had doubtless prevented McDowell from winning a victory on the 19th or 20th, but pursuit is a far less difficult business than attack. There was nothing to interfere with a forward movement. There were supplies along the railway, and if the mechanism for their distribution and the means for their carriage were wanting, the counties adjoining the Potomac were rich and fertile. Herds of bullocks were grazing in the pastures, and the barns of the farmers were loaded with grain. It was not a long supply train that was lacking, nor an experienced staff, nor even well-disciplined battalions; but a general who grasped the full meaning of victory, who understood how a defeated army, more especially of new troops, yields at a touch, and who, above all, saw the necessity of giving the North no leisure to develop her immense resources. For three days Jackson impatiently awaited the order to advance, and his men were held ready with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. But his superiors gave no sign, and he was reluctantly compelled to abandon all hope of reaping the fruits of the victory.

When McClellan, summoned in hot haste from northwestern Virginia to avert further disaster, reached Washington, on the 26th of July, he rode around the city inspecting the existing conditions. Of these he wrote:

I found no preparations whatever for defense, not even to the extent of putting the troops in military positions. Not a regiment was properly encamped, not a single avenue of approach guarded. All was chaos, and the streets, hotels and bar-rooms were filled with drunken officers and men, absent from their regiments without leave -a perfect pandemonium. Many had even gone to their homes, their flight from Bull Run terminating in New York, or even New Hampshire and Maine. There was really nothing to prevent a small cavalry force from riding into the city. A determined attack would doubtless have carried Arlington heights and placed the city at the mercy of a battery of rifled guns. If the secessionists attached any value to the possession of Washington, they committed their greatest error in not following up the victory of Bull Run.

That same day, Secretary of War Stanton wrote:

The capture of Washington seems now to be inevitable; during the whole of Monday and Tuesday (July 22d and 23d) it might have been taken without resistance. The rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the whole army were complete.

Of the attitude of the Southern people after this great victory, which might have been decisive, Colonel Henderson says:

When the news of Bull Run reached Richmond, and through the crowds that thronged the streets passed the tidings of the victory, there was neither wild excitement nor uproarious joy. No bonfires lit the darkness of the night; no cannon thundered out salutes; the steeples were silent till the morrow, and then were heard only the solemn tones that called the people to prayer. It was resolved, on the day following the battle, by the Confederate Congress: "That we recognize the hand of the Most High God, the King of kings and

Lord of lords, in the glorious victory with which He has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by appropriate services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their united thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance."

Johnston wrote as follows of the Confederate army after Bull Run:

The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army-not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers, and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat.

On the 25th of July, Johnston and Beauregard united in a congratulatory proclamation to the "Soldiers of the Confederate States," of which the beginning and conclusion are quoted:

One week ago a countless host of men, organized into an army, with all the appointments which modern and practical skill could devise, invaded the soil of Virginia. Their people sounded their approach with triumphant displays of anticipated victory. Their generals came in almost royal state; their great ministers, senators, and women came to witness the immolation of our army and the subjugation of our people, and to celebrate the result with wild revelry. It is with the profoundest emotions of gratitude to an overruling God, whose hand is manifest in protecting our homes and our liberties, that we, your generals commanding, are enabled, in the name of our whole country, to thank you for that patriotic courage, that heroic gallantry, that devoted daring, exhibited by you in the actions of the 18th and 21st, by which the hosts of the enemy were scattered and a signal and glorious victory obtained. . . . Comrades, our brothers who have fallen have earned undying renown upon earth, and their blood, shed in our holy cause, is a precious and acceptable sacrifice to the Father of Truth and of Right. Their graves are beside the tomb of Washington; their spirits have joined with his in eternal communion. We drop one tear on their laurels and move forward to avenge them. Soldiers, we congratulate you on a glorious, triumphant and complete victory, and we thank you for doing your whole duty in the service of your country.

In this first great battle in Virginia many officers. served, on both sides, who afterward became distinguished, or famous. On the Confederate side were Johnston, Beauregard, "Stonewall" Jackson, Stuart, Fitz Lee, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Early, Whiting, D. R. Jones, Sam Jones, Holmes, Evans, Elzey,

Radford and Jordan-all graduates of West Point. Among those holding inferior positions, but subsequently distinguished, were Munford, Kirkland, Kershaw, Rodes, Featherston, Skinner, Garland, Corse, Cocke, Hunton, Withers, William Smith, Hays, Barksdale, Kemper, Wheat, Terry, Hampton, Shields, Imboden, Allen, Preston, Echols, Cumming, Steuart, A. P. Hill, Pendleton, and others.

