that the grasp would not relax, nor the will relent, nor the energy weaken, which had proved, from the beginning, so indefatigable and irresistible.

Now, with Sherman moving northward, and certain to meet Schofield with a friendly army; with Sheridan back from his Staunton raid; with Thomas moving toward the railroad passes west of the Alleghenies; with Stoneman off on another raid from Tennessee into the Carolinas and thence toward Lynchburg; with Lee's failure at Fort Stedman;-let us open Grant's spring campaign of 1865 in and around Petersburg. Previous to Lee's attack on Grant's entrenchments at Fort Stedman, March 25th, he had called the attention of his government to the immense number of deserters from his army. This added to the dismay which existed. Lee attributed it to the discouraging sentiment outside of the army. On Feb. 3d a Confederate Commission composed of Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter and J. A. Campbell had met President Lincoln and Secretary Seward at Hampton Roads to ascertain whether negotiations for peace would be entertained in connection with some terms which might secure recognition of the Southern Confederacy. Their propositions were not agreed to, and, as Mr. Lincoln said, could not be "except on the basis of the disbandment of the insurgent forces and the recognition of the national authority throughout all the States of the Union." The President further said that "the complete restoration of the national authority everywhere was an indispensable condition to whatever form of peace might be proposed." Though Lee was not in sympathy with this Commission, he now, a month later, March 2d, 1865, wrote to Grant proposing an end of the controversy through a convention. Grant said he had no authority to accede.

On March 23d, Sherman and Schofield met at Goldsboro'. On the 22d, Lincoln paid General Grant a visit at City Point. On the 25th, Sherman, leaving Schofield in command, arrived

also at City Point. Admiral Porter was there. On the 28th, Grant's little hut was crowded with an illustrious company, Meade, Ord, Sheridan and others having been invited. It was not a council of war, but a free talk which embraced the entire situation and resulted in a full understanding of Grant's pur

poses and the part each was to bear in advancing them. These he had formulated and issued to Meade on March 24th. Sherman's first duty was to hold Johnston where he was, at Smithfield, or, if he moved, to demonstrate upon Raleigh, cross the Roanoke at Gaston, and move to Burkesville Junction of the Southside and Richmond and Danville railroads, or

join the Army of the Potomac as he might think best. Sheridan was to operate on Grant's left and be ready to aid Sherman if needed. Grant greatly feared that Lee would evacuate Petersburg and Richmond and escape capture. He felt sure that Sherman's crossing of the Roanoke would be the signal for him to leave. He had therefore a double

duty on hand; first, to retain and capture him; second, to be in position for hard and successful pursuit. He did not doubt that he would be equal to either task, and so shaped his movements. Lee was yet strong. His effectives on March 1st numbered sixty-three thousand. Grant had at his immediate disposal over one hundred thousand: sixty-nine thousand in the Army of the Potomac, twenty-seven thousand in the Army of the James, and thirteen thousand cavalry under Sheridan.

The orders to Meade involved a move on March 29th, those to Sheridan one on the 28th. The latter was to move his cavalry far enough south to avoid contact with the enemy, then turn and pass to Dinwiddie Court House on the Boydton plank road, and thence operate northward and westward against the right and rear of the enemy. To support Sheridan, Meade was to make a westward movement, keeping well covered, and if possible extending his entrenchments. Parke and Wright were to hold in front of Petersburg, Ord was to relieve the Second Corps, now commanded by Humphreys, on the extreme left of the lines. On the morning of the 29th, Warren's Fifth and Humphrey's Second were to cross Hatchers' Run and march northwesterly, with four days' rations.

Warren was in motion at 3 A. M., Humphreys at 6 A. M. At nine o'clock Grant left City Point for the scene of operations. The President wished him and his officers God speed, "Goodbye, gentlemen," he said, "God bless you all; and remember your success is my success." The Federal extreme left extended to Hatchers' Run, and Ord held it. Both Warren and Humphreys crossed the run and swung northward. Humphreys did not disconnect his right from Ord, but turned on it, faced eastward, and stretched his left to Dabny's Mill. Warren marched further northward, connected with Humphrey's left, and extended his own to and beyond the Boydton plank near Burgess' Mill. Lee did not attack. The Federal front now reached from the Appomattox at Petersburg to Hatchers' Run, and thence northward to the Boydton plank. That evening Sheridan was at Dinwiddie, five miles westward. Grant sent him word: "Our line is now unbroken from Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all from Jerusalem plank road to Hatchers' Run whenever the force can be used advantageously. . . . I feel now like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back In the morning push round the enemy and get on his right rear.

.. We will all act together as one army until it is seen what can be done with the enemy."

Heavy rains and bad roads almost stagnated operations. Officers and men were dejected. Some of the former suggested a return, and feared that Johnston might attack in the rear. “I wish he would," said Grant, "I would turn round and dispose of him and then be free to attack Lee." During the inaction Sheridan rode over from Dinwiddie to Grant's headquarters. He proved full of the spirit of battle, and returned with instructions to get possession of Five Forks within two miles of the Southside railroad. If this point were gained Lee could not remain in Petersburg. Warren now extended his left well across the Boydton plank. Sheridan pushed a division northward from Dinwiddie, but found the enemy in force at Five Forks. Humphreys drove the Confederates close behind their entrenchments on Hatchers' Run. All the other corps commanders felt their fronts, and Wright and Parke said they could assault successfully. This was evidence that Lee had thrown his forces to his right.

Grant now offered to detach the Fifth Corps (Warren's) and place it at Sheridan's disposal. Then an attack was to be made on the enemy, who were rapidly fortifying Five Forks. At the same time an assault should be made all along the entrenchments. But Lee knew full well the importance of Five Forks to him, and was massing on the White Oak road to attack Warren's left. Warren was ordered to contract his lines and Sheridan notified to protect his rear. But Warren extended his lines, which were attacked on the morning of March 31st. Ayres' division was struck from the north and on its left flank and hurled suddenly back upon Crawford's division. The Confederates pressed on and forced both Ayres and Crawford upon Griffin, who fortunately held his men till the other two officers could reform behind him. Humphreys sent up Miles to Warren's aid, and the Confederate onset was