CHAPTER XVI.

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES BEFORE RICHMOND.

L

EE, in his first general order to the army before Richmond, said: "The presence of the enemy in front of the capital, the great interests involved, and the existence of all that is dear to us, appeal in terms too strong to be unheard, and the general commanding feels assured that every man has resolved to maintain the ancient fame of the army of Northern Virginia and the reputation of its general [Johnston], and to conquer or die in the approaching contest." In a private letter he wrote: "I wish his [Johnston's] mantle had fallen upon an abler man, or that I were able to drive our enemies back to their homes. I have no ambition and no desire but for the attainment of this object." Writing in a humorous vein to a young friend, General Lee described himself, at this supreme moment of taking high command, in these words:

My coat is of gray, of the regulation style and pattern, and my pants are dark blue, as is also prescribed, partly hid by my long boots. I have the same handsome hat which surmounts my gray head, (the latter is not prescribed in the regulations), and shields my ugly face, which is masked by a white beard as stiff and wiry as the teeth of a card. In fact, an uglier person you have never seen, and so unattractive is it to our enemies that they shoot at it whenever it is visible to them.

McClellan was busy during the first half of June in massing four of his corps on the south of the Chickahominy, near the position where Lee found them when he took command; while with the remainder of his army he assiduously fortified his chosen position on the north side of that swampy river, drawing his supplies by the York River railroad from the stores at White House on the Pamunkey. McCall's division, from McDowell's army, reached him on the 13th, but Lincoln held the rest of that corps in front of Washington, still fearing attack from Jackson. By the 20th, McClellan had 115,000 men present for duty, to which Lee, at

an

first, could oppose but 57,000, but to these he soon added 15,000 from the Carolinas. On the 8th, while Jackson was ambidextrously engaged with Fremont and Shields, Lee was writing to him: "Should there be nothing requir ing your attention in the valley, so as to prevent your leaving it for a few days, and you can make arrangements to deceive the enemy and impress him with the idea of your presence, please let me know, that you may unite at the decisive moment with the army near Richmond." Jackson, in reply, asked for reinforcements and the privilege of dealing further blows at his Valley opponents. Lee promptly sent him fourteen veteran regiments, under Lawton and Whiting, sending them off by rail on that day; marching them through Richmond in martial array, with all the pomp and circumstance of war, and taking good care to have McClellan apprised of their destination. The story of Jackson's Valley campaign has already been told, as well as the use he made of these reinforcements, and how he left the Valley on the 17th of June to swell Lee's forces at Richmond, after having amply provided for the quiet and safety of the large Federal army that his strategy had massed in the lower valley.

Undaunted courage, coupled with rare caution, characterized the new Confederate general commanding. Desiring to be fully informed in reference to the rear as well as the front of the great host beleaguering Richmond, Lee took his bold and ever-alert cavalry leader, J. E. B. Stuart, into his councils, and dispatched him on the 12th with 1,200 veteran cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's rear. Starting from Richmond he followed the Brook turnpike northward to Ashland, then turned eastward by way of Hanover Court House, and followed the main road down the south side of the Pamunkey, a few miles in the rear of McClellan's far-stretching army, crossing the York River railroad at Tunstall's, making captures, destroying stores, and breaking the enemy's line of communication as he went; then, turning southward, he crossed the swollen Chickahominy, near Providence forge, and continued to the banks of the James at Charles City, whence he returned by the river road to Richmond, having in forty-eight hours, with the loss of but a single man, the brave Latané, whom he left in the hands of noble Virginia women for burial, ridden entirely around the Federal army and gathered information of incalculable value to Lee in maturing his plans.

Jackson, by marching and using the trains of the Virginia Central railroad, in a "ride-and-tie" way, reached Frederickshall on the 21st, where he rested on Sunday, the 22d. At midnight, after the Sabbath had passed, Jackson mounted his horse, and accompanied by a single courier, rode rapidly toward Richmond for a conference to which Lee had invited him. By impressing a relay of horses, he reached that city after a 50-mile ride, at I p. m., and at 3, Monday, 23d, was in conference with the commanding general in reference to an attack on McClellan's right. On that same Monday, Jackson's men moved forward and on the evening of the 25th reached Ashland, suffering greatly from the intense summer heat of the lowlands, the choking dust of the roads, and the scarcity of water.

By June 24th, McClellan had an inkling of the approach of Jackson, and asked Stanton, his secretary of war, what he knew of the whereabouts of this hard-tobe-located man. This information was supplied him on the 25th, locating Jackson anywhere from Gordonsville to Luray, or in the mountains of West Virginia, while Banks and Fremont, in the lower valley, were intently watching for an attack by him from up the valley. On this same 25th, McClellan telegraphed to Washington: "I am inclined to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true."

