turned successfully. They had gradually narrowed the enemy's fighting ground north of the Chickahominy. They had secured the roads leading to the James below Richmond. The losses had been heavy, but the advantages far more than compensated for them.

Grant was quick to push his opportunity. That night Hancock was ordered to the left of Wright's Sixth. This would stretch the left of the army almost, if not quite, to the Chickahominy. But the weather was hot, the roads dusty and unknown, and the march was confused. Not until daylight of June 2d did he reach Cold Harbor, twelve miles from his starting point. His men were worn out and rest was necessary. Therefore the attack by the left which was projected for the early morning was forcibly suspended till the afternoon. This continued subtraction of force from the right of the army left it at Bethesda Church, which Burnside's Ninth held. It was marching southward by the curious and tedious process of swinging an extreme right wing continually to the extreme left. The fighting too was almost continuous, for the Confederates were always trying Grant's front to find out what he was doing. To be sure they tried cautiously, and never very effectively, yet often insignificant skirmishes rose to the dignity of sharp battles between opposing brigades and divisions. All in all it was simply wonderful how Lee adhered to his system of fighting only under cover and retaining a shrewd and stubborn defensive. In this generalship he was so persistent as to lose many brilliant opportunities, and it was to overcome this that Grant was compelled to resort to that splendid series of movements by his respective flanks which have no parallel in military history and by means of which he was constantly nearing his destination and effecting his daring purposes.

On June 2d Wilson returned to Grant's right from an expedition to destroy the Virginia Central as far as Hanover Court House, and thus to prevent any accession of strength to Lee

from the Valley. Sheridan was well to the left, covering all approaches to the White House, and seizing and holding the crossings of the lower Chickahominy. Lee detected again Grant's movement to the left, and again he shifted to counteract it. Breckinridge's command, which had some time before reinforced him from the west, was thrown to his right, with parts of Hill's corps. Hoke and Anderson held his centre, and Early and Heth his left. His lines reached six miles from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor, a mile and a half nearer Richmond than Old Cold Harbor, or Cold Harbor proper. Grant's lines were a little longer, reaching from Bethesda Church where Burnside lay, through Warren's, Smith's and Wright's commands respectively, to the left at and below Old Cold Harbor held by Hancock. Hunter was approaching Staunton in the Valley, and his condition had to be looked to before Grant could make another swing to the left and leave all northern and inland communications behind.

Grant's left was now on the ground which McClellan had made historic in 1862 during the Peninsular campaign. There was Gaine's Mill, with the entrenchments behind which the Federals had fought, in numbers greater than those which Grant now commanded, Lee then being the attacking party. Now Lee was on the defensive there and behind even stronger entrenchments, from which he dare not sally to assume the aggressive. Armies and commanders were not the same as before, at least not in spirit.

As Lee's right approached the Chickahominy it gained the protection afforded by the thickets and marshes of that stream. There was therefore almost an end to further hope of turning it. But Grant was not dissuaded from a blow by this consideration. Though the attack designed for the afternoon of June 2d, which it was hoped Hancock would be sufficiently rested to make, was postponed, one of a more general and formidable character was projected for the next day, June 3d.

Hancock was to move in the early morning. Barlow and Gibbon were pushed forward through the mists and swamps, supported by Birney. The enemy's fire was terrific, the jungle thick, the marshes deep. Still the Federals pushed on undauntedly. Barlow struck the Confederates in a hollow road and drove them out. Pursuing them into their entrenchments he captured several hundred prisoners and three pieces of artillery. But his success was short-lived. He was not supported by a second line with sufficient promptitude. The Confederates rallied, raked the entrenchments with an enfilading fire and drove Barlow out, but only back to a friendly knoll close by, which he entrenched and held. Gibbon, on Barlow's right was equally successful at first in gaining the enemy's breastworks, but met with a similar fate in the end. Wright's Sixth moved simulta

open

neously with Hancock. His
charge was gallant and deter-
mined. He cleared the enemy's
rifle pits, but could make no
impression on the principal
works. Smith had an
front. He pushed Martindale
and Brooks upon the enemy
with great bravery, but lost his
connection with the Sixth and
had to re-establish it. His men
suffered terribly during the first
assault. But they were re-

GENERAL WRIGHT.

formed, the lost connection with the Sixth was made, and a second assault attempted. The fire was enfilading, destructive, and could not be silenced. By eleven o'clock he announced to

Meade that his last four regiments were in line, but he dared not order them to attack till supported by Warren on their right. Warren had not attacked vigorously owing to the length of his

lines. Burnside was to support him, but he had pushed further to the right, not without advantage, however, for both Griffin of the Fifth and Wilcox of the Ninth, had struck a strongly fortified enemy in that direction.

While these assaults were extending from left to right, they were being repeated again on the left. The investment of the enemy's lines was close in the extreme, and the tenacity with which he clung to his cover was something marvelous. Not even the inducement to pursue and capture the columns which battered in vain against his breastworks, and retired broken into shreds, could bring him from behind his barriers. But while flashes of battle broke out here and there along those close lines, there was no other general assault on June 3d. At noon Grant took a view of the situation, heard the opinions of all the corps commanders, and made up his mind what to do. It was evident that the enemy's lines could not be broken, unless better opportunity offered. If such existed, the Federal army was in a condition to find it. Its position was not dangerous, for Lee would not attack. As long as Lee's fortifications were hugged so tightly, he could not withdraw with safety. And then-singular determination-Lee was far more harmless, hampered and tied up where he was, than if behind the fortifications of Richmond. This pre-eminently wise conclusion was not reached by simple study of the local situation, but after consulting the entire field of operations. Grant had to look to every point of responsibility, to widely distant fields, to other generals, armies, and projects than those under his immediate eye. He had to think for those in remote sections, and plan incessantly that a common success might ensue. would therefore hold Lee there for the time being, watch vigilantly, and attack at any and every opportunity. “It is necessary to keep him here till Hunter can reach Lynchburg from Staunton." Halleck had proposed to reinforce him by sending him the Nineteenth Corps. He refused it, and said.

He

that if there were any spare troops in the west they should be organized and sent against Mobile. He sent plans, however, for organizing the Sixteenth Corps in West Tennessee, and directed the repairs of the railroad from the White House to his army.

All the corps commanders were ordered to entrench and hold their fronts. Firing continued all day, sometimes fiercely, then dying away to desultory volleys of musketry. Once during the afternoon, a severe battle was on along Burnside's front, during which he punished the enemy severely, causing him to retreat, leaving his dead on the field. The losses of the day were heavy on the Federal side. Officers and men fought with reckless daring, and the mortality among the former was very marked. The total losses to the Federals, killed, wounded and missing, on June 3d, were seven thousand, and the losses since crossing the Pamunkey footed up ten thousand. Those of the Confederates were less, since they fought only on the defensive and under cover. They probably did not exceed three thousand on June 3d, and five thousand since the crossing of the Pumunkey. Grant himself reported "his own loss as heavy, that of the enemy light, as I think. It was the only attack made, from the Rapidan to the James, which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own."

General Grant has been censured for this battle But he knew the situation better than any one else. Every defensive position Lee took was a challenge. Grant accepted, tried the fortunes of war; if not able to conquer, tried the power of strategy. Lee was now at the Chickahominy, his last natural defence, the watery ditch which protected Richmond on the north. If crushed here, he might be followed, and in the rout, his capital taken. If avoided by a further flank movement-and the next movement of that kind was to find Grant on the south side of the James, as he hoped-then the army was in for a siege of Richmond. Grant never entered upon a