and during that night the Second corps forded it at Williamsport, while the First and Third began crossing the pontoon at Falling Waters, a few miles lower down the river. Stuart so engaged the attention of Meade that the latter was not aware of Lee's crossing until it was well-nigh done. The Federal cavalry pressed against Hill's rear guard, composed of Heth's division, but to be repulsed with loss. The most serious damage to the Confederates was the death of the heroic Pettigrew in the rear-guard skirmish. By noonday of the 14th the three army corps were again in Virginia, and the Federal army was left in amazement at the skill with which Lee had withdrawn from their front and crossed a great river, practically without loss. It was evident that there was no fight left in the Federal army, and Meade was quite content to remain north of the Potomac and carefully watch between Lee and Washington.

He

Before recrossing the Potomac, and while awaiting an attack from Meade, Lee wrote again, urging President Davis to gather an army, under Beauregard, and threaten Washington, as he had persistently asked should be done. before and during his invasion of Pennsylvania. asserted that he was not discouraged, had not lost faith in Providence or in his army, the fortitude of which had not been shaken, and that the Federal army, though it had been much shattered, could easily be reinforced, while he could expect no addition to his numbers; hence the necessity for an immediate demonstration toward Washington.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGNS OF 1863.

D

READING to follow Lee and unable to resist importunate orders from Washington for an advance, Meade, after Lee returned to Virginia, recrossed the South mountain and then followed McClellan's route of the previous autumn, across the Potomac into Piedmont Virginia, guarding the passes of the Blue ridge, as he advanced, against attacks from Lee in the Valley. Lee, on the alert, anticipated this movement, and, on the 24th of July, placed his army across Meade's thin line of advance, in front of Culpeper Court House. The necessities at other points put a stop to military operations for a time in Virginia. Portions of Meade's army were called to New York city, to suppress riots and enforce the drafts to recruit the Federal armies. Lee was embarrassed by the calls for soldiers for other fields, after the fall of Vicksburg, which not only cut the Confederacy in twain, but opened to Federal gunboats and steamboats, for the transportation of troops and supplies, the thousands of miles of navigable waters in the Mississippi basin.

The

With the Trans-Mississippi portion of the Confederacy isolated, there only remained in the control of the Confederacy central and southern portions of the Atlantic highlands-the Appalachians and their slopes. combined land power and sea power of the Federal government completely surrounded and enclosed the remnant of territory now left in the control of the Confederate government. Only through the port of Wilmington was there an outlet to the outer world, and only through that single port could supplies come from abroad to eke out the scanty stores of the Confederacy. The executive was besieged by calls for the defense of vital points, threatened from all directions. Rosecrans was advancing into the Great valley in east Tennessee. The fate of Charleston was but a question of a short time. Environed by such gloomy surroundings and threatenings, Lee

wrote to President Davis, from "Camp Orange," on the 8th of August, thanking him for his efforts to supply the wants of his army, commending the proclamation he had issued to the people, and hoping that would "stir up their virtue... that they may see their duty and perform it;" cheerfully and hopefully adding, "Nothing is wanted but that their fortitude should equal their bravery to insure the success of our cause. We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come right in the end." After mentioning the proneness of men to censure those who do not meet their expectations, Lee said: "The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is removal. This is natural, and, in many instances, proper. For, no matter what may be the ability of an officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later ensue."

The general commanding further stated, that since his return from Pennsylvania he had been intending to propose that another commander should be selected for his army; he had noted the discontent of the newspapers at the result of his campaign; did not know how far such feeling might exist in the army, as he had had no evidence of it from officers or men, but it was fair to suppose that it did exist, and, as success is a necessity, nothing should be risked to secure it. He continued:

I therefore, in all sincerity, request Your Excellency to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness because no one is more aware than myself of my inabilities for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfill the expectations of others? In addition, I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations in the field which I feel necessary. I am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon Your Excellency from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader-one that could accomplish more than I could perform and all that I have

wished. I hope Your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason-the desire to serve my country and to do all in my power to insure the success of her righteous cause.

