CHAPTER XVII.

STONEWALL JACKSON'S CEDAR RUN CAMPAIGN.

T

HE conditions and the scene of conflict in Virginia now changed. McClellan, whining like a wellwhipped schoolboy, and in so doing damaging his military reputation, begged for reinforcements and for permission, when reinforced, to make another attempt on Richmond. But the Federal government, alarmed at the result of its gigantic effort to capture Richmond, now feared, and justly, that Lee's victorious army might take up the line of march to menace its own capital; so, instead of reinforcing McClellan and permitting him to try again an "on to Richmond," it ordered him back to the line of the Potomac and to the front of Washington.

When it was learned that the ubiquitous Jackson was really engaged in the contest with McClellan at Richmond, the army that had been waiting for him in the valley, finding none to oppose it, ventured to cross the Blue ridge at Chester gap, and encamp in the lovely coves of Piedmont Virginia, just under and amid the spurs of the grand mountains in the vicinity of Sperryville; where, on the 26th day of June, with the roar of booming cannon, the echoes of which were heard as far away as Gordonsville, was organized from the armies of Fremont, Banks and McDowell, the "army of Virginia,' under Maj.-Gen. John Pope. Its three corps, of now well-rested veterans, were prepared for another campaign-to essay another "on to Richmond" from another direction. The 13,000 men under Burnside, in North Carolina, were hastened to the Potomac end of the Richmond, Potomac & Fredericksburg railroad at Aquia creek, to guard the left of the new movement; and preparations were hastened to bring back the great host still on the James with McClellan, and add that to the new army of Virginia.

Excellent highways led from the Rappahannock region, where Pope was encamped, to Gordonsville and Culpeper,

and the march was not a long one to either of these places. A blow at Gordonsville would break Lee's line of railway communication with his best base of supplies in the Great Valley, and it was rightly concluded that if that blow were struck, Lee would meet it with a portion of his army, and thus give McClellan, opportunity to escape.

Full of ambition to accomplish what his predecessors had failed to do, and equally full of himself, and hoping to infuse some of the same spirit into the men whom Jackson had so lately roughly handled and discomfited, Pope joined his army near Sperryville, and on the 14th of July issued a very remarkable address, in which he said, among other things:

I have come to join you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack, not defense. . . . I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find in vogue amongst you, of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us dismiss such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance toward the enemy. Let us study the possible lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear.

After this bombastic fulmination, Pope immediately proceeded to wage unsoldierly war upon the peaceable citizens of the surrounding country, and "disaster" to these citizens followed every movement of his army. Under pain of expulsion from their homes, he ordered that every male citizen of the region dominated by him should take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and thus old men and boys, women and children became the suffering victims of this braggart, who expressed himself so anxious to meet and fight the Confederate soldiers.

McClellan was still lingering on the banks of the James, and Lee was as yet uncertain what his discomfited opponent might be ordered to do; but, watching the whole military chess-board in Virginia, he saw that it would not do to let Pope enter the field of contention without having him met by one competent to manage him, so, on the 13th of July, just as Pope was riding in from Washington to take command of his army of Virginia, Lee ordered Jackson to Gordonsville with Robert

son's cavalry brigade and the two infantry divisions of Ewell and Winder, only about 12,000 men, but all hardy and well-tested veterans; and on the 27th another 12,000 under A. P. Hill were added to Stonewall's command. Pope's unheard-of orders came to Lee's hands during these preparations. That gentle-mannered man and model soldier characterized such threatenings against "defenseless citizens" as "atrocious," and by direction of his government sent a note to Halleck, the general commanding the Federal forces, protesting that such orders were in violation of the recent cartel entered into for the exchange of prisoners, and characterizing them as beginning a savage war in which no quarter is to be given. Halleck did not reply to the protest; but it was noticed that Pope, for some reason, changed his behavior.

Lee still had 50,000 men in front of Richmond, watching for any opportunity to strike his enemy that might offer itself. A reconnoissance, on the south side of the James, revealed the fact that Coggin's point, opposite McClellan's camp across the James, and projecting toward its rear, commanded that camp from its bluffs and was within range of field artillery. Taking advantage of this, Lee sent D. H. Hill, secretly, to this point on July 31st, and he, under cover of darkness, startled the Federals in their camp and shipping by pouring into them the fire of forty-three pieces of artillery, doing considerable damage but suffering none, as he retired before an attack could be planned against him. This stung McClellan to seek retaliation, and on August 5th he moved out to Malvern hill, in battle array. Lee promptly advanced to Charles City cross-roads, ordering his left to threaten McClellan's rear, while with the brigades of Cobb and Evans, on the right, he drove the Federals behind the guns on the Malvern ridge and waited for the morning, designing to try again for the capture of that formidable position; but when morning came there was nothing there to meet him, as McClellan's courage failed when he found Lee ready to fight him.

