it doubtful whether it was the most politic, inasmuch as it tended, it has been argued, to decrease our influence throughout India, and consequently to weaken our hold of it. The evil in this case, however, if evil it was, as has been previously shewn in the pages of this Review,* lay, not with that excellent Governor, but with the Government of England; and consequently the then Government, and not the Governor-General, should be responsible for its effects. But at the period when Lord Mornington undertook the Government of British India, it was necessary that a change should be made in its policy. A revolution, silent but important, had been progressing in the native states, and consequently in their relative position with each other and with the English Government. To have continued longer the former system under these altered circumstances would have been extreme political folly, and the approbation expressed by the Home Government of the more vigorous policy of Lord Mornington sufficiently proves that a conviction of its necessity had been forced upon them. The non-interference system was, as has been sufficiently proved we trust, in the pages of this Review previously, the most politic when native states were quarrelling with each other, and no dangers to be apprehended to our own territories from their wars, but when the invasion of Zeman Shah was expected in the North, when a French army, with Napoleon at its head, was in Egypt, burning to reach India, when Tippú Sultan in the South was openly threatening us with invasion, and pushing forward his preparations with all the energy of genius, when a French force of 14,000 men was at Hyderabad, ruling the Nizam, our most constant ally, because less powerful than his neighbors-when all these things threatened British India it was surely time for its Government to be up and doing, it was surely time to strike a blow such as would convince the native powers and the world that the military energy which directed the operations of Clive and Cornwallis had been but slumbering and was not dead. Altered circumstances required an altered policy, and to have maintained the policy of 1794 in 1798 would have been as foolish as to fall back in 1848 upon the system of 1800. These circumstances, however, are too intimately connected with our present subject, and too important in themselves, to be thus summarily dismissed.

The treaty of Seringapatam had been supposed to establish peace on the foundation which secured it in Europe-the balance. of power. Irrespective of the great dissimilarity between the condition of Europe and of India, principles, only applicable to the former, had been acted upon in the latter, and with what result?

* No. 1, page 92.

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With that result which all rules of experience and of sound judgment must have led the judicious to anticipate. The balance was a chimera, a thing which from the commencement had no real existence, and even the appearance of which, very shortly after the conclusion of the treaty, was totally annihilated. In the first place the British Government was incomparably stronger than the Mahrattas, and the Mahrattas were very much stronger than the Nizam, and all three united, that is, if united in reality, and not in name only, would have been more than a counterpoise for two Tippús and two Mysores. Such was the pretended balance of power! Scarcely had the treaty, which was to secure peace, been concluded, when open war broke out between the pretended allies, the Mahrattas and the Nizam, a war the most impolitic and capricious, between those whom European politicians had expected would be governed by the rules of western diplomacy. Do we require then a stronger proof that the principles which direct the states of Europe in their intercourse with each other are totally inapplicable to the East? The consequence of this war was what might have been expected. The Nizam was reduced in strength and crippled in resources, and were it not for the dissensions of the conquerors, would have been rendered powerless for the future. His only reliance indeed. was a body of troops collected and disciplined by Raymond, a Frenchman, which, though it consisted in 1792, but of one or two battalions, was very shortly after increased to 10,000, and before 1798 to 14,000 men. This large and comparatively well-disciplined force was officered entirely by Frenchmen, who of course obtained very considerable influence at the Court of Hyderabad, and who lost no opportunity of instilling into the minds of the Nizam and his officers "the probability of the French nation acquiring, at no distant period, decided ascendancy in India, as well as in Europe."* The treaty of Seringapatam had provided for the maintenance of an offensive and defensive alliance between the English, the Mahrattas and the Nizam, with a mutual guarantee against the common object of their apprehension, the Sultan of Mysore. On this basis peace was then supposed to be secured, but how much had not the relative situations of the parties to the treaty altered since 1792? The Nizam and the Mahrattas, we have already seen, were deadly enemies to each other in the first place,-what common co-operation between them, then, could be anticipated or hoped for? Tippú, it was well known, in the second place, looked to the French, as the allies by whose aid he was to obtain full revenge for all that he

* Major Kirkpatrick's answers to Lord Mornington's queries.-Despatches, &c. vol. 1, p. 688.

had suffered from the British, whilst the Nizam and his Court were directed by French officers and influenced by French ideas. What prospect was there then that in case of aggression from Mysore the British Government would obtain any assistance from the Nizam? or rather, on the other hand, was there not every prospect of the French corps of 14,000 marching to the ranks of Tippú in such a case, and thus increasing the number of our enemy?" In the event of a war with Mysore," wrote the Governor-Generalin 1798, "there can be no doubt that the wishes and interests of this part of the Nizam's army must be favorable to the cause of Tippú Sultan, more especially under the actual circumstances of his having concluded an alliance with France, and having admitted a body of French troops into his service."

Nor was the state of affairs at the court of Púna more favorable to British interests. Such had been the diminution of the influence and power of the Peishwa, caused by the inordinate ambition and power of Scindia, that it was not to be expected the inferior chiefs would hold themselves bound by a treaty concluded by the Peishwa alone, and that too with powers, one of whom they openly hated and despised, the other whom they secretly feared and were opposed to; whilst in addition to all this there was the overweening influence of Scindia prevalent at Púna, an influence which it was well known would be directed in any other direction than in favor of the British. Indeed it was more than suspected at the time that Scindia and Tippú were on the best terms with each other, and anxious to advance each other's interests.

