force and fall upon Jackson, and by so doing draw Lee's attention from McClellan that the latter's army might be brought around to Pope's. The battle of Cedar Run taught Pope his first lesson and gave him thenceforward a wholesome fear of his military schoolmaster, which made him desist from further attempts on the railway, and remain idle in his Culpeper camps while McClellan's army was being transported to Washington, thence to reinforce Pope, and while Lee was moving the whole army of Northern Virginia from Richmond to Orange, preparatory to sending Pope's army to meet McClellan's at Washington, and transferring the field of operations to and across the Potomac, while the farmers and planters of Virginia, in Piedmont and in the Valley, garnered the magnificent harvest which a bountiful Providence had vouchsafed to them,

CHAPTER XVIII.

LEE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST POPE IN NORTHERN VIR

GINIA.

HE battle of Cedar Run, as General Lee says in his report, "effectually checked the progress of the enemy for the time;" but the pressure from Washington was so great that Pope had to respond with an advance, which he made, on August 14th, when Reno's arrival increased his force to 50,000. He disposed his army from the crossing of Robertson river by the Orange road, to the crossing of the Rapidan at the historic Raccoon ford, across which Wayne led his Pennsylvania brigade to reinforce Lafayette in 1781. Lee, in expectation of this, had, on the 13th of August, ordered Longstreet, with his division and two brigades under Hood, to move to Gordonsville, and R. H. Anderson to follow him, anticipating by a day McClellan's movement from Harrison's landing toward Fort Monroe. At the same time Stuart was ordered to move the main body of his cavalry toward Orange Court House, covering the right of Longstreet's movement and placing his cavalry upon the right of Lee's army when concentrated in Orange.

Longstreet's troops reached the neighborhood of Gordonsville on the 16th, and the same day Jackson, in advance, moving secretly, put his command behind the outlying Clark's mountain range, east of Orange Court House, covering Raccoon and Somerville fords of the Rapidan.

Lee, in person, followed and joined his army in Orange near the middle of August, and on the 19th gave orders for an advance, having determined to strike Pope and defeat him before the great force under McClellan could join him. Longstreet advised a movement to the left, so that Lee's army, with the Blue ridge behind it, might fall upon Pope's right; but Lee and Jackson thought it better to turn Pope's left and put the army of Northern Virginia between him and Washington, cutting his line

of supplies and retreat. Lee's order of the 19th directed Longstreet to cross the Rapidan at Raccoon ford with the right wing of the army, and move toward Culpeper Court House, while Jackson, with the left wing, was to cross at Somerville ford and move in the same direction, keeping on Longstreet's left. Anderson's division and S. D. Lee's battalion of artillery were to follow Jackson, while Stuart, crossing at Morton's ford, was to reach the Rappahannock, by way of Stevensburg, destroy the railroad bridge, cut Pope's communications, and operate on Longstreet's right. The men were to carry three days' rations in their haversacks, and the movement was to begin at dawn of the 20th. Jackson desired to attack earlier; but Longstreet was not prepared. The concentrated army was ready to move on the 19th, but Fitz Lee's brigade of Stuart's cavalry, the leading one in the march from Richmond, had gone too far to the right, in the direction of Fredericksburg, and was a day late in joining the army, thus causing another delay.

Pope, on the 19th, ordered a cavalry reconnoissance across the Rapidan, which captured one of Stuart's staff with Lee's order of march on his person. This was quickly furnished to Pope, who hastened to evacuate Culpeper and put the Rappahannock between himself and the now famous Confederate general-in-chief; and Lee had the mortification of seeing from the summit of Clark's mountain, the southeastern of "the little mountains of Orange," Pope's army in full retreat, across the plains of Culpeper, on the very day that he would have fallen upon it had his strategic orders been promptly and energetically obeyed by his first lieutenant.

