Page images
PDF
EPUB

It is not pertinent to this occasion, to advert to all the means by which these desirable ends were to be obtained. Some of them, closely connected with the subject now under consideration, are obvious and prominent. The objects were, commerce, credit, and mutual confidence in matters of property; and these required, among other things, a uniform standard of value, or medium of payments. One of the first powers given to Congress, therefore, is that of coining money, and fixing the value of foreign coins; and one of the first restraints imposed on the States, is the total prohibition to coin money. These two provisions are industriously followed up and completed, by denying to the States all power emitting of bills of credit, or of making anything but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts. The whole control, therefore, over the standard of value, and medium of payments, is vested in the general government. And here the question instantly suggests itself, why should such pains be taken to confide in Congress alone this exclusive power of fixing on a standard value, and of prescribing the medium in which debts shall be paid, if it is, after all, to be left to every State to declare that debts may be discharged, and to prescribe how they may be discharged, without any payment at all? Why say that no man shall be obliged to take in discharge of a debt paper money issued by the authority of a State, and yet say, that by the same authority the debt may be discharged without any payment whatever?

We contend, that the constitution has not left its work thus unfinished. We contend, that, taking its provisions together, it is apparent it was intended to provide for two things, intimately connected with each other.

1. A uniform medium for the payment of debts.

2. A uniform manner of discharging debts when they are to be discharged without payment.

The arrangement of the grants and prohibition contained in the constitution, are fit to be regarded on this occasion. The grant to Congress, and the prohibition on the States, though they are certainly to be construed together, are not contained in the same clauses. The powers granted to Congress are enumerated one after another in the eighth section; the principal limitations on those powers, in the ninth section; and the prohibitions to the States, in the tenth section. Now, in order to understand whether any particular power be exclusively vested in Congress, it is necessary to read the terms of the grant, together with the terms of the prohibition. Take an example from that power of which we have been speaking, the coinage power. Here the grant to Congress is, "To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coins." Now, the correlative prohibition on the States, though found in another section, is, undoubtedly, to be taken in immediate connexion with the foregoing, as much so as if it had been found in the same clause. The only just reading of these provisions, therefore, is this: " Con gress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; but no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts."

These provisions respect the medium of payment, or standard of value, and, thus collated, their joint result is clear and decisive

We think the result clear also, of those provisions which respect the discharge of debts without payment. Collated in like manner, they stand thus: "Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; but no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." This collocation cannot be objected to if they refer to the same subject matter; and that they do refer to the same subject matter, we have the authority of this Court for saying, because this Court solemnly determined, in Sturges vs. Crowninshield, that this prohibition on the States did apply to systems of bankruptcy. It must be now taken, therefore, that State bankrupt laws were in the mind of the Convention when the prohibition was adopted, and, therefore, the grant to Congress on the subject of bankrupt laws, and the prohibition to the State on the same subject, are properly to be taken and read together; and being thus read together, is not the intention clear to take away from the States the power of passing bankrupt laws, since, while enacted by them, such laws would not be uniform, and to confer the power exclusively on Congress, by whom uniform laws could be established?

Suppose the order of arrangement in the constitution had been otherwise than it is, and that the prohibitions to the States had preceded the grants of power to Congress, the two powers, when collated, would then have read thus: "No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; but Congress may establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." Could any man have doubted, in that case, that the meaning was, that the States should not pass laws discharging debts without payment, but that Congress might establish uniform bankrupt acts? and yet this inversion of the order of the clauses does not alter their sense. We contend, that Congress alone possesses the power of establishing bankrupt laws; and although we are aware, that in Sturges vs. Crowninshield, the Court decided, that such an exclusive power could not be inferred from the words of the grant in the seventh section, we yet would respectfully request the bench to reconsider this point. We think it could not have been intended that both the States and general government should exercise this power; and, therefore, that a grant to one implies the prohibition on the other. But not to press a topic which the Court has already had under its consideration, we contend, that even without reading the clauses of the constitution in the connexion which we have suggested, and which is believed to be the true one, the prohibition in the tenth section, taken by itself, does forbid the enactment of State bankrupt laws, as applied to future, as well as present debts. We argue this from the words of the prohibition; from the association they are found in, and from the objects intended. 1. The words are general. The States can pass no law impairing contracts; that is, any contract. In the nature of things a law may impair a future contract, and, therefore, such contract is within the protection of the constitution. The words being general, it is for the other side to show a limitation; and this, it is submitted, they have wholly failed to do, unless they shall have established the doctrine that the law itself is part of the contract. It may be added, that the particular expression of the constitution is worth regarding. The thing prohibited is called a law, not an act; a law, in its general

acceptation, is a rule prescribed for future conduct, not a legislative interference with existing rights. The framers of the constitution would hardly have given the appellation of law to violent invasions of individual right, or individual property, by acts of legislative power. Although, doubtless, such acts fall within this prohibition, yet they are prohibited also by general principles, and by the constitutions of the States, and, therefore, further provision against such acts was not so necessary as against other mischiefs.

