the country, are taken from the letters written by him at the Cape in February!" The jeopardy in which British interests were placed at Hyderabad by the existence of the formidable French force there under Raymond, was forcibly pointed out by Major Kirkpatrick, and profoundly weighed by Lord Mornington. In the despatches referred to he lays down with his usual ability and prolixity (for both are equally characteristics of his writings) the plan by which he proposed to remove the danger, and to make the force of Hyderabad become the agents of the British, instead of being, what they then were, the tools of Tippú and the French. The four measures proposed by Major Kirkpatrick to bring about this object were, 1st-The introduction of British subjects, or other Europeans, the subjects of friendly powers, into the service of the Nizam, care being taken that their characters should be such as that reliance might be placed upon them. This measure he hoped would have the effect, in the first place, of counterbalancing the corps of Raymond, and ultimately of suppressing it. 2ndly-That the dismission of the corps should be pointedly and firmly demanded, and the Nizam, at the same time, informed that in case of refusal to comply with this demand, the British Government should withdraw itself from its existing engagements with him. 3rdly-The holding out of suitable inducements to the European officers in the corps to leave the Nizam's service and enter that of the British. And 4thly-That the connexion between the Company and the Nizam, according to the expressed wish of the latter, should be drawn closer, and such an augmentation of the detachment of British troops in the Nizam's service made, as would preclude the necessity of his retaining Raymond's corps. With regard to the first of these measures Lord Mornington, in his Cape despatches, says, “I do not think this measure likely to be effectual to any good purpose, and it might even aggravate the evil which it is proposed to remove. A party so consolidated and united as that of Raymond's, which has been strengthening itself for a period of several years at Hyderabad, and has established the means of recruiting and augmenting its numbers will not be counteracted by the irregular and desultory opposition of such adventurers as might be induced by our encouragement to seek employment in the service of the Nizam; persons of this description (and we cannot expect that any others will engage in such an undertaking) would want the system and concert necessary to give vigor to their operations." Few, we imagine, will be disposed to deny the wisdom of this last observation. With regard to the second proposed measure the Earl wrote, certainly no representation from one friendly state to another could ever be more solidly founded than ours might be to the Nizam in the case before us. But besides that Major Kirkpatrick expects no benefit from representation and demand unconnected with the offer of some advantage to the Nizam; I doubt whether our manifesting in the first instance the extent of our anxiety for the dismission of Raymond's corps might not embarrass us in the progress of the most effectual measures for that desirable end; at present the Court of Hyderabad seems willing to purchase a closer connection with us by great sacrifices, and if that connection should not appear objectionable on other grounds, it may probably take place on much more advantageous terms to us, if we grant it as a matter of favor to the solicitations of the Nizam, than if we commence the negotiation by demanding the dismission of any part of the Nizam's military establishment." Major Kirkpatrick's third proposal, as may readily be supposed, did not obtain much favor in the eyes of the Governor-General. should never think it worth while," says he, even in the cases supposed of a rupture with the Nizam, or of an attack from Raymond, to repel the aggression by corrupting the officers of the hostile army; I trust, that in either case, we should soon find a more certain as well as a more honorable mode of effectually destroying this French party and its adherents." The fourth of the Major's proposals was that which met most favor from the Earl. The Nizam's empire, as we have previously noticed, had been, for some time, very much on the decline amongst the native powers of India. In influence, in power, in resources, in weight, it had been considerably reduced. Now, with the eagle eye of political wisdom, the Earl of Mornington saw that the reinstatement of that power in its original greatness would not only raise up a barrier against Mysorean and Mahrattan ambition, but serve also to draw tighter the bonds which connected the empire of the Nizam with that of the Company. Here then was the fulcrum of his entire political machinery. The Nizam desired a closer alliance with the British-he desired a larger subsidiary British force, and the Governor-General wisely determined that he should have both, the price demanded for both being the disbandment of Raymond's corps and the departure of its officers from India, together with the abolition of the peiscush paid on account of the Northern Circars. By these means would a doubtful enemy be changed into a faithful friend-by these means would a barrier be raised up against Mysore and the Mahrattas, whilst the resources of a large empire would be put into our hands. In April 1798 the Governor-General arrived at Madras, where he employed a few days of leisure in examining the condition of that presidency and getting an insight into the character of the leading men there. The following month he landed at Calcutta. On the 8th June, a paper was published in Calcutta purporting to be a copy of a proclamation* made by the Governor of Mauritius, General Malartic, which naturally attracted the attention of the Government. In this very impolitic and extraordinary document the French Governor declared that he had received ambassadors from Tippú who desired to enter into an offensive and defensive league with the French, a nation with which the British Empire was then at war. "He waits only," says this proclamation, "the moment when the French shall come to his assistance to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India." * The following is a copy of this curious document: Liberté Republique Française PROCLAMATION. Egalité. Anne Joseph Hyppolite Malartic, General en Chef, Gouverneur-general des Isles des France, et de la Réunion, et Commandant général des Etablissements Français, à l'est du Cap de Bonne Espérance. Citoyens, Connaissant depuis plusieues années votre zèle et votre attachment pour les intérêts et la gloire de votre Republique, nous sommes très-empressés et nous nous faisons un devoir de vous donner connaissance de toutes les propositions que nous fait Tippu Sultaun, par deux ambassadeurs qu'il nous a dépéchés. Ce prince a écrit des lettres particulières à l'Assemblée Coloniale, à tous les Généraux qui sont employés dans ce gouvernement, et nous a addressé un paquet pour le Directoire Executif. 