CHAPTER XXV.

THE BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSETHE DEFEAT OF SIGEL AND BUTLER.

D

IVINING Grant's next move, Lee occupied the morning of the 7th in cutting a direct military road southward, through the forest, from the plank road toward Shady Grove church, south of the Ny, to the highway leading eastward to Spottsylvania Court House, so he could have a continuous march of his entire army, by its right flank, when the time came for again placing that army across some other road, leading toward Richmond, that Grant might desire to follow. Grant's inaction led Lee to suspect the movement that he had ordered, and when Stuart, later on, sent him word that Grant's trains were moving in the rear of his army, and word came from Ewell that the Germanna road had been abandoned, Sedgwick leaving his dead unburied and many of his wounded uncared for, Lee issued orders for Longstreet's corps to take up the line of march, at dark, along the new military road toward Spottsylvania Court House, be followed by Ewell withdrawing by Hill's rear, while the latter remained guarding the rear of the army.

Anderson with the First corps, which, in Longstreet's absence, he now commanded, marched at 11 p. m., and, before daylight of the 8th, rested in a grove near Spottsylvania Court House, forming a strong support to the cavalry that was keeping back Grant's new advance. Ewell was held at the plank road, near Parker's store, until the early morning of the 8th, when the Second corps, with the exception of Early's division, which was left near Todd's tavern in support of Hill, marched to a junction with the First corps near Spottsylvania Court House. Grant, in person, tarried with Hancock until noon, after sending minute instructions to his advance for marching beyond Spottsylvania Court House toward Richmond and Butler; but learning, soon after, that Warren had met with a severe check on the highway to

Spottsylvania Court House, and that Lee, although having the longer march to compass, had won the race for position, and a second time blocked his "on to Richmond." During the night of the 7th, Fitz Lee, dismounting his cavalry division and using his men as infantry, had succeeded in throwing rude defenses of trees and rails across the Brock road, and had successfully driven back repeated attacks of the Federal advance, keeping Warren miles from the position which Grant had ordered him to occupy that night.

Early on the morning of the 8th, Anderson moved the First corps about a mile to the northern front of Spottsylvania Court House, to support Fitz Lee's hard pressed cavalry, where his men, in an incredibly short time, threw up hasty breast works and were ready for Warren's corps, as it advanced in assault, and to drive it back in a disastrous repulse. Stuart was on the field in person, for the last time, as it soon proved, to cheer the army of Northern Virginia on to victory, contributing, by his great tactical skill and ready but always practical advice, to Warren's defeat, and joining enthusiastically in the cheers of victory that followed the repulse of the Federal advance, making certain the holding of the position which Lee's superior energy had secured.

At 1 p. m. of the 9th, Grant's dispatch, from “near” Spottsylvania Court House, to Halleck read: "If matters are still favorable with Butler, send all reinforcements you can. The enemy are now moving from our immediate front either to interpose between us and Fredericksburg or to get the inside road to Richmond." It is incredible that at that hour of the day the Federal general commanding did not know that, instead of moving from his immediate front, Lee was, at that very time, in line of battle across his front; since at 5 in the afternoon of the preceding day, he had arrived with Ewell, and, with his First and Second corps in position, had met a second Federal attack, which he had driven back, and Ewell, in a countercharge, had gained an advance of a half mile, on the right of the Catharpin road leading to Todd's tavern, while the First corps held his right, across the Brock road, leading to the same point along the divide between the Ny and the Po rivers, the two most northerly of the four, that, not far to the southeast, unite and make the Mattapony.

During the night of the 8th, the Confederates threw up rude and irregular defenses along the emergency line which they had taken, a part of it after dark. On the morning of the 9th, Lee rode along the line that had been occupied, but was not favorably impressed with it. At Ewell's suggestion, a somewhat elevated point, projecting between some of the southward branches of the Ny, near the right center, was taken into the lines and occupied by artillery; orders were also given for providing a second line of defenses, beyond the incurved line, as taken, on the right. Lee's position, as now occupied, extended from the Po river on the southwest, where the Louisa road to Spottsylvania Court House and Fredericksburg crosses the big bend of that river, in the arc of a circle, eastward, across the Brock road and the Po- Ny watershed, to a branch of the Ny river; while from its right center sprang a horseshoe salient, northward, eastward and southward, around the crest of the spur between two small branches of the Ny and overlooking that river to the northeastward. Ewell's men were disposed within this salient, which conformed, in a general way, to a broad bend of the Ny. Hill's men were to extend the line to the left, to the Po, and Longstreet's were to extend it to the right, from the Bald hill southward and then southeastward, covering the front of Spottsylvania Court House and the roads leading to Fredericksburg, thus leaving open no way to the southward on which Grant could move toward Richmond, as he had planned on the 7th. Held back by Hampton and Early, the most of Hancock's corps had been detained on the Brock road, near and behind Todd's tavern, during the 8th, while Anderson with the First and Ewell with the Second corps were engaged with Grant's advance near Spottsylvania Court House.

