come and reinforce Sherman, when he should appear after his march from "Atlanta to the Sea."

During these splendid and thrilling operations in the Shenandoah Valley, Sheridan's forces never exceeded thirty thousand effectives. Early's forces were quite as numerous. The Federal losses in all the engagements footed, 1938 killed; 11,893 wounded; 3121 missing; total, 16,952. Early's losses in killed and wounded were doubtless as many, while he lost thirteen thousand as prisoners; making a total of, say twentyseven thousand. He lost in addition one hundred pieces of artillery and five thousand small arms, besides other valuable property. The campaign fully vindicated Grant's choice of a lieutenant, and his wisdom in consolidating the hitherto discordant departments around Washington. It gave further evidence of his ability to cope with Lee in that strategy which was designed to distract attention from Petersburg or to take advantage of the absence of northern armies from the vicinity of Washington. Not a single probability, or actual phase of the situation had been overlooked, and every contingency was met as fast as it arose. More than all, it had been so met as to count infinitely against Lee, by the crippling of his cavalry, the virtual breaking up of one of his largest corps de armée, and the loss of enough artillery to supply two or three efficient corps.

We must now return to the operations around Petersburg. During the compulsory absence of the Sixth Corps and most of the cavalry from the Army of the Potomac, military operations about the beleaguered city, and indeed on the south side of the James, were mostly of a defensive character. We have seen what these were up to July, or in other words, up till the time of the withdrawal of forces for the protection of Washington and for the Valley campaigns. In general, July and August were devoted to strengthening the entrenchments from the Appomattox to the Jerusalem plank road on the south of Petersburg. Siege batteries were erected and strongly mounted,

redoubts were built at commanding points, and by September 12th the railroad from City Point supplied the entire lines with ammunition and supplies.

But the monotony of the situation was often broken by sudden and startling events and by strategic tests and trials of strength. For days, at times, the firing from some newly erected fort, or from all, would be almost incessant. To dig, to build, to push, on the south of Petersburg till the Weldon railroad was reached was a supreme object on the part of Grant. But the enemy had cut off hope of getting much beyond the Jerusalem plank road by a system of formidable works. The strength of these must however be tried-not directly, to be sure, but perhaps they could be turned and rendered useless. The trial fell on the Second Corps. Mott and Barlow were thrown forward. Their movement left a gap between the Second and Sixth which the Confederates took advantage of. Swarming from behind their works into the opening, they struck the flanks of these two advancing divisions and virtually swept them away. Rushing on, they rolled up Gibbon's division, capturing guns, works and two thousand five hundred prisoners. This vigorous onslaught forced a contraction of the Federal left, and a strict defensive in that quarter for several weeks.

Again the work of building, mining and besieging went on, more methodically, if possible, than ever. The operations against the Petersburg front, opposed by the Ninth and Fifth Corps, were ordered to be conducted by regular approaches. In Burnside's corps was a regiment of Pennsylvania miners, under Colonel Pleasants. These sunk a shaft and drove a gallery one hundred and fifty yards to the front, and directly under a Confederate work on Cemetery Hill. Lateral galleries were run into it making a system of mines, which were loaded with gunpowder. There were eight magazines in all, each primed with four thousand pounds of powder. Grant thought advantage might be taken of the explosion to storm success

fully the Confederate works. But he would first weaken their force by a diversion, and perhaps do more.

The Second Corps was (July 26th) quietly withdrawn from the investing lines and crossed over the pontoon bridges (July 27th) to the north side of the James at Deep Bottom. Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, followed it. Foster of the Tenth held the bridges. Bailey's creek runs into the James on the north side at Deep Bottom. The enemy were found in force behind and on the Richmond side of this creek. Hancock deployed with Sheridan on his right. Foster was asked to swing in on the left, which he did very swiftly, driving the enemy and capturing four guns. Sheridan forced the fighting on the right and was equally successful. He captured four hundred prisoners. The enemy were now behind their breastworks and fully protected. It was the night of July 28th. Lee now hurried all the troops he could spare, cavalry and infantry, to the endangered point. On the morning of July 29th, Hancock was confronted by an entrenched force, three times the number of his own. While it was intended that Sheridan should make a dash upon Richmond, supported by Hancock, if the way proved open, or an unsupported raid upon the railroads to the north, the real object of the expedition was now accomplished, viz.: the diversion of Lee's strength to the north side of the James. Therefore, on the night of the 29th of July, Hancock and Sheridan both speedily and quietly withdrew to the south side of the river, and took their places about Petersburg.

At the same time Ord, now in command of the Eighteenth Corps, and Turner's division of the Tenth, were given a place in the lines. The explosion of the mine and the assault were fixed for morning of July 30th, at half-past three. Full and express orders were issued to all the corps commanders when to move and what to do. Burnside was to prepare his parapets and abattis for the passage of columns, have his pioneers

equipped to open passages for artillery, destroy the enemy's abattis, and secure lodgments. Warren was to support Burnside's assault. Ord was to put Mott's division in the entrenchments of the Eighteenth Corps, and form his troops in the rear of the Ninth. Hancock was to be up from Deep Bottom, and in position in Mott's rear ready to follow up the assault. Sheridan was to operate on the enemy's left against the roads leading to Petersburg from the south As soon as the explosion took place, Burnside was to move rapidly on the breach, seize the crest, and effect a lodgment. Ord was to follow on the right and Warren on the left. All the artillery within range was to open on those points of the enemy's works whose fire covered the ground over which the assaulting columns must

move.

These orders were carried out strictly by all the commanders, except Burnside. His parapets and abattis were not prepared for the columns of attack. His pioneers were not ready for effective work, nor were his entrenching tools distributed. Meade, in an interview with Burnside, Wilcox, Potter and Ledlie, on the 29th, impressed on them the necessity of taking advantage of the enemy's confusion to gain the crest beyond, that the holding of the crater would be of no possible use, and that if the assault was unsuccessful, the troops must be withdrawn at once.

The mine was on the Confederate General Johnson's front at the centre of Elliott's brigade. Wise's brigade was on Elliott's right, Ransom's on his left, Gracie's on Ransom's leít. A defect in the fuse delayed the firing of the mine till twenty minutes to five. Then the earth shivered and broke, an entire battery and part of two regiments vanished, and a great chasm yawned. The Confederates were surprised and fled in dismay from that part of the line, not knowing when the next explosion might take place, nor where. Now the Federal heavy guns and mortars, eighty-one in all, and an equal number of