would then be in a position to receive an attack, make one, or resume its southerly march.

Even before this disposition of forces could be completed, it was discovered that Lee had bent every energy to strike Grant's flank ere he could dispose himself for battle. The roads running eastward from Orange Court House, and crossing Grant's line of march at right angles, favored his design. Warren's forward movement had scarcely begun before the enemy were uncovered in force. One regiment of Wilson's cavalry had been swept away. Warren's covering division, Crawford's, was quickly deployed for action. Information of the situation was sent to the rear.

Orders came from Meade to Warren to force the fighting and develop Lee's strength and intention. Word was sent to Hancock to halt at Todd's Tavern and await developments. Sedgwick was ordered to push westward from the Germanna road and connect with the Fifth Corps, on the Orange pike. Grant came to the front with Meade, and the two took position on a knoll in an open space near Wilderness Tavern.

By noon the position of the enemy was sufficiently made out to warrant attack. Warren ordered Griffin's and Wadsworth's divisions into action. The enemy's force in front was Ewell's. The Federal assault was determined and successful, though made through thickets that prevented any kind of order. The Confederates were driven back nearly a mile, pursued by Griffin's division. But Sedgwick's corps, owing to the density of the woods, had not yet pushed forward sufficiently to connect with Warren's right, occupied by Griffin. This officer, therefore, found his flank exposed, especially, since he had gone on in advance of the lines. The Confederates seized this opportunity to rally and attack. They made a merciless onslaught on Griffin's exposed right, forced him back rapidly, and captured two guns and a number of prisoners. Wadsworth was also driven back, and Crawford was thus left in a nearly

isolated position, and suffered a severe loss of men, mostly as prisoners. There was a decidedly panicky condition throughout the divisions of Warren's corps at this juncture. Everything was rendered very uncertain by the peculiarity of the ground, and the impossibility of alignment and concert, owing to the thick dwarf pines and absence of roads. But, fortunately, the Confederates were in no condition to follow their advantage. They had evidently been surprised at finding a battle forced on them, while, as yet, unprepared for it. They stopped pursuit and began to entrench for the purpose of holding what they had recovered. As it turned out they were in really a desperate strait, for Ewell was on the Confederate left, and had it been turned as the Federal assault presaged, Lee's whole army would have been in danger.

When Grant was informed of the Federal repulse, he rode immediately to Warren's position. Such a glance as could be had through thicket and overhanging smoke told the necessity of holding it at all hazards. The lines must close promptly there. It would be a centre commanding the Orange turnpike. Sedgwick could make it strong on the right. Hancock, who was already past Todd's Tavern on his way to Shady Grove Church, could be whirled in on the left by way of the Brock road, and thus the lines would stretch across the Orange plank road. Burnside would make a strong reserve as soon as he was entirely across the Rapidan. Therefore, Grant issued urgent orders through Meade to all these corps commandersto Warren to hold his central position, to Sedgwick to make strong and prompt connection on Warren's right, to Burnside to make all haste with his reserve corps, but especially to Hancock to push with all energy back and westward, so as to close the ugly gap which existed between Warren's left and his right. The Orange plank road ran directly through this gap, and along it the Confederate Hill was driving his corps with great rapidity. The only obstacle to him was Getty's division

of the Sixth Corps, which had been thrown out along the Orange plank road, to its junction with the Brock road, with orders to resist the Confederate advance as stoutly as possible, and until Hancock should have time to come up to his support.

Hill dashed ahead, expecting to completely turn the Federal left at this point, but he encountered Getty, who stood obstinately in his way, and fought him with such desperation as to prevent him reaching the Brock cross road and marching north against Warren's left as he had designed. This gave Hancock time to get up. He fortified and held the line of the Brock road and made close connection with Warren, thus becoming the left of the Federal army, and presenting a firm obstacle to Hill's further advance along the Orange plank. It was now 4.15 in the afternoon. Word came to Getty to attack Hill, and to Hancock to support him with his entire corps. Then began a determined advance through thicket and over brush. The lines of battle were close, and friend and foe were often mixed in the dense forest mazes. Birney's and Mott's divisions were ordered in by Hancock at once, and soon his entire corps was in the midst of the fray, and entirely outside of its line of works on the Brock road. Hays was killed and Getty was wounded, but refused to leave the field. For hours the infantry firing was incessant, and the issue doubtful. It was apparently a life and death struggle with muskets and rifles in that lonely forest, for neither cavalry nor artillery could be brought into effective service.

And it was not only on Grant's left and with Hill that the battle raged. Warren's corps breasted a fresh storm from Ewell, and Sedgwick's on the right had been ordered in to turn the Confederate left, just as Hill was attempting to turn

the Federal left. Night was coming and neither force was making headway. Grant ordered Wadsworth's division, and Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division, toward Parker's Store to relieve the pressure on Hancock. Guided only by the compass or the sound of battle where apparently hottest, they made tedious and imperilled headway, as a band of skirmishers rather than a formidable force. It was night when they arrived in front of Hill, and the sounds of battle had ceased.

Wilson, with his cavalry, had

been isolated by Hill's march along the Orange plank. Sheridan. expected he would return by a detour to Todd's Tavern. He sent Gregg there to meet him. It was a fortunate move. The Confederate cavalry, moving from Hamilton crossing on the railroad running south from Fredericksburg, had struck Wilson on his detour, and a hot fight had taken place. Wilson had cut his way through, and was pushing for the tavern, followed by the enemy. On Gregg's arrival, they turned on the pursuers, and after a severe action drove them entirely off. Sheridan now concentrated so as to hold the country from Shady Grove Church to Todd's Tavern, proceeded to cover the roads running to Spottsylvania Court House, protect the Federal left, and guard the supply trains in the rear.

GEN. WILSON.

Thus this day of hard conflict and great uncertainty ended. Night gave time for reflection, consultation and much needed rest. It was evident that two stubborn armies were firmly set face to face, and that hours of hard fighting had yielded nothing that looked like decided advantage to either. Yet there were results of mighty moment to Grant and his army,