On the 9th, Grant sent Sheridan, with his cavalry, on a raid, moving from Alsop's at 4 in the morning, to first destroy Lee's ammunition train, then strike the James and open communication with Butler. Stuart safely guarded the ammunition train, but was not strong enough to prevent Sheridan passing his right and gaining the highway to Richmond. Early on the morning of the 9th, Burnside advanced across the Ny, on the road leading from Spottsylvania Court House to Fredericksburg, which he had reached by a circuitous march to the east

ward, and was moving to strike Lee's right and rear. Early, temporarily in command of the Third corps, arrived in time to meet this attack, which had to advance across open fields, with infantry and artillery, and give it a handsome repulse. Thus brought into position, the Third corps held Lee's right, from the horseshoe salient around the front of Spottsylvania Court House; it also occupied a portion of the eastern front of the salient, while Ewell held the remainder of that front, its north projecting apex and its western face. Favorable positions for artillery were found throughout the line, which was made stronger with each passing hour while awaiting Grant's attack from the north and west, after the repulse of that of Burnside from the east.

Advancing on the 9th, Hancock took position on Grant's right and sent three divisions across the Po to menace Lee's left and rear from the west. These movements revealed to Lee that Grant intended to attack his entire front, and, with his superior numbers, which were double those of Lee, attempt to turn both his flanks. During the night of the 9th, in anticipation of Grant's attack, Lee sent Heth's division, of Hill's corps, across the Po, by a circuit to the southward, under the command of Early, who, moved into line across the Louisa road, fell upon Hancock's flank and rear, at dawn of the 10th, just as he was obeying Grant's recall to join in his proposed front attack. Heth severely punished Barlow's division, of Hancock's corps, on which his attack fell, and captured one of his guns, in this engagement, which became known as the "battle of Waite's Shop."

About the time of the failure of Hancock's flanking movement to Lee's left, at 9:30 of the 10th of May, Grant dispatched to Washington, still from "near" Spottsylvania Court House:

The enemy hold our front in very strong force and evince a strong determination to interpose between us and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward steps but may be compelled to send back to Belle Plain [below Aquia creek on the Potomac] for further supplies. Please have supplies of forage and provisions sent there at once and 50 rounds of ammunition (infantry) for 100,000 men. Send General Benham with the necessary bridge train for the Rappahannock river. We can maintain ourselves at least, and, in the end, beat Lee's army, I believe. Send to Belle Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape. With present position of the armies, 10,000 men can be spared from the defenses of Washington, besides all the troops that

have reached there since Burnside's departure. Some may also be brought from Wallace's department. We want no more wagons

nor artillery.

This dispatch tells the condition of things within Grant's lines and his view of the situation, on the morning of the 10th, in a way that needs no comment.

At noon of the day before, May 9th, C. A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, who had joined Grant to watch events, reported to Secretary Stanton various matters that he had heard about, among others:

General Wilson, with his division of cavalry, occupied Spottsylvania Court House yesterday morning for an hour; but as Warren's corps had not yet made its appearance, and as columns of rebel infantry were gaining position on both his right and left, he fell back to Alsop's. Prisoners were taken by Wilson, who reported that two divisions of Longstreet's corps had just come, they having marched all night. General Grant at once gave orders for attacking these troops with the whole of Warren's corps, to whose support Sedgwick was hurrying up, in order to destroy them before the rest of the rebel army could arrive. Warren, however, proceeded with exceeding caution, and when he finally did attack, sent a single division at a time and was constantly repulsed. The general attack, which Generals Grant and Meade directed, was never made, for reasons I have not yet been able to learn; but successive assaults were made upon this and that point in the rebel positions with no decisive results. The last assaults were made just before dark, when the fighting was very sharp. . . . General Grant's orders, last night, were not to renew the fighting to-day; but if, as now appears to be the case, Lee has left anything open in front of our right, by massing on our left, he may attack at this weakened point of their lines with a view of passing toward Richmond on that side.

Hancock found Early, at the "open place" Grant was seeking, the next morning. At 11 of the morning of the roth, Grant began his massed attack on Lee's left, which was met by Field's division and driven back by a withering fire of musketry and artillery. At 3 in the afternoon, a second massed attack was made on the First corps, near Lee's center, on the line of the Brock road, through the piney woods of the Po-Ny watershed. This also met a bloody repulse, after which the Confederates sprang over their breastworks and collected the guns and ammunition the enemy had left behind, and distributed these so that each Confederate was doubly armed. a third time, near the close of the day, Grant made assault, with Hancock and Warren, against Lee's weak left. This front line, under Hancock, was driven back by Field's division, but his second line rushed bravely forward and leaped over the breast works of Gregg's Texans,

For