while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit still lives and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and our strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who has followed him to victory on so many fields. Let officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defense of our beloved country.

When, in the autumn of the year, Lee wrote his official report of this famous campaign, after calmly reviewing it, he said:

The movement by which the enemy's position was turned and the fortune of the day decided, was conducted by the lamented Lieutenant-General Jackson, who, as has already been stated, was severely wounded near the close of the engagement on Saturday evening. I do not propose here to speak of the character of this illustrious man, since removed from the scene of his eminent usefulness by the hand of an inscrutable, but all-wise Providence. I nevertheless desire to pay the tribute of my admiration to the matchless energy and skill that marked the last act of his life, forming, as it did, a worthy conclusion of that long series of splendid achievements which won him the lasting love and gratitude of his country.

In a letter to his wife, written May 11th, concerning "the loss of the good and great Jackson," Lee wrote: "Any victory would be dear at such a price. His remains go to Richmond to-day. I know not how to replace him, but God's will be done. I trust He will raise some one in his place."

In an article on "Stonewall Jackson's Place in History," by Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, professor of strategy in the British Staff college, contributed to the "Life of Jackson," by his wife, he wrote:

When Jackson fell at Chancellorsville, his military career had only just begun, and the question, what place he takes in history, is hardly so pertinent as the question, what place he could have taken had he been spared. So far as his opportunities had permitted, he had shown himself in no way inferior to the greatest generals of the century, to Wellington, to Napoleon, or to Lee. That Jackson was equal to the highest demands of strategy his deeds and conceptions show; that he was equal to the task of handling a large army on the field of battle must be left to conjecture; but throughout the whole of his soldier's life he was never intrusted with any detached mission which he failed to execute with complete success. No general made fewer mistakes. No general so persistently outwitted his opponents. No general better understood the use of the ground or the value of time. No general was more highly endowed with courage, both physical and moral, and none ever secured to a greater degree the trust and affection of his troops. And yet, so upright was his life, so profound his faith, so exquisite his tenderness, that Jackson's many victories are almost his least claim to be ranked amongst the world's true heroes.

C

CHAPTER XXII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN PENNSYLVANIA.

LOSING up the ranks of his victorious but deci mated army, the veterans of which he could not replace, Lee did all in his power to follow up the victory of Chancellorsville by an aggressive movement on the army of the Potomac. But for his meagerly supplied commissariat he would, earlier in the spring of 1863, have moved upon Milroy at Winchester, in the lower Shenandoah valley, confident that by so doing he could draw Hooker from the northern neck of Virginia into the more open country, where he could find opportunity for striking him an effective blow. He had urged this view upon President Davis before the campaign of Chancellorsville, and had asked that troops might be drawn from the more Southern States to reinforce his army, confident that his plan of campaign would furnish more relief to the Confederacy than could be gained by holding scattered forces to defend distant positions.

Longstreet rejoined Lee in May at Fredericksburg, with the portion of his troops that had been wintering near Suffolk, south of the James, where supplies were more abundant and easy of access. The general commanding then proceeded to reorganize his army, by dividing it into three corps-the First under Longstreet, the Second under Ewell (who having lost a leg at Second Manassas, had just returned from hospital), and the Third under A. P. Hill-and worked untiringly to get his army into condition for a forward movement, constantly urging the Confederate government to add to his numbers in Virginia, and to those of Johnston and Pemberton in Mississippi, so that these two armies might be strong enough to strike efficient and simultaneous blows on the great Federal armies that opposed them, leaving local defenses to the local soldiery. His pleadings were unheeded, but he continued resolutely to prepare for another campaign, apprehensive lest Hooker's vastly

superior numbers might possibly force him back to the trenches around Richmond.

Lee's plan of campaign, as he detailed it to Col. A. L. Long, of his staff, in his tent in the rear of Fredericksburg, was to maneuver Hooker from his almost unreachable stronghold between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and bring him to battle at Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, in the Great valley, or at York or Gettysburg in the Piedmont region of the same State, thus transferring the destructive agencies of war to northern soil, where he could readily subsist his army on the country; and by a decisive victory cause the evacuation of Washington and compel the Federal government to withdraw Grant from the siege of Vicksburg. This was, doubtless, the identical campaign that Jackson had in view, and which he probably had discussed with Lee during the preceding winter, when he ordered the preparation of a detailed map extending from the Rappahannock to the Susquehanna.

Lee's army at this time consisted of Stuart's cavalry corps, of about 6,000 men; the artillery corps, under Pendleton, with some 200 guns, and his veteran infantry, in all about 60,000 men, whom he had ready to march northward by the close of May. On the 3d of June he directed his right, under Longstreet, to move toward Culpeper, marching across the whole length of the scene of his recent victories at Salem church and Chancellorsville; followed by Ewell, who with eager interest scanned the field of victory as he rode across it at the head of Jackson's old troops. With his usual heroic audacity, Lee left his smallest corps, that under A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, to restrain Hooker from any "on to Richmond" he might rashly attempt to make.

