to publish their works during their lifetime. Even Guicciardini did not do so; nor did his nephew dare to publish them until twenty years after his death. All he could publish then were the first sixteen books; and these were by no means complete in themselves. In short, it was not until 1775, more than two centuries after his history was written, that it was allowed to be published complete in Italy. Philip Nerli may be alluded to as another instance. We are told that he presented the manuscript of his Commentary dé Fatti Civili to his nephew with his dying hand; that the latter presented them to the Grand Duke of Florence for publication, but that the work was not permitted to appear until one hundred and fifty years after the death of the author. Several other instances might be added; but all show not that the historians so treated caricature or misrepresent, but that, like their illustrious predecessors Livy and Tacitus, especially the latter, they have the manliness and courage to denounce the evil-doers, no matter how high they are in power, or how great is their influence. This was the case, for instance, with Bernardo Signi, author of another history of Florence, who concludes his work as follows: "My design has but one end, that our posterity may learn by those notices the root of the causes of so many troubles which we have suffered, while they expose the malignity of those men who have raised. them up, or prolonged them; as well as the goodness of those who did all which they could to turn them away." But we refer to these much more to show that there are no historians more fearless than the Italian historians, than with any view of showing that their conduct affords any justification, nay any excuse for the precepts of Machiavelli. There can be no weaker argument than that which seeks to make an author's country or countrymen responsible for his want of principle; but when applied to the historians of Italy, who are admitted by all competent judges to be unsurpassed if equalled by those of any other country, it becomes too puerile for serious notice.

We would not be understood, however, as asserting that there is nothing true or just in Il Principe. On the contrary, it contains some maxims the truth of which has been proved by the experience of ages; although it must be confessed that these are like angels' visits. Indeed, there are so few of them, that they can hardly be said to relieve the repulsive character of the work as a whole. Yet, as our wish is to give even Satan his due, we will note two or three of Ma

chiavelli's maxims, which are somewhat applicable at the present day. Like most others who have written anything on the science of war, he regarded a ruler who could not fight in time of need as an anomaly. "A prince," he says, "who is ignorant of the art of war can never enjoy repose or safety amongst armed subjects; he will always be to them an object of contempt, as they to him will justly be subjects of suspicion; how is it possible, then, that they should act in concert? In short, a prince who does not understand the art of war can never be esteemed by his troops, nor can he ever confide in them."* We have shown on former occasions that similar views were entertained by Grotius, Montesquieu, Vattel, and others, and that they were quite as applicable to presidents of republics as to princes-to all, without distinction, who undertake the duties of a ruler. By this we meant nothing unfriendly to any one; but, on the contrary, our object was to make suggestions to those whom they might concern, the force of which is founded in human nature.

In Chapter XIX. of the Prince there are other maxims the truth of which cannot be denied; such, for example, as the following: "A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute, and effeminate, is sure to be despised; these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks, and endeavor to display a character for courage, gravity, energy, and magnificence in all his actions." The only comment necessary to make on this is, that Machiavelli is by no means peculiar in the opinion, that, let rulers call themselves what name they may, they ought to employ jokers and buffoons if they have a taste for that sort of thing, but not make jokers or buffoons of themselves, since in doing the latter they not only bring contempt on themselves, but also bring discredit on the nation whose head they happen to be, though only for a season.

Machiavelli is equally supported by experience in the hints which he gives to teach rulers how to secure esteem. "Princes ought," he says, "to honor talents and protect the arts." Can it be said that presidents ought to pursue a different course? This may seem an absurd question, yet, were we to judge by the facts, we should seem bound to answer it in the affirmative. Nor does Machiavelli neglect to instruct his prince in the art of choosing a ministry—an art which is of much more importance than many would be

• Chap. xiv.

willing to admit. "In the capacities of mankind," he says, "there are three degrees: one man understands things by means of his own natural endowments, another understands things when they are explained to him, and a third can neither understand them of himself nor when they are CXplained. The first are rare and excellent, the second have their merit, but the last are wholly worthless."* And, we ask, does it not sometimes happen that the ruler himself is the only member of the government to which he belongs that "understands things by means of his own natural endowments?" Nay, is there not an instance of this kind at the present day on the American continent? But Machiavelli asks the very pertinent question, "How are princes to know their minis ters?" There is one infallible rule, viz., to observe whether he attends more to his own interest than to that of the state.” † That is to say, if he be a person who engages in other business, such as distilling bad liquor, trying to put himself in the prince's place, furnishing almanac manufacturers with false predictions, squandering the public money in printing volumes of long, rigmarole letters which nobody will read, &c., &c., then he is not fit to be a minister; and who will deny that it is a pretty correct view of the case?

