ciple of concentrated, co-operative action, splendid victories resulted. Most of all had this been made apparent by that union of departments and concert of forces which brought Grant to Chattanooga and paved the way for that great victory and the relief of East Tennessee. But while the government was willing to accept a logic which was clear-to wit, the necessity for combined movement of all its armies under a single, clearheaded, fearless and faithful leadership, it had not as yet struck the man in whose genius it could have implicit confidence. The amiable and popular McClellan, the wellmeaning and over prudent Halleck, had fallen short in the essentials necessary to make victories sure and profitable. They therefore failed to inspire the authorities with that hard, severe, unquestioned confidence whose existence only could justify the placing of supreme control of the armies and the destinies of the country absolutely in their hands.

At a very early period in the war, Secretary Stanton had become impressed with the importance of unified superintendence and effort under a general of capacity. It required the stirring events, the victories, the failures, the arguments, the admonitions of 1863, to force the idea along and make it a conviction in places where it could be given effective and tangible shape. General Grant's growth as a successful commander, his organizing force, his genius, his skill, his persistency, his wonderful grasp of situations, his tactical powers, his repeated victories, his freedom from political affiliations and offensive jealousies, the confidence reposed in him by all the officers and men of the armies, and now by the government and country, greatly simplified the labor and lightened the responsibility of preparing for and choosing a suitable generalin-chief.

And another thing that now impelled more strongly than ever to the adoption of the principle of unified command was the political and general military outlook. The Confederate

schemes to carry the war into the North, which had been the central feature of their operations in 1863, had failed, but they were to be supplemented by the disintegrating and demoralizing political doctrine of 1864, introduced into the National Democratic platform at Chicago, that the "war for the Union" had been a failure and should be abandoned. In the face of such a doctrine it would not do to push a contest for any great length of time without crowning it with frequent and substantial victories. And these victories were demanded from the very nature of the contest at the dawn of 1864, for it was plain that a crisis had been reached. The energies of the Confederacy had been taxed to the uttermost, yet it was a vigorous, determined unit. The energies of the Union had been largely, though not so exhaustively, drawn upon, and it was as much committed to its policy of peace, only through conquest, as the Confederacy itself. The issue was clearer than ever before. Defeat of either side meant its ruin more than ever before. And the scale must soon turn decidedly one way or the other. The war had not been uniformly progressive in its Eastern theatre. In its Western, during 1863, it had been active and aggressive on the part of the Federals, and productive of most substantial fruits. Was this an indication? It was so received by the country. And it was an inspiration as well. It determined much, or helped to. It made the theory of firmer and more concentrated effort conspicuous. It induced the spirit of rally for an effective and final blow. Such a blow would necessarily be more difficult than any to deliver, for Federal successes could only result in driving the Confederates closer together, compacting their forces, shortening their defensive lines, giving them the advantage of striking from a centre upon more widely diffused but gradually concentrating lines. All the factors of former Federal victories must now be present in tenfold force. There must be no frittering away of time, no waste of precious

energy, no discordant policies, no defensive tactics, no strategy, that was not bold and aggressive, no lack of concentration, no divided military councils, no fear of consequences. As the issues were clear and closely joined, so the arbiters-the armies must be kept face to face, in close contact, perpetual meeting, till a verdict was signed, sealed, delivered and published to the world.

The bill to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the armies of the United States, which had been introduced by Hon. Elihu B. Washburne, soon after the battle of Chattanooga, was making slow progress in the Congress, but was gradually ripening for final passage. The instincts of legislators, spurred by the sentiment of the country, by study of the situation, and by all outward, determining circumstances, forced a result on February 26th, 1864, when both Houses sanctioned the bill. The President approved it on the first day of March, and immediately nominated General Grant to an office which had not existed since 1798, when the grade of lieutenant-general was tendered as an honorary offering to General Washington, who held it for one year, when it was discontinued. In 1855 it was conferred by brevet on Major General Winfield Scott.

The authorities at Washington, outside of the Congress, neither favored nor opposed this bill while it was pending. They were convinced of its efficacy, and those who were connected with war affairs, including the President, felt that the man for the mission was already in the foreground, but it was a grave measure, and the responsibility should not be detached from the people, the real source of power. Hitherto the grade had been honorary. Now it would carry a power altogether new, and be productive of lasting good or irremediable evil, as it was wielded wisely or foolishly.

Though sentiment had long previously pointed to Grant as the man to be trusted with this new honor and power, though

his name had been used in the Congress and his successes and genius pointed to as arguments in favor of combining all future military effort under one capable head, he used no influence, spoke no words, wrote no line to bring about the result. He was as quietly indifferent to the fate of the bill as if his name had never been mentioned in connection with it, yet amid that indifference there was no disposition to shrink from the responsibilities it imposed, should the country choose to call him to higher spheres of activity and more important services.

During the debates on the bill, and after his name had been mentioned in connection with it, Mr. Washburne said: "No man with his consent has ever mentioned his name in connection with any position. I say what I know to be true when I allege that every promotion he has received since he first entered the service to put down this rebellion was moved without his knowledge or consent. And in regard to this very matter of lieutenant-general, after the bill was introduced and his name mentioned in connection with it, he wrote me and admonished me that he had been highly honored by the government, and did not ask or deserve anything more in the shape of honors or promotion; and that a success over the enemy was what he craved above everything else; that he only desired to hold such influence over those under his command as to use them to the best advantage to secure that end."

On March 3d, 1864, Halleck sent the following dispatch to Grant:

"The Secretary of War directs that you will report in person to the War Department, as early as practicable, considering the condition of your command. If necessary you will keep up telegraphic communication with your command while en route to Washington."

The next day, March 4th, General Grant started for the capitol. His last orders to Sherman give a view of his plans

for the spring campaign. They directed that officer to guard all the Mississippi river posts, as far as practicable with colored troops, and concentrate his other forces at Memphis, so as to be ready for active operations after the winter had passed. This was with a view to a direct movement on Atlanta and Mobile, which Grant intended to lead in person, notwithstanding his promotion. Thomas was to fight his way southward to Atlanta. Then cutting loose from that point the army was to swing upon Mobile or Savannah, whichever should prove most inviting. For this purpose Sherman's, Thomas' and Schofield's armies were to co-operate, and he had no doubt of the ultimate success of his daring plans, for every indication favored his long entertained and oft repeated theory that while the Confederacy presented a strong circumference it was really weak at its centre. He therefore left for Washington with the intention of returning in ten or twelve days to Chattanooga to superintend his spring plans, and head the great offensive movement of his combined armies.

The spirit with which he received notice of his promotion and his orders to report at Washington, cannot be more fairly set forth than by his private letter to Sherman, which was forwarded with the official orders of March 3d:

"DEAR SHERMAN :-The bill reviving the grade of LieutenantGeneral in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately, in person, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order.

"Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I, how much of this success is due to the energy and skill of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.