Lee's 50,000 men followed his marching orders at dawn. of the 20th; but not against Culpeper Court House, for Pope had evacuated that the day before. Longstreet, preceded by Fitz Lee's cavalry, marched to Kelly's ford of the Rappahannock, while Jackson marched by way of Stevensburg and Brandy station toward Rappahannock bridge, bivouacking for the night near Stevensburg. Stuart, with Robertson's cavalry brigade, had a spirited contest that day with Bayard's cavalry, near Brandy station. Forced from that point, Bayard took position between Brandy and Rappahannock bridge, still guarding the Federal rear, from which Stuart again routed him and drove him across the Rappahannock, under

cover of Pope's batteries on the high northern bank. The Confederates captured 64 prisoners and lost 16, killed and wounded.

The morning of the 21st found Lee's 50,000 veterans on the south bank of the Rappahannock, with Jackson on the left, extending from the railroad bridge to Beverly ford, across which Robertson's Fifth Virginia cavalry had made a dash, scattering the Federal infantry near by, disabling a battery, and spending most of the day on the north side of the river by the aid of Jackson's batteries on the south side. On the approach of a large Federal force, Rosser, by order of Stuart, recrossed. Longstreet extended Lee's line from Rappahannock bridge to Kelly's ford. Pope's 55,000 men held the commanding ground on the north bank of the Rappahannock, and a lively artillery duel was kept up during the day between the confronting armies, but with little or no damage to either.

The undulating Midland plain, on which these contending armies had now met, was far better fighting ground than was the swampy and densely forested Tidewater country, which was so recently the field of contention. The larger portion of this vicinity of the Rappahannock was cleared and had been under cultivation, in large plantations, until the opening of the war. At the same time it was a more difficult region for strategic movements to be covered from observation. It was evident that Pope's concentrated army could not easily be reached by a front attack, while his left was difficult of approach, and receiving the reinforcements steadily coming to him from the direction of Fredericksburg. Lee's military genius, and his conferences with Jackson, convinced him that the proper movement was one that should turn Pope's right and place the Confederates in his rear, cutting him off from the old time highway that led through the Piedmont country, by Warrenton, toward Washington. Moreover, "the strength of the hills" lay in that direction; for within sight, looking to the northward and westward, were the outlying ridges of the coast range, the Rappahannock and Bull Run mountains, behind which concealed movements could be made in the desired direction.

The first step in this strategic movement was to get the mobile left wing of his army, under the energetic

and always-ready Jackson, behind these covering low mountain ranges, the southwestward extensions of the Bull Run mountains, without the knowledge of Pope. To accomplish this, Lee adopted a series of novel advances. While Jackson and Stuart were engaging the attention of Pope along the Rappahannock, north of the railroad, he moved Longstreet from his right, by concealed roads, and placed him in Jackson's rear, leaving the latter free to fall back after dark, giving place to Longstreet, and march to a position farther up the river, but still holding on to Longstreet's left. This first exchange of positions was made during the night of the 21st, or rather the early morning of the 22d, and that day, preceded by cavalry, Jackson reached the neighborhood of Warrenton Springs, where the great highway, from Culpeper Court House toward Washington, crosses the Rappahannock and goes on through Warrenton to Centreville. During that day Longstreet, by a vigorous contention with skirmishers and artillery, engaged Pope's attention in his first position north of the Rappahannock, and caused him to add to his force at Beverly ford, apprehending that Longstreet was about to force a passage there and attack his center. Detachments of Federal cavalry and infantry made dashes on Jackson's line of march from a detached column that Pope was moving up the north bank of the river, to keep pace with whatever movement Lee might be making to his left. Especially was a bold dash made at Freeman's ford, about noon, as Jackson's rear was passing that point. His rear guard, under Trimble, deployed and awaited the Federal attack. Hood, with two of Longstreet's brigades, came up about four in the afternoon, when Trimble, aided by these, vigorously attacked the Federal brigade which had crossed the river, and drove it back with slaughter and in confusion. A third crossing, in pursuit of information, was made at Fant's ford, by cavalry, infantry and artillery, but these soon retired, having learned but little.

When Jackson reached the river, opposite the Warrenton Springs, and found the ford guarded, he at once began moving his troops to the other side, sending over the Thirteenth Georgia and two batteries, while Early crossed, on an old mill dam, about a mile further down the river. It began raining while these troops were crossing, and an afternoon of showers was followed by a