to constitute a basis of extension for a war establishment? and 2d. What form of organization is best calculated to secure these objects? The first of these questions we shall not attempt to decide, especially as differences of opinion, too extraordinary to be readily accounted for, or easily reconciled, have prevailed among our distinguished national legislators. At the close of the late war, Mr. Mason, a senator in congress from NewHampshire, advocated the reduction of the army to 3000 men. Mr. Mason, who is a man of uncommon intellectual endowments, enlightened by study and experience, has always been a distinguished member of the old federal party; and it is hardly necessary to add, that the system of this party has been to build up and invigorate all our national establishments. Mr. Monroe, the late president of the United States, was said to be in favor of an army of 15,000 men. Mr. Calhoun, on the floor of congress, voted for 10,000 men. Mr. Clay, on the contrary, whose voice is now raised against the evil tendency of the military spirit, advocated a retention of 20,000 men as a peace establishment.* But without deciding the respective merits of these several estimates, we are disposed to believe that the creation of a scientific corps of officers, sufficiently numerous to organize and discipline such an army as would meet the probable exigencies of the country in case of foreign war, would dispense with the preservation, in time of peace, of all except a very moderate number of rank and file. Recruits are easily disciplined to the habits of soldiers, if they have the advantage of able instruction. The delay which attended the formation of our armies during the late war, and the disasters to which their inefficiency gave rise, were all owing to the want of a body of scientific and experienced officers. The commissioned grades, like the ranks, were principally filled from domestic life; and the consequence was, that the officers were as inexperienced as their men: they had the rudiments of their education to acquire, at a time when it should have been perfected.

These observations lead us to the consideration of Mr. Calhoun's plan of organization, which is, to retain a proportion of officers greater than that which exists in war formations, so that the peace establishment, by the mere addition of rank and file, may be enlarged at once, on the occurrence of hostilities, to a compass which would be adequate to the public defence. Mr. Calhoun's views, as stated in the report cited at the head of this article, are given too much in detail to be inserted entire, but

"Tempora mutantur, et nos," &c.

the following extracts from different parts of the report will afford a tolerably just conception of his plan.

"Those qualities which essentially distinguish an army from an equal assemblage of untrained individuals, can only be acquired by the instruction of experienced officers. If they, particularly the company and regimental officers, are inexperienced, the army must remain undisciplined, in which case the genius, and even the experience of the commander, will be of little avail. The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience; so that, at all times, the country may have at its command a body of officers sufficiently numerous and well instructed in every branch of duty, both of the line and staff; and the organization of the army ought to be such as to enable the government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service. It is thus only that we can be in the condition to meet the first shocks of hostilities with unyielding firmness; and to press on an enemy while our resources are yet unexhausted."

"No position connected with the organization of the peace establishment, is susceptible of being more rigidly proved than that the proportion of its officers to the rank and file ought to be greater than in a war establishment. It results immediately from a position, the truth of which cannot be fairly doubted, and which I have attempted to illustrate in the preliminary remarks, that the leading object of a regular army in time of peace ought to be, to enable the country to meet, with honor and safety, particularly at the commencement of war, the dangers incident to that state. To effect this object, as far as practicable, the peace organization ought, as has been shown, to be such, that in passing to a state of war, there should be nothing either to new model or create; and that the difference between that and the war organization ought to be simply in the greater magnitude of the latter." "The war organization, thus raised on the basis of the peace establishment, will bring into effective operation the whole of the experience and skill of the latter, which, with attention, would, in a short period, be communicated to the new recruits and the officers recently appointed, so as to constitute a well disciplined force."

We conceive this plan of providing for our national defence as less objectionable than any which we have ever known proposed; 1, because it dispenses with the greatest possible number of common soldiers; and, 2, because it secures the greatest aggregate amount of facilities for promptly creating an efficient force on any sudden emergency. As we have already observed, recruits are readily levied, and, with able instruction, soon acquire the regularity and discipline of an army. Officers, on the contrary, require a systematic education to procure the knowledge and experience which would qualify them to organize an army, give it habits of order and obedience, and conduct it to victory. If there is any foundation for the apprehension that standing armies may prove dangerous to our liberties, the

plan of Mr. Calhoun gives the peace establishment the least objectionable form, as dangers would be expected from a mercenary soldiery, and not from a body of intelligent officers, chosen from among ourselves, bearing our own blood, and nurtured with us in the enjoyment of a common liberty. Mr. Calhoun's plan dispenses, as far as possible, with the former, and relies principally upon the latter. When we consider that the rank and file of the army, being enlisted for a short period, are constantly changing, the reduction of their numbers will hardly be deemed to involve any sacrifice of the public interest. If they were enlisted, like the soldiery of most European states, for life, and if there were a certainty that they would compose a part of the army, on the recurrence of war, the expediency of diminishing their numbers might be questioned. As it is, the officers would be our principal reliance in creating a more enlarged establishment, and hence the propriety of retaining them in a greater proportion than the rank and file:

