There is no supposition in the matter. The treaty of 1809 is extant, and in no way refers to the support of the reigning family, but the supposition that it does so has enabled Major Smyth to make a gratuitous comparison between Lahore and Bhurtpore affairs, as also between Louis Philippe and Sher Singh.

At page 21, Major Smyth is pleased to observe:

Regarding the Punjab war; I am neither of opinion, that the Sikhs made an unprovoked attack, nor that we have acted towards them with great forbearance."

This is very unfortunate for the British Government and will doubtless affect its reputation! In charity to Major Smyth we must hope that he is unaware of the force of the words he uses. The only person who could have provoked the attack was the lamented officer to whom this book is dedicated; if he had done so, however "great" he might have been or "greater he would have been," our pages should have execrated as much as it has endeavoured to honour his name.

Major Smyth informs his readers at page 23, in the teeth of ample evidence to the contrary, and in the face of the 10,400 men with whom he himself served at Ferozepore, that when "the Sikhs came we were quite unprepared to receive them." We wonder what Major Smyth would consider to be preparation, and whether he would now keep up an army at Gorrukpore and Segowli to watch the Gurkhas, and another at Arracan and Tenasserim to guard against the Burmahs. It was well for British India that Major Smyth did not command at Ferozepore, when, in spite of its efficient garrison, he could pen such lines as the following:

"The first great fault the Sikhs committed was in not attacking Ferozepore and destroying that place; and when Runjoor Singh found he was allowed quietly to cross the Sutlej near Loodiana-turn our right flankand get in our rear, he ought certainly to have marched direct upon Delhi instead of entrenching himself, first at Buddawal, and afterwards on the banks of the river; his Cavalry might have laid waste the country, and his army would have increased like a snowball, and easily have got possession of a portion of the siege train, which was on the road without proper ammunition, and unprotected."

The paragraph contains almost as many errors as lines. The Sikhs could not have destroyed Ferozepore, and dared not even attempt it, when repeatedly challenged by the gallant Littler and his heroic train. Runjore Singh did not get into our rear, and had not the means of effectually doing so. His plundering Horsemen might have done so; as, where may not bold marauders push forward: but it is sheer stuff pretending

that Runjore Singh's nine Battalions, five of them irregulars, could have done more than get themselves into an inextricable mess by an attempt on the train in the face of Sir Harry Smith's force, which was little inferior in numbers to his own, and contained two European Regiments, while a third (H. M. 53rd) which eventually joined him in time for Aliwal was in front of the siege train throughout its march to Bussean, and one and a half Native Regiments, as well as a detachment of Irregular Horse, accompanied its progress. How then the siege train came up without "proper ammunition and unprotected" is beyond our comprehension, considering it was protected as above noticed, and brought ammunition for all arms of the Army. Had Runjore Singh's whole force, much less his Cavalry, attacked it, he ought to have been not only repulsed, but well punished.

In a note to the paragraph under notice, it is observed:

"Had General Grey been permitted to march when he was first ordered, he might have been present at Ferozshah or at Moodkee, and would have superceded the necessity of bringing Brigadier Wheler's force away from Loodiana; or, had General Grey been ordered to Loodiana when he did march, he would have prevented Runjoor Singh from crossing the River."

The real circumstances of General Grey's march from Meerut were fully explained in a former number* of this work. It was intended that he should move on Lúdiana, but having resorted to Army Head Quarters via Umbala, no one knew where he was until he had passed Bussean, the point at which he ought to have turned off.

It would be difficult to understand what Major Smyth means by the following passage:

"But while we had a contempt for the Sikhs, it is evident the native army had a great idea of their prowess; it was, therefore, most fortunate that with this army there was a large body of Europeans: for after the war was over a Foreign officer in the Sikh service observed to a friend of mine, "If it had not been for your European soldiers, we would have driven you from Ferozepore into the sea;-and I must confess, I could only painfully acknowledge to myself, the truth of his remark; for, as it was, the troops under their excellencies Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge had but dearly gained a victory over a portion of the Sikh army when Sir John Littler came to their rescue !—and, after his arrival, from all that I can learn, the Europeans had almost formed as high au opinion of the Sikh soldiers as the natives: and it was long undecided whether we were to be the victors or the vanquished."

