Hunter, and dispatched him to Banks with full and peremptory instructions. They were to the effect that if after the capture of Shreveport he had turned toward Texas, he should retrace his steps at once and concentrate for the proposed move on Mobile. Hunter was to stay to see that the Mobile expedition was put under way. Three days after Hunter started, word came that Banks had been defeated near Pleasant Hill, and forced to retreat to Grand Ecore with the loss of his supplies. Thus the Red River expedition terminated in disaster. Grant felt greatly chagrined, for now Sherman could hope for no help from Banks. The large force of the latter, thirty thousand strong, would be neutralized for the balance of the season. All Grant's suggestions as to a change of officers west of the Mississippi were ignored, and he was forced to leave the situation there wrapped in cloud, in order to hasten final preparations for his immediate spring campaigns. Word was coming in that his plans were being met with great promptitude. Gillmore reported that his troops had been withdrawn from the Carolinas. Butler was massed at Gloucester Point, on the York river, as if a movement on Richmond, north of the James, were intended. On May 1st, Sigel reported the occupation of Winchester. Crook and Averill were well on toward the Kanawha. Sherman reported his army as ready to move from Chattanooga. Burnside was ordered into position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock, close to Meade's rear. A fleet of iron clads was sent to the James to co-operate with Butler. A little flurry occurred when Sigel reported that Lee was moving into the Shenandoah Valley, evidently bent on another invasion of the North. "Let him go," said Grant; “I will follow with force enough to prevent his return South." It turned out that the forces Sigel had seen were those of Longstreet, on their way from East Tennessee to join Lee. At last the mighty machine was ready in all parts to move. Rain, and a backward, cold spring had postponed the final order for some days, but at length there went forth from the silent man at Culpeper word which was to put to final test the armies and causes of the respective governments. Never such a big fate hung on one man's word. To Butler, "Start your forces on the night of the 4th, so as to be as far up the James as you can on the morning of the 5th of May." To Halleck, "When we move from here cannot the bridges between Bull Run and the Rappahannock be held by troops from Washington ?" To Halleck, again, "Say to Burnside not to leave his position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock before May 5th." To Sherman, "Get your forces up, so as to move by May 5th. All will strike together." To Meade, "You will move according to the orders issued." To Burnside, on the 3d of May, "All General Meade's troops will be away from Brandy Station to-morrow morning." Finally to Halleck, at 12.30 P. M. of May 3d, "This army moves tomorrow morning." That night, at Culpeper, Grant detailed all his plans to his staff. It was a lengthy, earnest, momentous consultation. The plans were so comprehensive, the results which hung on them so stupendous, the chances so various, the obstacles so formidable, that no one man was buoyant, though all were trustful and determined. Grant's spirit was the least moved among them, and his vision was the clearest. Two days before, he had received the following from the President: "EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, April 30th, 1864. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT: Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way, my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or the capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting, which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know. “And now, with a brave army and just cause, may God sustain you. "Yours very truly, Grant's reply was: "A. LINCOLN." "HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "Culpeper Court House, Va., May 1st, 1864. "THE PRESIDENT: Your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future, and satisfaction for the past, in my military administration, is acknowledged with pride. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint —have never expressed nor implied a complaint against the administration or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. And since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility, and the importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you. "Very truly, your obedient servant, "U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." Thus the political and military chieftains of the nation entered harmoniously and supportingly upon this momentous campaign, each conscious of their desire to do right, whatever might betide; each relying on the bravery and discipline of their soldiers; each trusting in that overruling Providence which establishes the just cause even at the expense of anxious delay and much sacrifice. CHAPTER XIII. THE WILDERNESS. In wees and move by his right the previous chapter we saw why Grant determined to flank. Bearing this in mind, let us see how, with what force, and against what opposition he did it. In counting men and comparing forces, the reader must remember that Confederate official figures show only the men of a command present and fit for duty on any given date. The Federal official figures show all the men enrolled on any given date. The latter figures are therefore always in excess of the men actually present and fit for duty. The per cent. of this excess can be safely set down at about eighteen. Thus Grant found an enrolled army of 662,345 men on May 1st, 1864, but an equipped and dutiable army of 533,447, a difference of over eighteen per cent. This was the entire Federal forces in all the Departments. Lee's army, called the Army of Northern Virginia, occupied during the winter and spring of 1864 a fine defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan. Its right rested on Mine Run, its left on the foothills of the Blue Ridge. Ewell, with one of the three corps into which the army was divided, held the right, protected by Mine Run and by an almost impenetrable tangle of pine woods, called the "Wilderness," which extended for many miles south. Hill held the left with another corps, well protected by the Blue Ridge and the Rapidan. J. E. B. Stuart had command of the Confederate cavalry. The third infantry corps, commanded by Longstreet, lay in the rear, among the hills at Gordonsville. Besides the Rapidan, with difficult fords and steep banks, the entire front of this army was artificially well protected by lines of breastworks, which made a successful front attack impossible. Its strength was 75,391 men, as nearly as may be, with probably 224 field pieces. The strength of the Federal army, including the Army of the Potomac, 97,273, and the Ninth Corps, 19,613, was, on the morning of May 4th, 1864, 116,886 men, with 322 field pieces. Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott 1st Brigade, 8 Reg'ts, Brig. Gen. Alex. S. Webb. Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Owen. 1st Brigade, 9 Reg'ts, Brig. Gen. J. H. H. Ward. 1st Brigade, 9 Reg'ts, Col. Robert McAllister. Corps Artillery Brigade, 11 Batteries, Col. John C. Tidball. Corps Artillery Brigade, 11 Batteries, Col. Chas. S. Wainwright. |