upon improved principles; upon principles tending to peace, and the mutual prosperity of nations. In this respect America, the whole of America, has a new career before her. If we look back on the history of Europe, we see how great a portion of the last two centuries her States have been at war for interests connected mainly with her feudal monarchies; wars for particular dynasties; wars to support or defeat particular successions; wars to enlarge or curtail the dominions of particular crowns; wars to support or to dissolve family alliances; wars, in fine, to enforce or to resist religious intolerance. What long and bloody chapters do these not fill, in the history of European politics! Who does not see, and who does not rejoice to see, that America has a glorious chance of escaping, at least, these causes of contention? Who does not see, and who does not rejoice to see, that, on this continent, under other forms of government, we have before us the noble hope of being able, by the mere influence of civil liberty and religious toleration, to dry up these outpouring fountains of blood, and to extinguish these consuming fires of war. The general opinion of the age favors such hopes and such prospects. There is a growing disposition to treat the intercourse of nations more like the useful intercourse of friends; philosophy-just views of national advantage, good sense and the dictates of a common religion, and an increasing conviction that war is not the interest of the human race-all concur, to increase the interest created by this new accession to the list of nations.

We have heard it said, sir, that the topic of South American Independence is worn out, and threadbare. Such it may be, sir, to those who have contemplated it merely as an article of news, like the fluctuation of the markets, or the rise and fall of stocks. Such it may be, to those minds who can see no consequences following from these great events. But whoever has either understood their present importance, or can at all estimate their future influence-whoever has reflected on the new relations they introduce with other stateswhoever, among ourselves especially, has meditated on the new relations which we now bear to them, and the striking attitude in which we ourselves are now placed, as the oldest of the American nations, will feel that the topic can never be without interest; and will be sensible that, whether we are wise enough to perceive it or not, the establishment of South American independence will affect all nations, and ourselves perhaps more than any other, through all coming time. But, sir, although the independence of these new States seems effectually accomplished, yet a lingering and hopeless war is kept up against them by Spain. This is greatly to be regretted by all nations. To Spain it is, as every reasonable man sees, useless, and without hope. To the new States themselves it is burdensome and afflictive. To the commerce of neutral nations it is annoying and vexatious.— There seems to be something of the pertinacy of the Spanish character in holding on in such a desperate course. It reminds us of the seventy years during which Spain resisted the Independence of Holland. I think, however, that there is some reason to believe that the war approaches to its end. I believe that the measures adopted by our own government have had an effect in tending to produce that result. I understand, at least, that the question of recognition has

been taken into consideration by the Spanish government; and it may be hoped that a war, which Spain finds to be so expensive, which the whole world tells her is so hopeless, and which, if continued, now threatens her with new dangers, she may, ere long, have the prudence to terminate.

Our own course during this contest between Spain and her colonies is well known. Though entirely and strictly neutral, we were in favor of early recognition. Our opinions were known to the Allied Sovereigns when in Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at which time the affairs of Spain and her colonies were under consideration; and, probably, the knowledge of those sentiments, together with the policy adopted by England, prevented any interference by other powers at that time. Yet we have treated Spain with scrupulous delicacy. We acted on the case as one of civil war. We treated with the new governments as governments de facto. Not questioning the right of Spain to coerce them back to their old obedience, if she had the power, we yet held it to be our right to deal with them as with existing governments in fact, when the moment arrived at which it became apparent and manifest that the dominion of Spain over these, her ancient colonies, was at an end. Our right, our interest, and our duty, all concurred at that moment to recommend recognition-and we did recognise.