Such was the condition of two of the parties to the triple treaty in 1792—was it not time then for the British Government in 1798 to look about for the means of bringing back affairs to their position in the former year, or so to alter them as to provide for itself efficient assistance against its great enemy in the South, whenever that assistance was requiredsince the intrigues and exertions of Tippú left little doubt. that that period would soon arrive?

A celebrated historian of British India, Mill, in pursuance of his object which appears to be on every occasion to shew the injustice, incapability and corruption of his countrymen, has unduly depreciated the character of Tippú. In proportion to the low estimate which we form of his abilities and activity will be our contempt of the alarm which the British rulers felt of him at this period, and such is precisely the feeling which Mill would excite in us. A very cursory consideration of the energetic measures pursued by the Sultan to bring about the consummation which he so devoutly desired, the humiliation

of the British, will be sufficient to prove how dangerous an enemy he was, and that, in directing his policy towards anticipating the great outbreak which he expected in that quarter, Lord Mornington was but taking the part of wisdom. During the six years of peace which followed the treaty of Seringapatam, the whole energy of Tippú's active mind was directed towards the re-establishment of his military power; an ordinary chief would have been contented with this alone, but Tippú was far from being such, and, in the pursuance of his great plan, made his influence be felt at one and the same time in Paris, in Kabul, in Hyderabad and in Púna.

His embassy to the unfortunate Louis XVI. in 1787 had been unsuccessful in consequence of the disorganized condition of France at the period, and the apprehensions of its sovereign. The humiliation of Tippú subsequently, in the war which ended in the partition of half of his dominions, did not prevent his still looking forward to aid from the same country, and although his representations were confined to the Government of Mauritius, they were not the less urgent or amicable. At length in 1797 the accident of a privateer from Mauritius having been driven dismasted into Mangalore afforded him, he hoped, the opportunity so long sought of arraying the French forces with his own against his former conquerors. The French captain represented himself as the second in command at Mauritius, and as having been sent to ascertain the Sultan's views relative to the co-operation of a French force with that of Mysore, for the expulsion of the English from India. Tippú too anxiously desired these representations to be true to allow of his entertaining a doubt respecting them, and entered upon the negotiation with zeal. Ambassadors were sent by him to the island, who arrived there in January 1798, with a letter from Tippú to the Governor. They found their expectations miserably disappointed there was no force prepared to accompany them back to Mysore-no preparation had been made, and the expedition finally resulted in the issuing of an absurd proclamation by General Malartic, the Governor of the island, and in their being accompanied on their return, not by a powerful French army, but by a few of the rabble from the Mauritius, whose number did not exceed two hundred.

Nor was it from European assistance alone that Tippú hoped to see the object. of his wishes finally accomplished. Zeman Shah, King of the Affghans, succeeded his father Timur, in 1792, and speedily announced his determination to restore the Mogul Empire in Hindustan. All India, but particularly the Mahratta state, was excited at this intelligence; some with hope,

others, like the nation mentioned, with fear. In 1796, in pursuance of his object, the Shah advanced to Lahore with a force of upwards of 30,000 men. The Shiks did not oppose his progress; the Mahrattas loudly called upon the British to assist them, whilst their internal dissensions prevented their acting with energy or a chance of success; all was confusion and dismay when Zeman was recalled to his own capital by a rebellion, and thus for a time were the fears of the Mahrattas allayed. Tippú did not fail to take advantage of this new enemy-he sent ambassadors to the Shah, and awaited with anxiety the day when the British would be arrayed against them in the north, in order to strike them down in the south.

Aware of the dissensions amongst the Mahrattas, the Sultan carried on his intrigues vigorously at Púna, to attach some chiefs to his own interests, and to detach others from that of the British, and so effectually were these different objects accomplished that it would have been consummate folly in any British general acting against Mysore to expect efficient aid from the court of Púna. Nor was the influence of the sovereign of Mysore felt less at Hyderabad than at the capital of the Mahrattas. There he had a force of 14,000 men, officered by his allies, governing the Nizam and the country at the time when they were in the closest alliance with himself. Such was the extent of the intrigues of Tippú! and yet whilst these were being thus vigorously prosecuted, politicians such as Mill would have us believe that there existed no valid ground for apprehension on the part of the British!

The Earl of Mornington arrived at the Cape of Good Hope on his passage to India in February 1798, and whilst there the Houghton and other vessels, with India Despatches on board, arrived from Bengal. These, the new Governor-General thought it fit to peruse in the then critical state of the country, and their contents he carefully examined. He was fortunate also in meeting at the Cape with Major Kirkpatrick, formerly resident at Hyderabad, from whom he derived the most valuable information relative to the condition of the Nizam, and other native powers. The despatches which he thence addressed to the President of the Board of Control, and to the Court of Directors sufficiently prove how deeply he had studied Indian politics, and how sound the views were by which his procedure then and subsequently was directed. "It is a remarkable, and I believe an unexampled circumstance," says Lord Brougham, "showing how accurately Lord Wellesley's opinions and plans were formed, that whole pages of his minute of the 12th August at Calcutta, explaining his views, after they were perfected by a six months' residence in