, but to reserve something peculiar and proper to the assembly, where the final resolution is to be made, after which there remains nothing but to obey? But if all that is here particular

and proper be, at the bottom, only words, was this worth employing the Churches of the new Reformation, and five or six of their National Synods? This is what they ought to clear up, if they would say any thing; yet they speak not one word about it, although it is a difficulty which at once meets the eye, and I have expressly pointed it out.

In fine, to reduce my argument to a few words: every oath ought to be founded on a certain and known truth. Now this promise made to the National Synod, and confirmed by the solemn oath of all the Reformed Churches-" We swear and proImise to follow your decisions, being persuaded that you judge aright"—this promise, I say, turn it which way you will, has no certainty but in one of these two senses. The first: "We swear and promise to follow your decisions, if we find you judge aright:" a thing indeed very certain, but at the same time illusory; since there is no person on earth to whom one may not say as much, and, as I observed in the Conference, M. Claude may say so to me, and I to him. The second: "We are so persuaded you will judge aright, that we swear and promise to follow your decisions:" in which case the oath is false, if we be not thoroughly assured that the assembly it is made to cannot judge amiss. All the pretended Reformed have now to do is, to choose which they will of these two senses, one of which is a manifest illusion, and the other, which seems the only natural sense, clearly supposes the Church's infallibility. Nor must they answer here, that this submission respects only public order and discipline; for in matters of faith, a decision obliges to nothing less than what the apostle St. Paul says" to believe with the heart and confess with the mouth."* And our Reformed themselves understand it so, when they declare in their "Discipline," that the effect of this their National Synod's ultimate and final decision is, "the acquiescing therein, point by point, with an express disowning of the contrary doctrine."+ He, then, who swears to submit to a decision that shall be made in an assembly, swears to believe with his heart and confess with his mouth the doctrine which shall be there decided. But in order to make, and confirm with an oath, such a promise, it is requisite the assembly it is made to should have a divine promise of being assisted by the Holy Ghost; that is, that it should be infallible. At the Conference, M. Claude insinuated that there was in fact a divine promise, that those who sought should find, and that the oath of his churches might be grounded on this assurance. But this answer will not extricate him from the

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NECESSITY OF A FINAL DECISION.

difficulty. For, to render the oath conformable to the promise, it must be conditional, as the promise is; and as Jesus Christ said, "if you seek well, you shall find," the sense of the oath would also be, "if you do your duty, we will believe you," which would be to fall again into the pitiful illusion we have rejected. To the end, then, that the oath we treat of may be made without rashness, it must be founded on an absolute promise from God; on a promise which secures us against the infidelities of men; on a promise, in short, such as Jesus Christ makes his Church when he indefinitely and absolutely assures her "that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her."* long as our Reformed shall persist in denying that the authority of the Church's decisions is founded on this promise, their oath will always be an illusion or a manifest extravagance; and they will find themselves forced either to defer to the Church's authority, more than they are willing, or to acknowledge that they have by fine words imposed on the people's credulity: since after their having distinguished the Church's final decision from all the rest, by so remarkable a character and the protestation of so special a submission, it will be found in the bottom that this submission, confirmed by so singular an oath, is of no other nature or kind than such as is naturally due to all ecclesiastical assemblies and every lawful pastor: that is, one may always pass from it to new doubts, and still examine after the ultimate resolution, as after all the rest.

It is so, indeed, according to the principles of the new Reformation; but the principles of the new Reformation have not been able to change the necessary condition of human nature, which, for the hindering of divisions and quieting of men's minds, requires a final decision, independent of all new examination, either general or particular.

The Christian Church is not exempt from this law; and the more regular she is, the more her constitution depends on an entire submission of mind, the more need she has of such an authority. And therefore, from the very beginning of Christianity, God himself has put in the hearts of all true Christians, that they must no longer search nor examine after the Church has determined. This inviolable tradition has wrought its effect on the Reformed, in spite of their principles: nor do I wonder at it. St. Basilf has very wisely and very truly observed, that

Matt. xvi. 18.