If he means anything, it is, that the Sepoys were always afraid of the Sikhs and that latterly the Europeans became so. Neither assumption is correct. The whole army, officers as well as Soldiers were indeed surprised at the hardihood displayed by the

* No XVI. Art. VI,

Sikhs, and like the British army in the Peninsula, the same discipline and pluck were not displayed at the beginning as at the end of the Campaign; but this goes against rather than in favour of Major Smyth's argument. During the first two years of Wellington's Campaigns very many more imputations might have been laid at the door of the British Troops-the best Infantry in the world, than now against those of Bengal. In those days, however, as well as now, officers were to be found, who, for notoriety's sake, or other motives were, not ashamed to befoul their own nests. But, as it was in the latter battles of the Peninsula and at Waterloo, so was it at Sobraon that discipline and conduct vastly improved with experience. At Sobraon many Regiments, European and Native, were, in the first instance, repulsed with heavy loss, but they rallied under fire, and returned to carry the Enemy's works at the point of the bayonet. Seldom do the Troops of any Army so rally or so devote themselves. It would have been more creditable to Major Smyth's esprit d' Armie to have remembered some such truthful facts, rather than by hints and implications to give handle to the many who are always ready, on the slightest pretext, to run down the Indian Army. Considering, however, how often and absurdly Major Smyth contradicts himself, it is not very material what he says. For instance, in the very next page (xxvi) to the one we are now noticing, he calls the Sikhs "but a contemptible Enemy," though only six lines further on he commends The way the Khalsa Troops fought;" and at page 179 writes, on the desperate resistance" they offered at Sobraon.

We are constantly hearing in India of combinations of Native powers that are to drive us into the Sea; but it so happens that we have almost invariably fought our enemies single-handed. Major Smyth appears to us to be an especial alarmist; according to him, the Jammu Rajah only wanted opportunity to join the "Wallace of Kabul, Akbar Khan, which it is well known he intended doing." The uninitiated would say that he had opportunity enough in the imbecility displayed at Kabul, and the even greater imbecility that was evinced in India on the occasion of the Kabul catastrophe. Had Golab Singh on that occasion attacked General Pollock, Major Smyth pronounces that he "must have been destroyed with his whole army:"

Dehan Singh, with the army at Lahore, would be too much for the force under Sir Jasper Nicolls; and without the special interference of Providence, the Sikhs would even have destroyed" the Army of Reserve,” though headed by " the Brumegem Napoleon" himself."

All this we must simply pronounce, on the other hand, to be as inaccurate as it is impertinent.

So much for Major Smyth's general politics in regard to the Sikhs: we must now have a few words with him regarding the conduct of the war.

Lest we should do the Major injustice we give in full his, or rather, his protegée's account of the actions of Múdkí and Ferozshah. More miserable and more contradictory balderdash in all respects we have seldom read. Every body is aspersed, and Sikhs as well as British, Lal Singh and Tej Singh as well as "the enemy's" commanders, are all found wanting in the eyes of the writer, who it will be observed in two places calls the British troops" the Enemy:"

"The question of an attack on Ferozepore was now mooted. Both Teja Sing and Lall Sing were in favor of an attempt on the place, but the troops were irresolute. They had imbibed a belief that the fort was mined to a considerable distance all round, and would be blown up on their taking possession of it. They believed in short that it was a huge trap, baited for their destruction with some lakhs of treasure; and they regarded the exhortations of their chiefs to proceed to the assault as evidence of a desire for their slaughter and ruin. Moreover the British garrison put on a bold front and astonished the Sikhs with the sight of a handful of men with fortifications at their command, turning out to offer battle to overwhelming numbers in the open field.

