duties, the purpose of the choice, and the constitution of the congregation, they are inconsistent with any such irrevocable appointment. If the minister has a right to continue in that situation against the will of the majority of the congregation and of the trustees, and enjoy the emoluments for his life, the numbers and proportion of the majority could make no difference, and, instead of being the minister of the congregation, he might be the minister of a minority of ten or of one. Such a position would certainly not be that of the minister or pastor of the congregation described in the Declaration of Trust of 1808. As to the argument that this congregation is not a society existing by voluntary subscription, but is endowed with property held upon certain trusts, and that the minister is a cestui que trust under the deed, it in no degree supports Mr. Gordon's claim to continue minister during his life or good behaviour. By the deed he is a cestui que trust only so long as he shall continue minister or pastor of the society or congregation, and officiate as such and no longer.' The endowment is for the benefit of the congregation, and that they might be benefited by the services of a proper minister. The declaration of trust as to the rents and profits which the minister is to receive creates a trust for the benefit of the congregation, and a remuneration for those services by which they are to be benefited. There is no trust or purpose for the personal benefit of the minister, except to reward the services which he performs for the congregation.

6

"In the 3rd paragraph of his answer Mr. Gordon says, that, in the absence of any special usage or rules, the will of every such congregation is in all cases ascertained, and their powers exercised, by the vote of the majority. He adds this qualification,—that the minority are bound by the majority on all points, so long as such majority act consistently with the cardinal doctrines and principles held by the whole body. Such a qualification is futile, because, as soon as the cardinal doctrines are contravened by the majority, they cease to be the doctrines of the whole body, and unless the minority submit there is no longer a united body held together by doctrines and principles. No doubt the trustees and the corporation, by the unanimous vote which appointed Mr. Gordon to be minister, might have, at the same time, contracted that he should enjoy all the emoluments for his lifetime. It may, however, well be doubted whether such a contract would be valid as binding the property, or justified by the terms of the trust deed, or the purposes for which the trust was created. That reasonable degree of harmony which is secured by the submission or complete secession of the minority seems essential to the endurance of an association founded for the sacred purpose which united this congregation. In the case of Perry v. Shipway' I noticed the authorities, which establish these two main points:-1, That the minister of a dissenting congregation is at law merely the tenant-at-will of the trustees; 2, That in such bodies the decision of the majority of the trustees binds the minority. Indeed, unless the law were so settled, nothing could follow but confusion and defeat of

the very purposes for which these congregations are formed. The submission of the minority is the principle on which civil society is founded. is a principle essential for that reasonable harmony which is necessary for the coherence of all societies, great or small, civil or religious. In the case of 'Attorney-General v. Aked,' it was decided that the minister of a body of Dissenters has no equity to hold his office against the legal right of the majority to dismiss him. The judgment leaves open the question whether, in case of a capricious or improper dismissal, the Court might interfere. This is not very important because of the improbability that anything done by the majority of the congregation concurring with the majority of the trustees could be capricious or improper. This Court would be very slow to interfere, and more probably would not interfere at all, with the discretion of the majority. In the present case there is nothing to prove that there is anything capricious in the decision of the majority of the trustees and of the congregation.

There is nothing to show · he has at law. Nor is

"It is in vain to try to confound his position, as to the permanence of its tenure, with that of a public officer, of the rector of a parish, or a parish clerk. The permanence of their tenure is established by the law of the land for public purposes, and for the public benefit. The minister of a Dissenting congregation has a position which the law respects, and will protect, as that of one chosen by a voluntary association of private persons associated for sacred purposes, and entitled to choose a minister suitable to their own particular opinions, whose services are to be rewarded out of their own private funds. He is engaged upon a contract which is merely a private contract, and is to be construed with the same regard to the rights of each of the contracting parties as any other private contract. His position as to tenure under the trustees is clearly defined by the law. that in equity he can have any position higher than there any equity to control that power in the majority of the trustees which is established at law. The power of the majority of the congregation seems to me to rest on the same principle. Indeed the statement of Mr. Gordon himself, in the fifth paragraph of his answer, as to the secession from this congregation, which occurred in the year 1845, shows the practical wisdom of maintaining the power of the majority. When the minority refuse to submit, peace is maintained by their seceding and forming themselves, if they can, into another harmonious congregation. This seems more suitable to the purpose for which such religious bodies are formed. It is better than that a contentious and recusant minority should continue members of a congregation which would thereby be disturbed by feelings and passions which should not prevail among persons meeting together for public worship.