† [Οὕτως, οἶμαι, τὸ τῆς παραδόσεως ἰσχυρὸν ἐνῆγε πολλάκις τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τοῖς οικείοις αὐτῶν δόγμασιν ἀντιλέγειν. De Spir. Sancto, ch. 29, tom. iii. 61, ed. Ben.]

tradition made men speak more than they would, and inspired them with things contrary to their sentiments. And if our Reformed will not confess themselves indebted to tradition for this ultimate and final resolution, and this submission so solemnly sworn, it is then necessity and experience that has forced them to it; it is because an end must be put to the doubts and examinations of private persons by an absolute authority, in order to have peace and uphold humility; it is because if this authority be not exercised, they must make a show of possessing and exercising it, and at least give the idea of it; it is, in a word, because one may indeed discourse and answer arguments by words; but the ignorance, infirmity, and pride, natural to the human mind, require other remedies.

In the Conference, I undertook to show, that by denying the Church's infallible authority, one falls into these two difficulties; and I say not into one of the two, but inevitably into both of them. The first is, that every particular person, how ignorant soever he may be, is obliged to believe that he understands the Scripture better than the most universal synods and all the rest of the Church together. The second, that there is a time when a baptized Christian is not in condition to make an act of faith upon the Holy Scripture; but that, whether he will or not, he shall find himself obliged to doubt whether it be inspired by God.

I have not met with any one of the Reformed religion who has not shuddered at the two propositions, and who has not told me that, far from ever believing them himself, he should detest those who should. Let us see, then, how it continues fixed by the Conference, that they are consequences of the Reformed doctrine, and such manifest consequences, that they are owned by the ministers.

And indeed, to go no further than M. Claude's Relation, he himself asserts in it, that after all ecclesiastical assemblies, every particular person ought to examine whether they have rightly understood God's word or not. When he had spoken of human interests, which often, as he said, darken the truth in the most authentic and most universal assemblies of the Chuch; I, to destroy this answer, and show that it was at bottom a mere cavil, asked him, whether, supposing all to pass orderly, and without the appearance of any human interest in the deliberations, every private person must not still examine? He acknowledged he must, and he avows it still in his own Relation, maintaining that there is no absurdity, no pride, in a private person's believing that he may understand God's word better than any ecclesiasti

cal assemblies, however orderly held, and of whatsoever persons composed.

Here is a proposition and doctrine that will appear hideous to every teachable temper: but, to make the matter more evident, let us apply this doctrine to a particular example. The Calvinistic Church, during the six score or seven score years which have elapsed since her first establishment, has held no assembly more authentic or more solemn than the Synod of Dort. Besides all the Churches of the Low Countries, all the rest of the same belief-that of England, that of Geneva, those of the Palatinate, those of Hesse, those of Switzerland, that of Bremen, and the rest of the German language, were there by their deputies, and received it; and to the end nothing might be wanting to it, if the Reformed Churches of France were hindered from being present at it, they adopted all its doctrine in the National Synod of Charenton, in 1631, where all the articles of Dort, translated verbatim, were embraced and sworn to by the whole synod, and afterwards by all the provinces and all the particular Churches. Since that time none of the "Reform" has protested against this synod. The Arminians alone who were then condemned, blame its doctrine, and talk of its cabals, and the share which policy and the interests the house of Orange had in it. All else have yielded; and if there be any thing that can be said to have been received with an unanimous consent by all the Churches of the "Reformed," it is, without doubt, the decrees of this synod. And nevertheless, I will maintain that M. Claude, being asked whether any private person whatever of his Church may rely upon an authority so great amongst them as this is, without examining any further, if he be pressed to answer positively, Yea or No, to so precise a question, and on a fact so well circumstantiated, must say No; and that, in fine, notwithstanding all this, they were but men-how able, how enlightened, how holy soever they are imagined—still subject to fail, to follow whose sentiments blindfold and without examining, would be to equal men to God.

Thus, according to the maxims of the new Reformation, every private person, even to the most ignorant woman, ought to believe that he can understand the Holy Scripture better than an assembly composed of all that is great in that whole Church which he acknowledges to be the only one where God is purely served; and not only better than this assembly, but than all the rest of the Church, and than all that he knows in the whole universe. This is what M. Claude has acknowledged to me;

[A. 1618. See Note C.]