Thus Ferozepore and its garrison remained unmolested by the Khalsa force, which lay encamped in the neighbourhood for several days. Early on the morning of the 17th December, however, news reached Lall Sing's camp of the approach of a British force of no great strength, with the intention of joining that already at Ferozepore. On this the entire body of Gorechars immediately prepared to advance, supported by sixteen horse artillery guns, ordered from the camp of Teja Sing, those with Lall Sing being all heavy ordnance, drawn by bullocks. Thus the cavalry and artillery advanced some ten on twelve coss, and again came to a halt in the forenoon of 17th December. Lall Sing evidently had much difficulty in making up his mind to attack the British force that was approaching his position; and it was not until the Sikhs had reproached him with cowardice, and declared their determination to fight whether he led them or not, that he advanced to meet the British column, which was then drawing near to Moodkee, about five coss in his front. In the afternoon of the 18th as the Sikhs came within two coss of the main body of the enemy, they stumbled on a picquet of about a hundred horse, which retreated before them with great coolness and regularity, although attacked by the Gorechars with much impetuosity and vigorously followed in their retreat. The Sikh cavalry was thus lured on until it came close to the main body of the British when the picquet which acted as a decoy galloped forward and joined the advancing ranks. On finding himself in front of the enemy, Lall Sing commenced a fire of round shot from fourteen of his guns, the other two having been left on the road. The British troops then formed in columns with their artillery in front, and first slowly and then at a rapid pace advanced upon the Sikh line, which by order of Lall Sing, awaited their attack. Presently however, the British began to fire shells, which did great execution; and caused much confusion in the ranks of the Gorechars. The Sikh artillery now began to fire grape, but without the expected effect of checking the onward progress of the enemy, who still continued steadily

and rapidly to advance. On coming within range of small arms, the Gorechars commenced a desultory fire, but on the fierce attack of the British they gave way and fled, leaving most of their guns behind them.-Lall Sing, their leader, being one of the first to turn his horse's head towards the Sutlej. The British force did not pursue the fugitive Sikhs, but encamped on the ground. During the whole of that night, the Gorechars came dropping into their camp from the different directions in which they had fled. Lall Sing himself did not make his appearance till after day break the next morning, having, it was reported, been hid in a bush for some time.

The next day, the 19th, the gallant Rajah sent to Teja Sing for a reinforcement of twelve battalions, whereupon the French division (late General Ventura's) was ordered to join him, as also those of Matthaub Sing and the Misser, or in all the required twelve battalions, with fifty-two guns.

By the 21st December, Lall Sing had again screwed up his courage for another attempt to arrest the progress of the British force. He therefore advanced in front of his entrenched camp at Ferozshah for nearly a mile, but thinking better of the matter, he then, partly by command, and partly by persuasion, induced the troops to turn back and re-enter the camp. On arriving within their entrenchments again the soldiers got leave to take off their regimentals and accoutrements, and to cook and eat their victuals. While thus engaged and thus unprepared, the British force was seen coming down upon them in column from the right. On this the drums beat to arms and the troops were promptly in line. They were scarcely in their ranks, however, when the enemy opened a murderous fire upon them, and immediately bore down upon and broke the French Squares, the Ventura division being on the right, and unsupported by their comrades. The Gorechars were on the left, and were furiously attacked by the British cavalry which turned their flank and completely routed them. The artillery was thus left unprotected and such of the artillerymen as had not sought safety in flight were cut down at their guns. Soon after this the divisions of Mathaub Sing and the Misser retreated, and thus only the French division, which had re-formed, was left to keep up a desultory fire, which continued throughout a great part of the night.

Before day light, however, even this division, finding itself unsupported, and in fact deserted, deemed it best to retire after the others, so that by sunrise not a man that could get away was to be seen in the Sikh Camp, The British, who it was said, had also retreated during the night, now, hearing that the Sikhs had fled to the river, advanced and took possession of their Camp and Artillery. At this moment Sirdar Teja Sing, with some twentyfive or thirty thousand fresh troops, arrived from the camp at Ferozepore, and presented himself before the British force, which, tired and exhausted with its previous exertions, was unable to attack him, and would, in all likelihood, have been found unable to repel a vigorous assault from an army of fresh men, in overpowering numbers, like that led by him. The usual good fortune of the British prevailed however, and instead of seeing the Sikh reserve advance to the attack, they had the satisfaction of beholding them turn back without firing a shot and follow their defeated comrades towards the Sutlej. The British force was thus left in undisputed possession of the field of Ferozshah, with the entrenched camp of the Sikhs and all their artillery."

Sir John Littler is here made to have " put on a bold front and astonished the Sikhs with the sight of a handful of men with fortifications, &c." This handful, as already remarked, was 10,400, a number more than double what won most of our