Now, sir, the history of this proposed Congress goes back to an earlier date than that of our recognition. It commenced in 1821; and one of the treaties now before us, proposing such a meeting, that between Colombia and Chili, was concluded in July, 1822, a few months only after we had acknowledged the independence of the new States. The idea originated, doubtless, in the wish to strengthen the union among the new governments, and to promote the common cause of all, the effectual resistance to Spanish authority. As independence was at that time their leading object, it is natural to suppose that they contemplated this mode of mutual intercourse and mutual arrangement, as favorable to the necessary concentration of purpose, and of action, for the attainment of that object. But this purpose of the Congress, or this leading idea, in which it may be supposed to have originated, has led, as it seems to me, to great misapprehensions as to its true character, and great mistakes in regard to the danger to be apprehended from our sending ministers to the meeting. This meeting, sir, is a Congress-not a Congress as the word is known to our Constitution and laws, for we use it in a peculiar sense; but as it is known to the law of nations. A Congress, by the law of nations, is but an appointed meeting for the settlement of affairs between different nations, in which the representatives or agents of each treat and negotiate as they are instructed by their own government. In other words, this Congress is a diplomatic meeting. We are asked to join no government-no legislature-no league-acting by votes. It is a Congress, such as those of Westphalia, of Nimeguen, of Ryswyck, or of Utrecht; or such as those which have been holden in Europe, in our own time. No nation is a party to any thing done in such assemblies, to which it does not expressly make itself a party. No one's rights are put at the disposition of any of the rest, or of all the rest. What ministers

agree to, being afterwards duly ratified at home, binds their government; and nothing else binds the government. Whatsoever is done, to which they do not assent, neither binds the ministers nor their government, any more than if they had not been present.

These truths, sir, seem too plain, and too commonplace to be stated. I find my apology only in those misapprehensions of the character of the meeting to which I have referred both now and formerly. It has been said that commercial treaties are not negotiated at such meetings. Far otherwise is the fact. Among the earliest of important stipulations made in favor of commerce and navigation, were those at Westphalia. And what we call the treaty of Utrecht, was a bundle of treaties, negotiated at that Congress; some of peace, some of boundary, and others of commerce. Again, it has been said, in order to prove that this meeting is a sort of confederacy, that such assemblies are out of the way of ordinary negotiation, and are always founded on, and provided for, by previous treaties. Pray, sir, what treaty preceded the Congress at Utrecht? and the meeting of our Plenipotentiaries with those of England at Ghent, what was that but a Congress? and what treaty preceded it? It is said, again, that there is no sovereign to whom our ministers can be accredited. Let me ask whether, in the case last cited, our ministers exhibited their credentials to the Mayor of Ghent? Sir, the practice of nations in these matters, is well known, and is free of difficulty. If the government be not present, agents or Plenipotentiaries interchange their credentials. And when it is said that our ministers at Panama will be, not ministers, but deputies, members of a deliberative body, not protected in their public character by the public law; when all this is said, propositions are advanced, of which I see no evidence whatever, and which appear to me to be wholly without foundation.

It is contended that this Congress, by virtue of the treaties which the new States have entered into, will possess powers other than those of a diplomatic character, as between those new States themselves. If that were so, it would be unimportant to us. The real question here is, what will be our relation with those States, by sending ministers to this Congress? Their arrangements among themselves will not affect us. Even if it were a government, like our old confederation, yet, if its members had authority to treat with us in behalf of their respective nations on subjects on which we have a right to treat, the Congress might still be a very proper occasion for such negotiations. Do gentlemen forget that the French Minister was introduced to our old Congress, met it in its sessions, carried on oral discussions with it, and treated with it in behalf of the French King? All that did not make him a member of it; nor connect him at all with the relations which its members bore to each other. As he treated on the subject of carrying on the war against England, it was, doubtless, hostile towards that power; but this consequence followed from the object and nature of the stipulations, and not from the manner of the intercourse. The Representatives of these South American States, it is said, will carry on belligerant councils at this Congress. Be it so; we shall not join in such councils. At the moment of invitation, our Government informed the

ministers of those States, that we could not make ourselves a party to the war between them and Spain, nor to councils for deliberating on the means of its further prosecution.

If, it is asked, we send ministers to a Congress composed altogether of belligerants, is it not a breach of neutrality? Certainly not: no man can say it is. Suppose, sir, that these ministers from the new states, instead of Panama, were to assemble at Bogota, where we already have a minister: their councils, at that place, might be belligerant, while the war should last with Spain. But should we, on that account, recall our minister from Bogota? The whole argument rests on this; that because, at the same time and place, the agents of the South American Governments may negotiate about their own relations with each other, in regard to their common war against Spain, therefore we cannot, at the same time and place, negotiate with them, or any of them, upon our own neutral and commercial relations. This proposition, sir, cannot be maintained; and, therefore, all the inferences from it fail.

