But, as has been said, sentiment was chaotic, loose. It could not bear the thought of grooves and limitations, was struggling against walled up policies. Grant's ways were those of a soldier. His advisers were lieutenants. His methods were disciplinary. Hence, without thought of his integrity or consideration of his purity of intention, that rapid and foolish cry of “Grantism,” "Cæsarism," and that equally foolish fear that he would do something to make his term of office perpetual. We laugh at these things now, and wonder, in the light of the present, how there could be such a misunderstanding of clear situations and such a distortion of lucid facts.

Grant's second administration opened amid financial disaster. The speculative period after the war culminated in 1873, and there came a panic which wrecked business credit and shook faith in that of the government. It disordered public policies, disorganized parties, bred discontents, and carried along with them a flood of confusions. It made the legislation of the Congress which met December 1st, 1873, difficult.

The popular idea ran in favor of inflation. It was thought that by increasing the national currency to the extent of $400,000,000, the country would be relieved of pressure and further disaster avoided. An act was passed authorizing an increase of the above amount, in the face of the fact that too much redundancy had already contributed to the speculative spirit which brought on the panic, and of the further fact that the dominant party had resolutely set its head in the direction of specie payments and a higher public credit.

The Republican majority was still large in both branches— thirty-six in the Senate, and one hundred in the House. This majority was therefore largely responsible for the inflation act. Notwithstanding this fact, President Grant vetoed the bill, giving as a reason that it ran counter to the sounder sentiment which already tended toward resumption, that it was inflation without an exigency to warrant it, and that it would impair the

public credit by increasing its promises to pay.

The bill could

of the neces

not be passed over the President's veto for want sary two-thirds, though a powerful minority in both parties favored it. This idea of inflation, coupled with the decision of the Supreme Court that the legal tender acts of the government were valid, became the basis of that" Greenback" movement which soon assumed party proportions and figured so extensively in the State elections of 1874, and for some years after.

In this veto Grant stood fast by the principle enunciated in his first inaugural. "Fluctuation in the paper value of the measure of all values (gold) is detrimental to the interests of trade. It makes the man of business an involuntary gambler; for in all sales where future payment is to be made both parties speculate as to what will be the value of the currency to be paid and received. I earnestly recommend to you then such legislation as will insure a gradual return to specie payments and put an immediate stop to fluctuations in the value of currency."

This firmness was unpopular in the midst of depression and panic, but it was wise, as all now agree. It helped to stay the inflation furore and advance the safe, conservative business thought that the way to recover was not by plunging the country deeper into debt, but by retrenchment on the part of individuals and the exercise of a more cautious energy. It hastened the "age of gold," which was then not far in the future.

The President had the pleasure of signing during this term of office several tariff measures, notably that of 1874, which had been passed to remedy the too rapid reduction of duties on imports, begun in 1871-72. He was always in harmony with the protective idea, and believed that the building up of our industries and thus creating a home market for our surplus cereals was a wise policy as well as solemn duty.

The administration found itself cramped in its Southern policy. It had for a long time been clear that the "Home

Rule" sentiment in the Southern States was, in the end, bound to extinguish the local governments which existed on the strength of support given by all the people without regard to nationality, color or previous condition. Organizations called the "White League" ramified the States, and "The White Man's Party" had become a rallying cry. So long as this ferment involved only State issues and did injustice to no one, interference would have been improper. But, unfortunately, it ended in a riotous and bloody controversy in Louisiana, where two State governments, one under Kellogg, the other under McEnery, rival governors, were contending for supremacy.

Several of the Republican governments, as in Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas had called upon the President for military aid in maintaining their positions, but this was declined except in the presence of such outbreak as the proper State authorities could not suppress. The condition of all was turbulent, demanding constant attention from the President, and presenting him a task most difficult and dangerous. There came up to the Executive the most conflicting stories from "Home Rulers" and freedmen," White Leaguers" and "Carpet-baggers." It was impossible to form an accurate judgment of the situation, and grave fears arose of a war of races. Political sentiment in the North was greatly affected by the situation, and showed itself adverse to the Republicans in 1874, when a Democratic majority was returned to the Forty-Fourth Congress.

Sheridan's report, January 10th, 1875, of the situation in Louisiana showed that a condition of war existed between the rival factions, which was beyond control of the State authorities and called for federal intervention. On January 13th, President Grant sent a special message to Congress reviewing the contention between Kellogg and McEnery, the rival governors, who both claimed to be elected, and asking that some steps be taken to ascertain the merits of their respective claims

in the interest of peace. In the meantime the federal troops, under Sheridan, had been drawn into several ugly complications with the soldiery, or rather mobs, of the factions, and had been forced to suppress riotous demonstrations, if not actual warfare. The Congress referred the whole controversy to a select committee, after deciding that the Kellogg government was the legal one. This committee investigated affairs fully and drew up the celebrated "Wheeler compromise," which became the basis of settlement among all the claimants for peace in the State. Thus, further bloodshed was averted, and the Executive relieved, for the time being, of the delicate task of interfering in the affairs of an inflammatory state and section.

He was hardly relieved of this difficult and dangerous responsibility when administration circles were plunged into confusion by the trial of his Private Secretary, O. E. Babcock, for complicity with the "Whisky Ring," then undergoing investigation for corrupt and notorious practices in securing legislation favorable to its interests. He was acquitted, and resigned his position. This ring was formed in the West in 1875, or earlier. It had not only succeeded in influencing legislation relating to the internal revenue tax, but in cheating the government out of such tax. This form of corruption, after President Grant's order "Let no guilty man escape," was traced by the government detectives through all its ramifications, and resulted in some notable trials. It was tracked, as we have just seen, up to so close a friend as his Private Secretary, and the enemies of the administration sought, by all means in their power, to connect it directly with the frauds. But even partisan rancor failed, in the end, to smutch the President's character and good

name.

This trouble had hardly passed till his Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, was charged with selling an Indian trading establishment, which resulted in his impeachment. But he

resigned before the time of trial, and the vote in the Senate was one of not guilty, more on the ground of a want of jurisdiction of his case than as a declaration on its merits.

These events were very embarrassing to President Grant personally and officially. While they did not detract from the prevailing sentiment respecting his integrity, they showed that his confidence in men, and his faithfulness to trusted friends could be taken advantage of, to his detriment. He had been forewarned of the possibility that these two officials were implicated by rumors and hints of suspicion, but he could not strike them a blow in the face of detractive fires. He would rather tolerate them, and divide the consequences of their fall, when conviction came. than help to ruin them in advance by removing them, or asking for their resignations. This was the President's spirit in military and civil affairs. It was right in principle, but often made him the victim of unmerited abuse.

On January 14th, 1875, the President witnessed, in the passage of the Resumption Act, the planting of a corner stone for that financial temple, whose erection he had advocated from the day of his first inauguration. Owing to the panic, the Greenback theorists, the unsettled state of public sentiment, immediate resumption was deemed impolitic. But to provide for it, in order to occasion a drift towards it at some future day, was the object of the act. It fixed a period four years afterwards (1879) as the time when all might hope to look on a paper promise to pay as equivalent to gold.

Most extraordinary pressure was brought to bear on the President to induce him to withhold his signature from the bill. Many of his warmest personal friends were ardent inflationists. Eminent bankers, merchants, men with the care of great railroad enterprises, by petition, by personal appeal, by letter, by telegraph, warned him of ruin to the country by forcing resumption.