But the most important effect which would follow an adoption of Mr. Calhoun's plan to its full extent, would be the necessity of elevating the character and increasing the efficiency of the militia of the country. In proportion as the peace establishment is diminished in numbers, the attention of the government will be directed to arming the militia, and giving it uniform systems of discipline and instruction; an object which has long been discussed, which has been advocated on the floor of Congress with great and meritorious zeal, but to which the public has given a degree of attention far inferior to its importance. On this subject, it is our intention to enlarge our view in a future number, when we shall be better prepared, and when we shall be able to present it unembarrassed by other discussions. At this time, we shall content ourselves with saying, that we deem the militia of this country, whether we regard it with a reference to our national character and institutions, with a view only of its own intrinsic efficiency and power, or as the source from which the materials for our regular forces are derived in time of war, as a national establishment of the first importance. A community accustomed to the use of arms, may set at defiance domestic, as well as external enemies, so long as the social virtues are unimpaired. The occasions on which the militia of the United States has been called forth to achieve victories over the regular forces of Europe, are so many convincing illustrations of its importance as an arm of defence; while, at the same time, the many defeats it has suffered, sometimes without resistance, indicate the necessity of bringing it as near the per

fection of a regularly disciplined force as is compatible with the general interest of the community. That this interest would be in some measure impaired by the sacrifice of time and labor, which necessarily accompanies a regular system of military exercises, must be admitted; but not in any sort of proportion, we conceive, to the beneficial change, which such a system would work in the power and security of a free people. The facility, with which such a militia could be converted into a regular army, by such a body of officers as Mr. Calhoun proposes to preserve, is obvious.

With an army of small dimensions, organized on Mr. Calhoun's plan with a large proportion of officers, and a militia well armed and instructed in the first principles of discipline and exercise, according to some uniform system, we should consider our military preparation complete. The officers of the peace establishment would be capable, in case of war, of disciplining, without delay, a vastly extended force, and the militia would furnish the materials for such extension. We, of course, consider the military academy at West Point as an indispensable branch of the peace establishment, and it is our intention at a future day to examine it in detail. There are considerations in its favor too numerous and weighty to be briefly stated, and we waive all comment on it, until we shall be able to present at large the arguments in favor of cherishing and perfecting it. On this point, however, we believe there is no difference of opinion in the country.

We perceive, by a report of Major General Brown, that the war department has adopted a suggestion made by him, to enlist no foreigners into the ranks of the army. In this arrangement we cordially acquiesce, because we believe our own citizens have a higher character, and are better calculated, independently of the national spirit which they would carry to the field, for our public defence. We take it to be an undeniable principle, that a man is formidable as a soldier in precise ratio of his political importance as a citizen--that, with equal numbers and equal discipline, success invariably follows the balance of freedom. Setting aside a few instances of extraordinary enthusiasm in conquering armies, the results of which seem to have been obtained in violation of the commonly received relations of cause and effect, this position will be supported by any reference which can be made to the annals of society, at any stage of its progress. Upon the strength of this principle alone, we should prefer a native to a foreigner as a mem

ber of the army; and we have further cause of preference in the consideration that his origin, his connexions, his education, his course of life, and his habits of thought, all tend to combine with his national spirit, as a part of the public defence, the more domestic spirit of a citizen. Between the soldier of a republic and the soldier of a prince, there are numerous points of difference; but none so important as that which springs from this very distinction, that one is the dependent of a free, and the other of an arbitrary form of government. Each participates in the characteristic spirit of the institution, under which he is arrayed in arms. The impulses of the one are principally derived from personal considerations-those of the other, from the more animating and exalted sentiment of country: the one is fitted, by the course of his reflections, to become the passive instrument of tyranny-the other is almost irresistibly impelled by the current of his thoughts in a popular direction.

We have already glanced at the securities which we possess against the calamities of war, in our geographical position with regard to Europe, and our relations of interest with the countries of our own continent. Our national character affords a still higher degree of security. Among a people enjoying the blessings of an enlightened education, a free press, and a representative government, wars will never be hastily commenced, because the popular will, guided by a cultivated judgment, is invariably brought to the decision of every question of general interest. Arms will, therefore, not be resorted to, except in cases where the public mind is strongly excited by a sense of injustice or indignity; and as individuals are more readily roused by encroachments on their own personal immunities than by those which touch the general interest of the community, there is danger that the public injuries of the United States will rather be endured too long, than resented too hastily. Our distance from the warlike nations of the world stands in striking contrast with the condition of European states. An immense ocean is to be traversed before we can be assailed; while on the continent of Europe, a statistical boundary only is to be passed, and an invading power is upon the possessions of its enemy. In proportion as nations are disjoined by intervening seas and territories, the dangerous influence of conflicting principles and institutions is diminished;* and feuds are dissipated by separa

* In ancient times, a mere difference of customs and manners was classed among the prolific causes of war.

"Ex diversitate morum crebra bella."-Tac. Hist. V.