By the 8th Lee had concentrated the commands of Stuart, Longstreet and Ewell in front of Culpeper Court House, with his advance pickets on the Rappahannock. On that day Stuart had a grand cavalry review on the broad and then unobstructed open around Brandy Station, which was witnessed by most of the principal officers of the infantry corps in the vicinity and by Lee in person. That night the Federal cavalry forced the passage of the Rappahannock, and on the morning of the 9th fell upon Stuart's encampment, when a furious, and at times hand-to-hand, engagement followed, which lasted

the greater portion of the day. Stuart, after a most valorous fight, finally succeeded in driving the Federal cavalry back across the Rappahannock, with very considerable loss. Hooker had ordered this reconnoissance, with cavalry followed by infantry, to find out what Lee was doing; for as yet he was in profound ignorance concerning his northward movement.

After the repulse of the Federal cavalry, Lee ordered Ewell with the Second corps to cross the Blue ridge at Chester gap, and drive the Federal force under Milroy, at Winchester, from the Valley; ordering Jenkins, at the same time, to move his cavalry brigade down the Valley, in the same direction, while Imboden moved his brigade down the South Branch valley, in the mountain country, to threaten Milroy from Romney on the west. On the 13th, Ewell appeared in front of Winchester and a portion of his advance at Martinsburg, while Jenkins broke the line of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, thus preventing reinforcements to Milroy from the west. Closing around Winchester on the 14th, Ewell, by a bold and wellplanned flank movement of Early to the left, drove Milroy, late in the day, from his strong intrenchments, captured a large portion of his army and his military stores, and scattered the troops that escaped, following them on the 15th to Harper's Ferry, thus again relieving the lower valley and the patriotic city of Winchester from a detested and tyrannical foe, such as Milroy had proved himself to be in waging war on defenseless women and children. Ewell's captures were 4,000 prisoners, many wagons, and a large quantity of military stores. On this same 15th of June, Jenkins moved on Chambersburg with his cavalry, and Ewell's advance crossed the Potomac, while Longstreet followed, from Culpeper, to hold the passes of the Blue ridge, closely followed by Hill to Culpeper, who had remained in front of Fredericksburg until he saw the army of the Potomac disappear, marching to the northward toward Washington.

Thus was Lee steadily pressing the army of Northern Virginia northward, to the Chambersburg objective of his premeditated plan of campaign, the way having been opened by disposing of Milroy's 10,000 at Winchester, by capture and rout, and driving the other scattered forces in the lower valley into Harper's Ferry, which he now passed by, leaving a small force in observation to

hold its garrison in position. By the 17th of June the long column of the Confederate army was stretched from Culpeper in Virginia to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, Jenkins' cavalry holding the latter place. Ewell's advanced division was encamped, in the midst of abundance, near Hagerstown; another was in a like favorable encampment near Sharpsburg, while his third division. was approaching the fords of the Potomac, near Shepherdstown. Longstreet was crossing the Blue ridge to the banks of the Shenandoah, guarding the passes of that mountain chain from the eastward; while Stuart held the Piedmont country and the passes through the Bull Run mountains, thus keeping Hooker within bounds with his great army encamped from Manassas, near Bull run, to Leesburg, near the Potomac, striving to keep pace with Lee's speedy northward movement.

For five days Stuart held steady contention with Hooker's cavalry, effectually veiling Lee's movements, and then holding Ashby's gap of the Blue ridge against superior numbers, but with Longstreet just behind him, all along the ridge, while A. P. Hill passed the rear of the latter, by Chester gap, and rested in the Great valley, in and on the borders of which Lee had now gathered all of his army, except the cavalry immediately in charge of Stuart, which continued to hover around Hooker's flanks and rear. Lee had offered Hooker battle with Longstreet's corps, looking threateningly from the eastern slopes of the Blue ridge; but when that was not accepted, and Hooker still continued south of the Potomac, Lee boldly withdrew Longstreet to the western side of the Shenandoah, and on the 18th, from the vicinity of Millwood, ordered Longstreet and Hill to follow Ewell across the Potomac, satisfied that by so doing he would draw Hooker into Maryland. Hill crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 18th, followed by Longstreet, except McLaws' division, which was left with Stuart to watch the passes of the Blue ridge and the roads of the Shenandoah valley until Hooker should have crossed the Potomac. Imboden was also ordered into Pennsylvania, moving to the west of the Great valley, and it was suggested to Gen. Sam Jones that his cavalry should march his command into northwestern Virginia and menace the line of the Baltimore & Ohio. Lee also asked that the brigades left at Richmond should be sent