We have now presented both sides of the question to our readers as to an intelligent jury, with every disposition to do justice to one who, whatever were his faults, was undoubtedly one of the most highly gifted men of the age in which he lived. We have, indeed, omitted many facts and circumstances which no doubt would shed much additional light on the subject; but this was inevitable. No one could expect us to compress within the limits of an article what would require an octavo volume. All we intended was to give the main facts pro and con., compare them with each other, and see whether they were more reconcilable, upon the whole, with the theory of Machiavelli's innocence than with that of his guilt. In the short time we have been able to devote to the subject, we have done this to the best of our ability, and, while it would afford us infinitely more pleasure to acquit than condemn so powerful and vigorous an intellect, we cannot agree in any of the various interpretations of the Prince which would justify its revolting maxims.

* Chap. xxiii.

† Ib.

VOL. X.--NO. XX.

9

ART. VII. Prospectuses and Pamphlets of various Petroleum Companies, New York and Philadelphia. 1865.

THERE are many things that are useful and valuable in themselves which are made the means, or rather the pretext, of ruining thousands. Petroleum is destined to prove one of these; and accordingly we would warn the public not to be too credulous. That the article is a great source of wealth, and that fortunes will be made by it, far be it from us to deny. But, like every other commodity involving labor and expense, it requires capital to render it available. It is not every half dozen or dozen of persons who combine together and call themselves a company that can command a million, a halfmillion, or even one-tenth of a million of money, let them proclaim what they may to the contrary. Some can, no doubt, and do. All understand this; but the difficulty is to distinguish the genuine from the spurious. It often happens that the latter make a much greater display than the former, the same as the worst fire produces the most smoke. The terms they offer, too, are frequently better-that is, better in appearance; they offer higher interest, a larger dividend, or larger profits, as the case may be; but it is better in reality to offer five, four, nay, one per cent. and pay it when it becomes due, than to offer ten or even fifty per cent. and pay nothing. The speculators understand this, and accordingly they sometimes use low figures so that they may be able to say "We do not make you as large offers or extravagant promises as others, because what we say we will do in any event; we prefer to surprise our stockholders by giving them more at the close of the year than we promised, rather than by giving them less." This sort of logic has its effect on a large number who find when it is too late that neither fine promises nor a great display of hundreds of thousands in the form of printed figures are to be relied upon.

The only safe plan under existing circumstances, that is, while certain of our laws continue so imperfect as they are, is to institute some inquiries in regard to the character, bu siness standing, and resources of the principal members of the company in whose stock one has an idea of making an investment. To find that they are proof against this test when it has been intelligently applied is of greater importance as an inducement to invest than any amount of rhetoric or figures. Men, distinguished for their integrity in other

branches of business, or who are known to have acquitted themselves honorably of their duties as public men, are not likely to engage in a spurious enterprise, or to receive the money of their fellow-citizens under false pretences, and therefore those disposed to try their fortune in that way should choose those companies to which such men belong.

That this discrimination is necessary will be readily admitted by all who have paid any attention to the history of commercial speculations in different parts of the world. Be it remembered that there is scarcely a country in Europe in which the most stringent laws have not been passed against such for the purpose of protecting the numerous class to which is applied the adage, "A fool and his money soon part." As an example, it will be sufficient for us to refer to England, whose statute-books contain a considerable proportion of such enactments. The latter show that during the years 1718, 1719, and 1720 an incredible number of persons of more than ordinary intelligence suffered themselves to be reduced to poverty by the "bubbles" of the day, as such speculations were then called. A writer of the time tells us that "the pretended design of those undertakings was to raise a stock, setting on foot, or carrying on some promising or useful branch of trade, manufacture, machinery, or the like. In order to which, proposals were given out showing the advantages of the design, and inviting persons into it. The sum necessary to carry on the affair, together with the profits arising from it, were divided into a certain number of shares or subscriptions, to be purchased by persons disposed to adventure therein. The real design in some was to raise a sum for the private advantage of the proprietors, to be laid out by them in the South Sea stock, &c., in hopes by the rise thereof to be able to refund the subscribers' money with profit to themselves. In others, the design was absolutely to defraud the adventurers of their subscription money without any view to restitution," &c.

Various attempts were made by government to put an end to a system which was so prolific in evil to those who were at once avaricious and silly-of whom there is always a large number in every country that pays much attention to commerce. An act was passed in the sixth year of the reign of George I. which subjected all unwarrantable undertakings by unlawful subscriptions to the penalties of pramunire, but the mania for money-making was so great that it failed to produce the desired effect. A proclamation