In reply, President Davis wrote, among other things:

I am truly sorry to know that you still feel the effects of the illness you suffered last spring, and can readily understand the embarrassment you experience in using the eyes of others, having been so accustomed to making your own reconnoissances. But suppose,

my dear friend, that I were to admit, with all their implications, the points which you present, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which you believe to be required? . . . To ask me to substitute you by some one in my judgment more fit to command, or who would possess more of the confidence of the army, or of reflecting men of the country, is to demand an impossibility.

Lee's morning reports show that by the 10th of August, by returns from hospitals and elsewhere, his army had increased to 58,600 men. On the 9th of September, he detached Longstreet, with two of his divisions, to help Bragg, in Tennessee, keep back Rosecrans from marching farther up the Great valley toward Virginia, leaving with himself some 46,000 men. Longstreet wrote, in farewell to Lee, speaking for himself and his corps: "Our affections for you are stronger, if it is possible for them to be stronger, than our admiration for you."

On the 13th of September, Meade advanced, from beyond the Rappahannock, to learn what Lee was doing; the latter awaited an attack in the position he had chosen and partially fortified, in front of Orange Court House, overlooking the Rapidan. Meade took a distant look at the preparations made for him, and then withdrew to camps in Culpeper.

After learning of the battle at Chickamauga, Lee, on the 25th, wrote pleasantly to Longstreet:

My whole heart and soul have been with you and your brave corps in your late battle. It was natural to hear of Longstreet and Hill (D. H.) charging side by side, and pleasing to find the armies of the east and west vying with each other in valor and devotion to their country. Finish the work before you, my dear general, and return to me; I want you badly, and you cannot get back too soon.

On the 9th of October, Lee again took the offensive and crossed the Rapidan to attack Meade, taking a concealed and circuitous route, hoping to flank him and bring him to battle on the plains of Culpeper; but the Federal commander, who professed to have marched all the way from Gettysburg seeking a battle,

promptly retreated during the night of the 10th, to beyond the Rappahannock. Lee then tried by another flank movement, by way of the Fauquier Springs and Warrenton, to bring on an engagement on the plains of Fauquier; but while Lee was halting to ration his troops, Meade hastened to the south side of the Orange & Alexandria railroad, by way of Bealeton, then took the road still farther to the southward, leading through Brentsville toward Alexandria. The two armies now engaged in a race, at times within sight of each other, on opposite sides of the railroad; Meade hastening to escape Lee, and Lee hurrying to intercept Meade and bring him to battle.

This

As he passed through Brentsville, Meade detached a portion of Warren's corps and sent it across to Bristoe Station, to guard his flank from attack by the highway from Lee's route that there crossed the railroad. covering force was adroitly concealed in the cuts and behind the fills of the railway at Bristoe Station. A. P. Hill, leading Lee's advance, sent Cooke's superb North Carolina brigade to the same point, from the northward without advanced skirmishers. As these approached the station, Warren's men met them, with unexpected volleys, and drove the brigade back in confusion, with a loss of nearly 1,400 men. Lee met Hill with stern rebuke for his imprudence, then sadly directed him to gather his wounded and bury his dead. This disaster, at the head of the column, and the failure of Ewell to close up on Hill, gave check to Lee's advance, which enabled Meade to make good his escape to the fortifications at Centreville, on the northern side of Bull run. Lee followed to the vicinity of Manassas Junction and then retraced his steps to the Rappahannock, subsequently saying, in his report concerning this campaign:

Nothing prevented my continuing in his (Meade's) front but the destitute condition of the men, thousands of whom are barefooted, a greater number partially shod, and nearly all without overcoats, blankets or warm clothing. I think the sublimest sight of the war was the cheerfulness and alacrity exhibited by this army in the pursuit of the enemy under all the trials and privations to which it was exposed.

Stuart, with his usual vigilance and daring, covered the fords on either side of the railroad, and two of Early's brigades were left on the intrenched trap-dyke hill, on the northern bank of the Rappahannock, at the railroad