Lee's plan of attack, which he communicated to his division commanders in a confidential general order, was for Jackson to move on the 25th from Ashland, and encamp his 16,000 men west of the Virginia Central railroad; at 3 a. m. on the 26th to march southeastward by way of Old Polly Hundley's corner and across the Totopotomoy, to Pole Green church, near Hundley's corner, in the rear of McClellan's position and on the Shady Grove road which leads into the road following down the Pamunkey. As Jackson crossed the railway he was to inform Branch, on the Brook turnpike, who was guarding that approach to Richmond with one of A. P. Hill's brigades, who, when thus informed, was to cross the Chickahominy and move down its northern bank toward Mechanicsville. The order next stated: "As soon as the movements of these rear columns (Jackson's and Branch's)

are discovered, Gen. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division (11,000 men), will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville;" Hill's movement to be followed by Longstreet, crossing the Mechanicsville bridge with his 9,000, followed by D. H. Hill with his 10,000, these three to unite in a general movement against McClellan's right flank down the north bank of the Chickahominy. Stuart, with his cavalry, was to lead Jackson's movement and then extend his left, the object of Lee being to cut off any retreat of McClellan toward his base of supplies, by having Stuart and Jackson in his rear and ready to push eastward and intercept a retreat if he should attempt one.

To repeat, Lee's 50,000 men, if marched according to his order, would be thus disposed: A. P. Hill moving on McClellan's right flank at Mechanicsville, supported by Longstreet, with Jackson moving upon the rear of the same flank, supported by D. H. Hill. Jackson's order read: "Bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam creek and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor," after that to "press forward toward the York River railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy." The orders clearly indicate that Jackson, when he was ready for action, was to give the signal for beginning the fight. These were the tactic arrangements on Lee's left. Lee's left. His right wing, south of the Chickahominy, 30,000 strong, held the line of fortifications extending from the front of Mechanicsville to Chaffin's bluff on the north bank of the James, not far below Drewry's bluff on the south side of that river. Holmes with 5,000 held the intrenched bluffs; Magruder and Huger, in the fortifications east of and before Richmond, confronted with their 25,000 men the nearly 80,000 of the four Federal corps south of the Chickahominy and between that and White Oak swamp, with their intrenched advance at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. It took sublime courage and confidence in his men for a commander to make such dispositions, and so divide his forces in the face of such great odds; but Lee had that courage in an eminent degree, and knew that he could trust the veterans of the army of Northern Virginia to resist a defensive attack against more than double their numbers, or to make an equally bold offensive one when he saw fit to command it. He also knew the hesitating

disposition of McClellan, and was doubtless well informed as to his fears in reference to a largely superior attacking force. Magruder and Huger were instructed to impose upon the large Federal cavalry force in their front with constant demonstrations, and if attacked to unflinchingly hold their intrenchments.

The intense heat and the lack of water exhausted Jackson's men and animals, and the reconstruction of bridges and the removal of obstacles from the roads which Fitz John Porter had destroyed and placed during his movement on Hanover Court House, delayed Jackson's march, so that his column did not reach Ashland until the night of the 25th, although his army had made 50 miles from Gordonsville in three days. By 3 a. m. of the 26th his advance, under Whiting, moved from Ashland on the Ash-cake road; by 9 a. m. it was crossing the Virginia Central railroad, near Peake's, and by 10, Branch was informed of Jackson's progress, some six hours later than Lee had expected. Part of this delay was caused by the failure of the commissary department at Richmond to provide rations for Jackson at Ashland, as had been promised him. Jackson, in person, was pushing forward with all possible dispatch and, as White writes in his "Life of Lee," with "vigor unabated and his spirit aglow with the ardor of battle." Keeping to the left and pressing toward Cold Harbor, his right guarded by Stuart's horsemen, at 3 p. m. Hood's Texans in the lead had a hot skirmish at the Totopotomoy. There the Federals destroyed the bridge, which had to be rebuilt before Jackson could cross that stream; so he was unable to reach Hundley's corner, in McClellan's rear, until after dark of the 26th. Obeying orders and bearing to the eastward, he had not passed within sight or sound of the battle that A. P. Hill, contrary to orders, had brought on at Mechanicsville, forcing Lee to follow up without the aid of Jackson and contrary to his plan of attack.

After being notified by Jackson that he had crossed the Virginia Central railroad, Branch moved down the Chickahominy by the road on its northern side, to uncover the Meadow bridges, that A. P. Hill might cross his other brigades and be in position to attack when he heard Jackson's signal guns. Branch met Porter's outposts when crossing the Virginia Central at Atlee's, where he was delayed by a vigorous skirmish. At 3 p. m., A. P. Hill,