Jackson's advance reached Gordonsville on the 19th of July, and he at once marched his veterans to the charming Piedmont region west of the coast range (the "little mountains of Orange," as Light Horse Harry Lee called them), where they luxuriated amid the open groves and in the grassy fields of that charming region, and recu

perated from the effects of the miasmatic swamps of the low country in the great wild blackberry patches loaded with ripened fruit. Jackson himself pitched his camp far up on the western slope of the mountain range, whence he overlooked the terrace occupied by Pope, and could study from afar its peculiar topography, at the same time urging to tense activity in the study of the country and in the preparation of campaign maps his topographical engineers, who had again joined him. His cavalry held the line of the Rapidan up to the mouth of the Robertson, and then along that river toward the Blue ridge, communicating with the Confederate cavalry beyond, that still guarded the upper Shenandoah valley. The Federal cavalry picketed to these rivers on their northern sides. Lee had no misgivings about intrusting the care of Pope to Jackson. Writing to him, after sending Hill to his aid, he says: "Relying upon your judgment, courage and discretion, and trusting to the continued blessing of an ever-kind Providence, I hope for victory"-words and sentiments that found a responsive echo in the soul of his twin brother in the art of war.

Watching, through his cavalry, his scouts and his spies, for a coveted opportunity to meet his arrogant adversary, whom he constantly deceived by his own marchings and countermarchings (one of them 10 miles to the rear of Gordonsville to cover the coming of A. P. Hill to his army), Jackson soon found it when Pope moved forward to Culpeper Court House, and sent a portion of his command on the road leading to Orange Court House, but leaving parts of it strung all along the way, back for many miles, to Sperryville, at the foot of the Blue ridge, where a whole division under Sigel still tarried in camp. Pope's strategic force on the 7th of August was 36,500 men; but his tactic force, within easy reach of Jackson, was but a part of this number, and Jackson knew it. This partial force was the 8,000 men under Banks, an old Valley acquaintance of Jackson's army, in an advanced camp across the Rapidan. Ricketts' division, of about 10,000, was nearer to Culpeper Court House, but Sigel was far away at Sperryville.

Late in the day of the 7th of August, Jackson moved his men, by concealed roads, to the vicinity of the Rapidan, where they slept on their arms and were ready to

march in the early morning of the 8th, drive in the Federal cavalry, and occupy a favorable position where the road to Culpeper crosses the low watershed between the Rapidan and Cedar run. The day was intensely hot, the roads dusty, and both animals and men suffered fearfully. A misunderstanding of orders by one of his division commanders, which led to an interference of marching columns, added to the delay caused by the heat and the dust. On the morning of the 9th, Jackson moved forward and drew up his line of battle in the edge of the forest that crowned the Cedar run watershed, at right angles to the road and to the range of low hills known as the Cedar Run or Slaughter's mountain, that, covered with forest, extended parallel to the road and at right angles to his line on his right. A road ran along the top of this broken ridge, which Jackson proceeded to occupy with artillery and a portion of Ewell's division. The basin of Cedar run, crossed by that stream about a mile in his front, lay spread out before him, the larger portion of it divided into the fields of cultivated plantations, but with patches of forest, especially on its western side, along which ran the highway to Culpeper, on the west of which was a low ridge, mostly covered by forest but gashed with fields extending from the road to its crest.

Jackson, by a glance over the field of contest, discovered that he had secured an advantageous position for disposing of his troops for either attack or defense. He turned Ewell's division, which was in advance, to the eastern side of the Culpeper road, and Ewell himself, leading his right, advanced it to Cedar mountain, accompanied by a number of guns, for which he found good positions on the slope and crest of Slaughter's mountain. Early's brigade was formed on the left, followed by Hays' and Trimble's. Winder's division was ordered to support Early, but in echelon, extending his line to the left of the Culpeper road. Several batteries followed, on Early's right, through the open fields, while those of Winder followed the highway. Early's skirmishers soon advanced and drove back the Federal cavalry across Cedar run. Numerous Federal batteries, from the slopes beyond the run, opened on him as he advanced, but these were promptly answered by those on Jackson's left, center and right, and an active artillery duel was kept up for nearly two hours.