ht with reference to which so many romances were invented e war in Mexico."

When our war ended," said General Grant, "I urged President Johnson an immediate invasion of Mexico. I not sure whether I wrote him or not, but I pressed the er frequently upon Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seward. You Napoleon in Mexico was really a part, and an active part, e rebellion. His army was as much opposed to us as that irby Smith. Even apart from his desire to establish a archy, and overthrow a friendly republic, against which y loyal American revolted, there was the active co-operabetween the French and the rebels on the Rio Grande h made it an act of war. I believed then, and I believe that we had a just cause of war with Maximilian, and with oleon if he supported him-with Napoleon especially, as he the head of the whole business. We were so placed that were bound to fight him. I sent Sheridan off to the Rio nde. I sent him post haste, not giving him time to particiin the farewell review. My plan was to give him a corps, him cross the Rio Grande, join Juarez, and attack Maxan. With his corps he could have walked over Mexico. Johnson seemed to favor my plan, but Mr. Seward was osed, and his opposition was decisive."

The remark was made that such a move necessarily meant r with France.

I suppose so," said the General. "But with the army that ad on both sides at the close of the war, what did we care Napoleon? Unless Napoleon surrendered his Mexican proI was for fighting Napoleon. There never was a more cause for war than what Napoleon gave us. With our w we could do as we pleased. We had a victorious army, ed in four years of war, and we had the whole South to it from. I had that in my mind when I proposed the nce on Mexico. I wanted to employ and occupy the hern army. We had destroyed the career of many of at home, and I wanted them to go to Mexico. I am not now that I was sound in that conclusion. I have thought

that their devotion to slavery and their familiarity with the institution would have led them to introduce slavery, or something like it, into Mexico, which would have been a calamity. Still, my plan at the time was to induce the Southern troops to go to Mexico, to go as soldiers under Sheridan, and remain as settlers. I was especially anxious that Kirby Smith with his command should go over. Kirby Smith had not surrendered, and I was not sure that he would not give us trouble before surrendering. Mexico seemed an outlet for the disappointed and dangerous elements in the South, elements brave and warlike and energetic enough, and with their share of the best qualities of the Anglo-Saxon character, but irreconcilable in their hostility to the Union. As our people had saved the Union and meant to keep it, and manage it as we liked, and not as they liked, it seemed to me that the best place for our defeated friends was Mexico. It was better for them and better for us. I tried to make Lee think so when he surrendered. They would have done perhaps as great a work in Mexico as has been done in California."

objection to attack The General said:

It was suggested that Mr. Seward's Napoleon was his dread of another war. "No one dreaded war more than I did. I had more than I wanted. But the war would have been national, and we could have united both sections under one flag. The good results accruing from that would in themselves have compensated for another war, even if it had come, and such a war as it must have been under Sheridan and his army-short, quick, decisive, and assuredly triumphant. We could have marched from the Rio Grande to Mexico without a serious battle."

In one of our conversations upon the General's desire to drive Maximilian out of Mexico at the close of the Secession war, the observation was made that such a war would have had an important bearing upon the fortunes of Napoleon. "No one can tell what the results would have been in France," said the General; "but I believe they would have been very important. Maximilian's life would have been saved. If Sheridan had gone

into Mexico, he would of course have saved Maximilian. We should never have consented to that unfortunate and unnecessary execution. I don't think Napoleon could have rallied France into a war against us in defense of slavery. You see that he could not rally it against Prussia. His empire, never really strong, would have had such a shock that it would most probably have fallen, as fall it did five years later, and France would now be a republic-minus Sedan. Mr. Seward's objection to my Mexican plan cost Maximilian his life and gave the

emperor five more years of power. Still, Mr. Seward may have been right. War is so terrible that I can conceive of no reason short of a defense of the national honor or integrity that can justify it."

This led to a conversation upon the character of the French emperor and of Napoleonism generally. "I have always had," said General Grant, "an aversion to Napoleon and the whole family. When I was in Denmark the Prince Imperial was there, and some one thought it might be pleasant for me to meet him. I declined, saying I did not want to see him or any

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until they could have a few months training out of the way of a hostile force. Under these circumstances how was it possible for any one on reflection to doubt the result. There exists, and has since the foundation of our government always existed, a traditional friendship between our people and the French. I had this feeling in common with my countrymen. But I felt at the same time that no people had so great an interest in the removal of Napoleonism from France as the French people. No man outside of France has a deeper interest in the success of the French republic than I have."

Well,

"I never shared the apprehension felt by so many of our leading men," said General Grant, "as to the recognition of the Southern rebellion, as a Confederacy, by England or France, or by both. It used to be the great bugbear during the war that the Confederacy might be recognized. suppose it had been recognized! It would not have interfered with Canby, or Meade, or Sherman, who would have kept on marching. I am sure I should not have drawn away from Richmond. It would not have interfered with our money supplies, as we were buying our own loans. It would not have affected supplies of men, as we did not have more than three per cent. of our army who were not full citizens when the war began. We would have gone on about the same, and ended about the same. The difference would have been with England. We could not have resisted a war with England. Such a war, under the conditions of the two countries, would have meant the withdrawal of England from the American continent. Canada would have become ours. If Sheridan, for instance, with our resources, could not have taken Canada in thirty days he should have been cashiered. I don't mean this as a reflection upon the patriotism or bravery of the people of Canada, they are as good a people as live. but facts were against them. We could have thrown half a million of men into their country, not militia but men inured to war. They would have covered Canada like a wave. Then, if you look at the map, you will find that the strategic and defensive points of the Canadian frontier are within our lines. It seems odd that Eng