"It is scarcely necessary to notice the argument that the tenure of his ministry for life must be implied from the terms of the invitation and acceptance mentioning no shorter period. Nothing that involves an absurdity can by mere implication be made part of a contract. If it is to be

implied that he was made minister for his lifetime, even the unanimous vote of the congregation could not displace him. And if he could not be displaced there would be the absurdity of his being the officiating minister of a congregation unanimously recusant to his services. There must be a decree declaring that the defendant Mr. Samuel Clarke Gordon is not entitled to officiate or preach in the chapel, in the pleadings mentioned, against the will of the majority of the trustees and of the society or congregation in the pleadings mentioned, and an order for an injunction against him and the defendant Pike according to the third paragraph of the prayer of the bill. It is unnecessary to direct any account. Indeed, it has not been pressed for. The plaintiffs are entitled to the costs of the suit against the defendant Mr. Gordon, and also against the defendant Pike. Notwithstanding the allegations in the answer of the defendant Pike, and the argument that he was merely the agent of Mr. Gordon, the evidence proved his interference as to pew rents, and he was properly made a defendant. The defendant Christie having refused to join as a plaintiff must bear his own costs."

III.-NOTES AND COMMENTS ON THE READING CASE.

1. We refrain from all comment on the original matters in dispute between the two pastors and their respective supporters. In fact, we have but a very imperfect knowledge of them. And if we knew them thoroughly we should not feel ourselves called upon to become judge, and pronounce sentence.

2. We likewise refrain from comment on the reasons assigned for opposition to the junior pastor's teaching, as reported. If we saw the document in its completeness it might produce a very different impression from that which a dry summary produces. It is certainly startling to find it objected to a Christian minister, that he sets up too high a standard of moral or spiritual excellence. But, without assuming that this is a fair statement of the objection, we may remark that there is no end to the ingenuity with which objections are framed by those who wish to find them. Some years since the communicants of a Scottish parish, who have now by law a right to offer objections before the Presbytery to the nominee of a patron, gravely objected to a man whom they did not wish to have for pastor, that he was red-haired! In the Reading case we have no knowledge of the ministry that has been rejected, whether it was edifying or unedifying, suitable or unsuitable to the people, and we wish it to be understood that on this point we indicate no opinion whatsoever.

3. We maintain that Congregationalism does not lack the means of settling questions of this order, although Congregationalists have too much neglected means which their system possesses of determining all matters that affect them. A self-willed man may drag any ecclesiastical body before the civil courts-no system of polity is security against such a contingency. Or, to suppose a more favourable case, a man may, without either self-will

or selfishness, think it right, in the interests of the very body which he believes to have wronged him, to make his appeal unto Cæsar. But we hold that such an appeal is not necessitated by any inherent defects of Congregationalism. In the Established Church of England a minister can be dispossessed of his church and status only by a process in the Ecclesiastical Court, which is a civil court in everything but name. And the last appeal is to the Privy Council, which is likewise a civil court. In Presbyterianism the position of a minister is determined finally by the General Assembly of the Church. This General Assembly, consisting of ministers and elders, is purely a spiritual body. But in Presbyterian Churches, even the unestablished, a minister who feels himself aggrieved by deposition can appeal to a civil court. The spiritual court objects to being thus dragged before civil judges, and refuses to plead the case before them, especially on the ground that the very man who has sued them engaged in his ordination vows to yield submission to the spiritual court. But in the face of this the civil court asserts its jurisdiction, at least up to a certain point. It claims to look at the original contract or quasi-contract between the parties, and to say whether that contract has been violated. It may not review the real merits of a case or the evidence on which a charge has been founded, but it will certainly interpret the contract, as the Vice-Chancellor has done in the Reading case, and say whether it has or has not been violated. And in the event of a collision between the civil and spiritual court, the complainant will at least secure to himself such temporal advantage as the original contract, enforced by the civil court, may yield.