Stuart, on the 21st, followed the retreating Federals 12 miles beyond Manassas, when his command was so depleted by sending back detachments with prisoners, that he gave up the pursuit and returned to encamp near Sudley church. He advanced to Fairfax Court House on the morning of the 23d, and a little later established his pickets along the Potomac, and in front of Washington, in sight of the dome of the capitol. The infantry of the army was moved to new camps beyond Bull run, with advanced detachments in support of the cavalry. McClellan took command at Washington on the 27th, and at once proceeded to make that city an intrenched camp, to which large numbers of troops were hurried from all the Union States.

OPERATIONS

S

CHAPTER VIII.

ABOUT NORFOLK AND YORKTOWNBATTLE OF BIG BETHEL-BURNING OF HAMPTON. COTT'S fourth line of invasion had for its objective the capture of Richmond by way of "the peninsula" from Fort Monroe, using the navy on the James and York rivers to guard the flanks of the movement. Before this could be successfully made it was necessary to secure Norfolk and the Gosport navy yard and their defenses, which guarded the entrance to the waterway of the James, and Yorktown and Gloucester point, which guarded that to the York.

The general-in-chief was a soldier, who, naturally, placed the most reliance upon the army to carry out his plans. Therefore he attached the greatest importance to the direct movement on Richmond from Washington, by way of Manassas, and gathered his largest army for that purpose. Yet, one well informed as to the defensive conditions of Virginia, and especially of Richmond, at the beginning of the war, can but wonder that the most important movement was not made by way of the peninsula by the army, aided by the navy on the York and the James, since at that time there had been no preparations worth mentioning to prevent such a movement or the capture of Virginia's capital. This can only be accounted for by the demoralized condition in which the war and the navy departments of the United States were left by the resignation, as soon as Virginia passed an ordinance of secession, of such a large proportion of the best officers of these two arms of the service, natives of Virginia and other Southern States.

As before stated, when it had been decided that the Virginia convention would provide for secession, the first two objects to demand the attention of the executive were the capture of the armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the arsenal and navy yard at Gosport in the vicinity of Norfolk. On the night of April 16th, some men in Norfolk, without authority, seized light boats and

other small craft and sank them in the channel to prevent the escape of ships from the navy yard. There were at the navy yard at that time 4 ships of the line, 3 frigates, 2 sloops of war, 1 brig and the steam frigate Merrimac, and some 780 marines and other armed men.

On the 18th of April, Governor Letcher called out the militia of Norfolk and vicinity, and dispatched Maj.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro to take command of the same and endeavor, by a rapid movement, to secure the navy yard. After having done this he asked Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, to immediately send 2,000 troops to Norfolk to aid the Virginia militia. Pickens at first declined, as "it might appear intrusive," and besides, "we stand at present on the defensive." He said he would ask President Davis for advice. The latter wired Letcher for information as to his object in asking for troops. He replied that it was to secure the Gosport navy yard, where the Merrimac, the Cumberland, the Pennsylvania, and perhaps other vessels were at that time; that the channel was partially obstructed and it would require 5,000 men to take the place. On the 19th the Confederate secretary of war informed Governor Brown, of Georgia, that 2,000 troops had been ordered from South Carolina to Norfolk, to report to General Taliaferro, and asked that several companies be sent from Georgia to the same place, to go at once, or they would be too late. Davis replied to Letcher, on the 19th, that he had ordered sent him two regiments from South Carolina and some companies from Georgia; also that the resolution of the Virginia convention for an alliance had been received and accepted. On the 19th, Letcher telegraphed Taliaferro: "As we need powder, keep an eye to securing that article." On the 20th the governor of Georgia reported that he had four companies ready to start for Virginia. The Seaboard railroad furnished facilities for sending these South Carolina and Georgia troops directly to Norfolk.

Scott, on the 19th of April, ordered Capt. H. G. Wright, of the engineers, to proceed to the Gosport navy yard to aid the commodore there in command, in designing and executing a plan of defense; instructing him to call at Fort Monroe and consult Colonel Dimick regarding the sending of a regiment of infantry to assist in the defense of the navy yard, but to "bear in mind that, although the navy yard and its contents are of very