66

2. The most conclusive argument, perhaps, arises from the con nexion in which the clause stands. The words of the prohibition, so far as it applies to civil rights, or rights of property, are, "that no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in the payment of debts, or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The prohibition of attainders, and ex post facto laws, refer entirely to criminal proceedings, and, therefore, should be considered as standing by themselves; but the other parts of the prohibition are connected by the subject matter, and ought, therefore, to be construed together. Taking the words thus together, according to their natural connexion, how is it possible to give a more limited construction to the term contracts," in the last branch of the sentence, than to the word "debts,” in that immediately preceding? Can a State make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of future debts? This nobody pretends. But what ground is there for a distinction? No State shall make anything but gold and silver a tender in the payment of debts, nor pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Now, by what reasoning is it made out that the debts here spoken of, are any debts, either existing or future; but that the contracts spoken of are subsisting contracts only? Such a distinction seems to us wholly arbitrary. We see no ground for it. Suppose the article, where it uses the word debts, had used the word contracts The sense would have been the same then, as it now is; but the identity of terms would have made the nature of the distinction now contended for somewhat more obvious. Thus altered, the clause would read, that no State should make anything but gold and silver a tender in discharge of contracts, nor pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; yet the first of these expressions would have been held to apply to all contracts, and the last to subsisting contracts only. This shows the consequence of what is now contended for in a strong light. It is certain that the substitution of the word contracts, for debts, would not alter the sense; and an argument that could not be sustained if such substitution were made, cannot be sustained now. We maintain, therefore, that if tender laws may not be made for future debts, neither can bankrupt laws be made for future contracts. All the arguments used here may be applied with equal force to tender laws for future debts. It may be said, for instance, that when it speaks of debts, the constitution means existing debts, and not mere possibilities of future debt; that the object was to preserve vested rights; and that if a man, after a tender law had passed, had contracted a debt, the manner in which that tender law authorised that debt to be discharged, became part of the contract, and that the whole debt, or whole obligation was thus

qualified by the pre-existing law, and was no more than a contract to deliver so much paper money, or of whatever other article which might be made a tender, as the original bargain expressed. Arguments of this sort will not be found wanting in favor of tender laws, if the Court yield to similar arguments in favor of bankrupt laws.

[ocr errors]

These several prohibitions of the constitution stand in the same paragraph; they have the same purpose, and were introduced for the same object; they are expressed in words of similar import, in grammar, and in sense; they are subject to the same construction, and, we think, no reason has yet been given for imposing an important restriction on one part of them, which does not equally show, that the same restriction might be imposed also on the other part. We have already endeavoured to maintain, that one great political object, intended by the constitution, would be defeated, if this construction were allowed to prevail. As an object of political regulation, it was not important to prevent the States from passing bankrupt laws applicable to present debts, while the power was left to them in regard to future debts; nor was it at all important, in a political point of view, to prohibit tender laws as to future debts, while it was yet left to the States to pass laws for the discharge of such debts, which, after all, are little different, in principle, from tender laws. Look at the law before the Court in this view. It provides that if the debtor will surrender, offer, or tender to trustees, for the benefit of his creditors, all his estate and effects, he shall be discharged from all his debts. If it had authorised a tender of anything but money to any one creditor, though it were of a value equal to the debt, and thereupon provided for a discharge, it would have been clearly invalid. Yet it is maintained to be good, merely because it is made for all creditors, and seeks a discharge from all debts; although the thing tendered may not be equivalent to a shilling in the pound of those debts. This shows, again, very clearly how the constitution has failed of its purpose, if, having in terms prohibited all tender laws, and taken so much pains to establish a uniform medium of payment, it has yet left the States the power of discharging debts, as they may see fit, without any payment at all.

To recapitulate what has been said, we maintain; first, that the constitution, by its grants to Congress, and its prohibitions on the States, has sought to establish one uniform standard of value, or medium of payment. Second, that, by like means, it has endeavoured to provide for one uniform mode of discharging debts, when they are to be discharged without payment. Third, that these objects are connected, and that the first loses much of its importance, if the last, also, be not accomplished. Fourth, that reading the grant to Congress and the prohibition on the States together, the inference is strong that the constitution intended to confer an exclusive power to pass bankrupt laws on Congress. Fifth, that the prohibition, in the tenth section, reaches to all contracts existing or future, in the same way as the other prohibition in the same section extends to all debts existing or future. Sixthly, and that, upon any other construction, one great political object of the constitution will fail of its accomplishment.

REMARKS

IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS, UPON THE RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO OATHS OF OFFICE. 1821.

It is obvious that the principal alteration, proposed by the first resolution, is the omission of the declaration of belief in the Christian religion, as a qualification for office, in the cases of the governor, lieutenant governor, counsellors, and members of the legislature. I shall content myself on this occasion with stating, shortly and generally, the sentiments of the select committee, as I understand them, on the subject of this resolution. Two questions naturally present themselves. In the first place; have the people a right, if in their judgment the security of their government and its due administration demand it, to require a declaration of belief in the Christian religion, as a qualification or condition of office? On this question, a majority of the committee held a decided opinion. They thought the people had such a right. By the fundamental principle of popular and elective governments, all office is in the free gift of the people. They may grant, or they may withhold it at pleasure; and if it be for them, and them only, to decide whether they will grant office, it is for them to decide, also, on what terms, and with what conditions, they will grant it. Nothing is more unfounded than the notion that any man has a right to an office. This must depend on the choice of others, and consequently upon the opinions of others, in relation to his fitness and qualification for office. No man can be said to have a right to that, which others may withhold from him at pleasure. There are certain rights, no doubt, which the whole people, or the government as representing the whole people, owe to each individual, in return for that obedience and personal service, and proportionate contributions to the public burdens, which each individual owes to the government. These rights are stated with sufficient accuracy, in the tenth article of the Bill of Rights, in this constitution. "Each individual in society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to the standing laws." Here is no right of office enumerated; no right of governing others, or of bearing rule in the state. All bestowment of office remaining in the discretion of the people, they have of course a right to regulate it, by any rules which they may deem expedient. Hence the people, by their constitution, pre

« PreviousContinue »