1. Il demande a faire une alliance offensive et défensive avec les Français, en proposant d'entretenir à ses frais, tant que la guerre durera dans l'Inde, les troupes qu'on pourra lui envoyer. 2. Il promet de fournir toutes les choses nécessaires pour faire cette guerre, excepté le Vin et l'Eau de vie, dont il se trouve absolument denié. 3. Il assure que tous les préparatifs sont faits pour recevoir les secours qu'on lui donnera, et qu'à l'arrivée des troupes, les Chefs et officiers trouveront toutes les choses necessaires pour faire une guerre à laquelle les Européens sont peu accoutumés. 4. Enfin il n'attend plus que le moment où les Français viendront à son secours, pour déclarer la guerre aux Anglais, desirant avec ardeur pouvoir les chasser de l'Inde. Comme il nous est impossible de diminuer le nombre des soldats des 107 et 103 regimens, et de la garde soldée du Port de la Fraternité, à cause des secours que nous avons à envoyês notres alliés les Hollandais; nos invitons tous les citoyens de bonne volonté, a se faire inscrire dans leurs municipalités respectives, pour aller servir sous les drapeaux de Tippú. Ce prince desire aussi avoir des citoyens de couleur, libres, et nous invitons tous ceux qui voudront aller servir sous ses drapeaux, à se faire aussi inscrire. Nous pouvous assurer tous les citoyens qui se feront inscrire, que Tippú leur fera des traitements avantageux qui seront fixés avec ses ambassadeurs qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur souverain, à ce que les Français qui auront pris parti dans ses armées, ne puissent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront rentrer dans leur patrié. Fait au Port Nord-Ouest, le 10 Pluviose, l'an six de la République Française, une et indivisible. (Signé) MALARTIC. On being assured that this document was authentic, the Earl of Mornington naturally formed the determination of not waiting till the dominions which he governed were attacked, but resolved to urge on the measures on which he had determined relative to the Nizam and the Mahrattas, whilst he directed General Harris, then Acting Governor, as well as Commander-in-Chief, at Madras, quietly to concentrate a force sufficient to repel Tippú in case of attack, and which should form the nucleus of an invading army if an invasion were rendered necessary. In these preparations Mr. Mill can perceive nothing but the results of that "state of inflammation" in which the mind of the Governor-General was, and which precluded anything like sound judgment! The fact of his advocating as speedy an attack as possible upon Tippú proves, says that historian, either that he "condemned the policy of the treaty which was concluded by Lord Cornwallis, and highly applauded by the Ministers, by the Parliament, and by the people of England; or such was the change in circumstances that the enmity of Tippú, which was neither formidable nor offered any reasonable prospect of being formidable, in 1792, had become intensely formidable in 1798; or lastly, the mind of the Governor-General was, in a state of inflammation, and decided upon suggestions totally different from a cool and accurate contemplation of the circumstances of the case." This last is of course, in the opinion of our historian, the only allowable hypothesis. The fact was that, by his embassy to the Mauritius, Tippú himself had altered the relations subsisting between him and the British. The question was, one of time merely, and we think few who consider the matter will agree with Mr. Mill in thinking that it would have been wiser in Lord Mornington to allow Tippú to choose his own time for making the attack, or to allow him the chance of ultimately receiving French assistance, instead of anticipating him, and thus saving the expense of keeping up a large armament to await him. Such a procedure as the former would have been in opposition to every recognized principle of military or political tactics. But in the meantime a circumstance had occurred in Europe, which rendered it doubly necessary, that Tippú should be speedily disabled an event which combined with the proclamation of General Malartic, caused the Court of Directors, through their Secret Committee, to write out to Lord Mornington on the 18th June of this year," recommending" him "not to wait for his attack, but to take the most immediate and the most decisive measures to carry their arms into the enemy's country." The event referred to was the sailing of the expedition from Toulon in May of the same year under Napoleon, an expedition evidently H intended for Egypt in the first place, and for India ultimately. Had the Earl of Mornington, then, pursued the policy recommended by Mill, he would not only have been placing the British Indian empire in peril, but have been acting in direct contradiction to the recommendations of the Court of Directors. * No unbiassed individual, we conceive, can reflect on the position in which India at this period stood without perceiving the absolute necessity which existed for energetic proceedings on the part of its Government. France was thundering in Egypt under the modern Alexander, whose ambition would be as little likely to be bounded by the Indus as by the Rhine. The Affghan King had sworn to restore the Mogul empire in its integrity, and from his capital to Delhi there was no power to oppose him with any chance of success, whilst Tippú, with 100,000 men, was threatening our empire in the South, and ceaselessly intriguing to throw the enemies of the British power upon the empire. As soon, therefore, as explicit information relative to the intrigues of Tippú with the French had reached him, Lord Mornington lost no time in urging upon General Harris the necessity of making every possible preparation for an immediate and decisive attack upon Tippú―a measure however which "the dispersed state of the army on the coast of Coromandel and certain radical defects in its establishments," as he declares in one of his despatches, “rendered a much more tedious and difficult operation" than he had anticipated. The interval which elapsed from the commencement of the preparations for an attack upon Tippú to their close was by no means left unoccupied by the Governor-General. We have already seen that the disbanding of the French force in the service of the Nizam at Hyderabad was a fundamental part of his policy for raising up a check to Tippú and the Mahrattas. With a view to this, on the 8th of July, he instructed the Resident at the Nizam's Court to propose a new treaty between the two powers which, whilst in accordance with the Nizam's wish, it should unite the two powers more closely together, would, at the same time, be the means of bringing to pass the GovernorGeneral's wish relative to the French force. By this treaty the British subsidiary force in the service of the Nizam was increased to 4,400, whilst the annual subsidy to be paid by His Highness in consequence amounted to about nineteen lakhs of rupees (£190,000). This treaty was ratified on the 18th of September, with the full concurrence of the Peishwa, to whom all its stipulations were communicated. On the 10th October the * Vide Appendix C. Wellesley Despatches. 1st Vol. |