But, sir, I see no proof that, as between themselves, the representatives of the South American States are to possess other than diplomatic powers. I refer to the treaties, which are essentially alike, and which have been often read.

With two exceptions, (which I will notice,) the articles of these treaties, describing the powers of the Congress, are substantially like those in the treaty of Paris, in 1814, providing for the Congress at Vienna. It was there stipulated that all the powers should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, to regulate, in general Congress, the arrangements to complete the provisions of the present treaty. Now, it might have been here asked, how regulate? How regulate in general Congress?-regulate by votes? Sir, nobody asked such questions: simply because it was to be a Congress of plenipotentiaries. The two exceptions which I have mentioned, are, that this Congress is to act as a council and to interpret treaties; but there is nothing in either of these to be done which may not be done diplomatically. What is more common than diplomatic intercourse, to explain and to interpret treaties? Or what more frequent than that nations, having a common object, interchange mutual counsels and advice, through the medium of their respective ministers? To bring this matter, sir, to the test, let me ask, when these ministers assemble at Panama, can they do anything but according to their instructions? Have they any organization, any power of action, or any rule of action common to them all? No more, sir, than the respective ministers at the Congress of Vienna. Everything is settled by the use of the word Plenipotentiary. That proves the meeting to be diplomatic, and nothing else. Who ever heard of a plenipotentiary member of the Legislature?—a plenipotentiary burgess of a city?-or a plenipotentiary knight of the shire?

We may dismiss all fears, sir, arising from the nature of this meeting. Our agents will go there, if they go at all, in the character of ministers, protected by the public law, negotiating only for ourselves, and not called on to violate any neutral duty of their own governIf it be so that this meeting has other powers, in consequence of other arrangements between other States, of which I see no proof,

ment.

still, we are not party to these arrangements, nor can be in any way affected by them. As far as this government is concerned, nothing can be done but by negotiation, as in other cases.

This

It has been affirmed, that this measure, and the sentiments expressed by the Executive relative to its objects, are an acknowledged departure from the neutral policy of the United States. Sir, I deny there is an acknowledged departure, or any departure at all, from the neutral policy of the country. What do we mean by our neutral policy? Not, I suppose, a blind and stupid indifference to whatever is passing around us; not a total disregard to approaching events, or approaching evils, till they meet us full in the face. Nor do we mean, by our neutral policy, that we intend never to assert our rights by force. No, sir. We mean by our policy of neutrality, that the great objects of national pursuit with us are connected with peace. We covet no provinces; we desire no conquests; we entertain no ambitious projects of aggrandizement by war. is our policy. But it does not follow, from this, that we rely less than other nations, on our own power to vindicate our own rights. We know that the last logic of kings is also our last logic; that our own interests must be defended and maintained by our own arm; and that peace or war may not always be of our own choosing. Our neutral policy, therefore, not only justifies but requires, our anxious attention to the political events which take place in the world, a skilful perception of their relation to our own concerns, and an early anticipation of their consequences, and firm and timely assertion of what we hold to be our own rights, and our own interests. Our neutrality is not a predetermined abstinence, either from remonstrances, or from force. Our neutral policy is a policy that protects neutrality, that defends neutrality, that takes up arms, if need be, for neutrality. When it is said, therefore, that this measure departs from our neutral policy, either that policy, or the measure itself, is misunderstood. It implies either that the object or the tendency of the measure is to involve us in the war of other States, which I think cannot be shown, or that the assertion of our own sentiments, on points affecting deeply our own interests, may place us in a hostile attitude with other States, and that, therefore, we depart from neutrality; whereas the truth is, that the decisive assertion, and the firm support of these sentiments, may be most essential to the maintenance of neutrality.

An honorable member from Pennsylvania thinks this Congress will bring a dark day over the United States. Doubtless, sir, it is an interesting moment in our history; but I see no great proofs of thick coming darkness. But the object of the remark seemed to be to show that the President himself saw difficulties on all sides, and, making a choice of evils, preferred rather to send ministers to this Congress, than to run the risk of exciting the hostility of the States by refusing to send. In other words, the gentleman wished to prove that the President intended an alliance; although such intention is expressly disclaimed.

Much commentary has been bestowed on the letters of invitation from the ministers. I shall not go through with verbal criticisms on these letters. Their general import is plain enough. I shall not