The object of these remarks is to show that no system of Church government can provide against the possibility of having its decision subjected in some form to a civil court. And for this reason that these decisions involve more or less certain temporal or pecuniary consequences. Spiritual relationships cannot be maintained or restored in unestablished Churches by civil law. But certain temporal incidents of these relations may be. In the Reading case for example, no Vice-Chancellor could compel the Church in Broad Street to restore Mr. Gordon to his pastorate, but the decision of the Court might have compelled them to surrender to him an empty dwelling-house, and an empty chapel. It is only the adjunct of property to the status of pastor that brings that status in any sense within the cognisance of the civil court.

But what means, it will be asked, does Congregationalism furnish for settling such questions as this of the Broad Street Church in Reading? Let us see. The junior pastor is deprived of his office by the vote of the majority of the members. He regards himself as wronged, and a minority of the Church regards him as wronged. It may be that he believes that the majority against him is not real-some having voted who, he says, had no right to vote, or, if the majority is real, he believes, perhaps, that its decision is based on grounds which are not only injurious to him personally, but to the pastorate generally-destructive it may be of its independence

and honour. What shall he do? In the Statute Book of Congregationalism he finds these words addressed to an ancient Church: "I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? No, not one that shall be able to judge betwixt his brethren? But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers. Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? Why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" (1 Cor. vi. 6.) He ought to find in these words not only the suggestion of arbitration, but an obligation to submit the questions at issue to arbitration. The obligation cannot be evaded by saying that the judges in our courts are not unbelievers. They may or they may not be. But the circumstance of the Corinthian magistrates being unbelievers is introduced by the Apostle only as an aggravation of the impropriety of "brother going to law with brother." The positive requirement of his instruction is, that brethren," having a matter against" brethren, should submit that matter to the decision of brethren. And surely if ordinary cases between brethren should be so adjudicated, much more should Church differences be so adjudicated.

This is the Apostolic method, and it is the Congregational. The parties to this difference at Reading, should have submitted the difference to arbitrators. From the nature of the case the arbitrators must be found beyond the circle of the Church. There are, first of all, the ministers and members of other Churches in the town. Or, going to a wider circle, there is "the Berkshire, Oxfordshire, and South Bucks Association," of which the contending parties were members. Or if local prejudices and biasses were feared, the arbitrators might be chosen from a circle outside of all such prejudice and bias. In New England the parties would have selected a certain number of Churches, and asked them to send their pastors and a lay delegate from each to form the Board of Arbitration. Opinions may differ as to the best mode of forming such a Board. Some may prefer that a County Association shall have a standing Committee of Arbitration-some that the Association shall be, itself, the Committee of Arbitration—some that a Committee of Arbitration shall be improvised in each case by the mutual consent of the parties—some that such Committee shall be constituted on the New England model. All that we contend for is the principle, and that the principle be embodied in a form that shall have the consent of both parties. And this we insist on, not as optional, but as obligatory.

But at this point another preservative of order comes into view. And here our practice falls short of our principle. It ought to be a rule of every County Association, that ministers and Churches declining to submit differences, which they cannot settle among themselves, to arbitration, shall forfeit membership. With such a rule, let the junior pastor at Reading prefer Chancery to arbitration, and he is at once disowned by the Berkshire Association. Or let the senior pastor and the majority decline